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The negative impacts of climate change are particularly damaging for communities in low- 
and middle-income countries that have fewer resources available for adaptation. High-income 
countries have pledged $100 billion annually to support efforts to mitigate climate change and 
cope with its impacts. Grounded in principles of equity and restitution, international climate 
finance has tremendous potential to enable adaptation among the most vulnerable. Concern is 
growing, however, that international support for adaptation is not reaching those communities 
that need it most. Recent studies have shown that many international interventions fail to 
recognize the social and political underpinnings of climate vulnerability and can actually make 
inequality worse. Many have pointed to informal and entrenched systems of unequal power, such 
as clientelism and patrimonialism, as key obstacles to more equitable adaptation. Such informal 
institutions – unwritten codes and conventions that shape behavior – have long been seen by 
international actors as obstacles to equality.  
This dissertation explores the issue of informal power in climate finance, particularly how 
informal institutions shape equity in internationally financed adaptation. It is comprised of three 
separate analyses, each of which examines informal power at a different scale: global, national, 
and sub-national. At the global scale (Chapter 2), I examine the overall architecture of climate 
finance, focusing on the ways in which it differs from development aid. I find that climate 
finance is grounded in new principles of restitution, country ownership, and the use of climate 
specific criteria in decision-making. As a result, I argue, spaces are emerging within this 
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architecture for experimentation and risk-taking with new approaches to informal institutions in 
countries receiving international funding.  
Chapters 3 and 4 empirically investigate how informal institutions of clientelism and 
patrimonialism shape the equity of international adaptation projects targeted at the particularly 
vulnerable in Mauritius and Madagascar. Drawing on 105 interviews at the national level 
(Chapter 2), I find that government decision-makers in both countries directed project benefits 
through informal channels and used project resources as part of broader efforts to build political 
power. While outcomes in Mauritius were relatively equitable, outcomes were highly inequitable 
in Madagascar. I argue that these divergent outcomes can be explained by characteristics of each 
country’s institutional environment. 
At the sub-national level in Madagascar (Chapter 4), I investigate the distributional outcomes 
of the same adaptation project in its primary intervention sites. I test the hypothesis that 
households’ connections to the patronage structure of the state influenced access to project 
benefits. Analyzing 599 household surveys, I find that project benefits are strongly associated 
with household political connectivity. I further argue that access was influenced not only by 
connections to state patronage, but also the uneven movement of information and knowledge 
through informal community networks.  
These findings illustrate how informal power can influence internationally financed 
adaptation. New approaches are needed to ensure equity, especially in targeting funding to 
socially disadvantaged and politically marginalized groups. This dissertation therefore focuses 
on identifying opportunities and approaches to advance equity within current frameworks. In 
particular, I argue for focusing on equitable outcomes as much as inequitable ones. Taken 
together, the new spaces for experimentation within the overall architecture of climate finance 
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can combine with new approaches on ground to not only make adaption more equitable but also 




Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Global efforts to address the root causes of climate change have yielded little progress. The 
negative impacts of climate change are particularly damaging for communities in low- and 
middle-income countries that have fewer resources for adaptation. Under the United Nations 
(UN) Climate Convention,1 high-income countries recognize their historical responsibility for 
emissions and have committed to provide $100 billion annually to help low- and middle-income 
countries “fund actions that mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC, 
2020). These commitments are based on pragmatism as much as any notion of justice: financing 
played a key role in securing low- and middle-income countries’ support for the landmark 2015 
Paris Agreement, which aims to limit warming to manageable levels.  
International climate finance has tremendous potential to enable adaptation among vulnerable 
communities. The commitments made under the Convention represent a significant transfer of 
wealth from the global north to the global south (Ferrey, 2012). Broadly, this financing is 
underpinned by the principle of restitution, the idea that polluting countries should pay to clean 
up the mess they have caused (Gaines, 1991; Khan & Roberts, 2013; Roberts, 2009). This 
principle has rarely been applied in international contexts and it distinguishes climate finance 
from forms of international aid, such as development aid, that are based on principles of altruism 
(Moore, 2012). Financing for adaptation, in particular, is guided by the principle of equity: the 
 
 
1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
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idea that funding should target those most vulnerable to climate impacts (Grasso, 2010; 
Schalatek, 2019).  
Five years after the signing of the Paris Agreement, however, concerns are growing that 
international financing for adaptation is falling short. Part of this concern is focused on the 
inadequacy of funding to date, as well as the opaque manner in which it is delivered (Weikmans 
& Roberts, 2018). A large number of international actors are involved in moving funding from 
high-income (donor) countries to low- and middle-income (recipient) countries. These actors 
range from well-known organizations like the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development, to newer actors like the UN’s Green Climate Fund 
and the Gates Foundation. Recent studies have shown that such interventions, rather than 
enabling adaptation among the most vulnerable, have actually made inequality worse in targeted 
communities (Artur & Hilhorst, 2012; Eriksen et al., 2021; Mikulewicz & Taylor, 2020; 
Nightingale, 2017; Sovacool, 2018). This has contributed to calls for an increased focus on 
equity in climate finance, particularly efforts to direct funding to socially disadvantaged and 
politically marginalized groups (Pelling & Garschagen, 2019). Both equity and vulnerability are 
only vaguely defined under the Climate Convention, however, and the equity of climate finance 
has only rarely been analyzed below the national level (Barrett, 2014; Persson & Remling, 
2014). 
Many theorize that structural inequality in recipient countries prevents international support 
from reaching vulnerable groups (Eriksen et al., 2021; Marino & Ribot, 2012; Nightingale, 2017; 
Sovacool, Linnér, & Goodsite, 2015). It is well established that vulnerability is a product not 
only of geographic location and exposure to hazards, but also of social and political processes 
(Adger, 2006). Among the ways structural inequality manifests is through entrenched, unequal 
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power relationships, for example systems of clientelism and patrimonialism. Though they are 
often conflated, clientelism and patrimonialism differ in important ways. Clientelism 
encompasses a broad set of relationships, characterized by unequal power, in which lawmakers 
provide goods to individuals or groups in exchange for political support (Hicken, 2011; Stokes et 
al., 2013; van de Walle, 2009). Patrimonialism describes a situation where the administrative 
apparatus of the state is appointed by and responsible to the top leader (Brinkerhoff & 
Goldsmith, 2002). Patronage thus usually characterizes a more narrow set of relationships in 
which government workers are recruited and promoted for partisan connections (Hicken, 2011). 
In many states, such relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade the legal-administrative 
structure of the government. These systems are known as neopatrimonial (Bratton & Van de 
Walle, 1994). 
Patrimonialism and clientelism are just two of the more common forms of informal 
institutions: socially shared rules that are “created, communicated, and enforced outside 
officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, 725). In contrast to formal 
institutions, in which power is derived from written rules, power in informal institutions is often 
unwritten and embedded in personal relationships (North, 1990). In many countries, clientelism 
and patrimonialism intertwine with the official administration of the state and influence, among 
other things, the distribution of public goods (Van de Walle, 2002). Though clientelism and 
patrimonialism are often analyzed as distinct systems, in reality they often co-exist and blend 
into each other. Several recent studies have illustrated how these systems enable elites to 
dominate decision-making and disproportionately capture the benefits of internationally-financed 
adaptation interventions (Artur & Hilhorst, 2012; Nightingale, 2017; Sovacool, 2018).  
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Informal institutions have posed an intractable challenge for international actors, especially 
multilateral organizations (MOs) like the World Bank and UN. These MOs are historically 
rooted in Western political thought that tends to see informal institutions as competing with the 
official state, undermining democracy, and contributing to inequality (Mkandawire, 2009; 
Nanda, 2006; Thirkell-White, 2003). Starting in the 1990s, MOs dedicated a significant portion 
of international aid to reforming governance, seeking to remake recipient country governments 
following Western models (Booth, 2011). Many have argued that MOs’ inability to recognize 
how informal institutions shape behavior, particularly that of leaders and elites, contributed to 
the ineffectiveness of these reforms (Harrison, 2005; Thomas, 2007; Williams & Young, 1994). 
Though MOs’ have since made efforts to better account for informal power, there is little 
evidence that these efforts have meaningfully altered their approach (Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 
2015; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). 
Climate finance includes many of the same international actors as development aid. Critical 
adaptation scholars argue these actors’ apolitical approaches prevent them from recognizing and 
addressing structural inequality as a root cause of vulnerability to climate impacts (Eriksen et al., 
2021; Ireland & McKinnon, 2013; Taylor, 2014). These actors, they assert, can only ensure 
equitable adaptation if they directly challenge and overturn unequal power structures, including 
informal systems of clientelism and patrimonialism (Eriksen et al., 2015; Eriksen & Lind, 2009). 
Many have called for a fundamental rethinking of current ways of intervening, advocating for a 
“post-development” or even “post-adaptation” paradigm shift that decenters international actors 
(Eriksen et al., 2021; Ireland & McKinnon, 2013). Most agree on the need to localize and 
democratize adaptation decision-making within communities (Eriksen et al., 2015; Marino & 
Ribot, 2012; McCarthy, 2014; Mikulewicz, 2018). This discussion has been largely normative, 
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however, with little indication of what form “post-development” international financing for 
adaptation might take. 
The discussion has also overlooked similar research on international interventions in other 
contexts, especially development aid (Andrews, 2013; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2005; Evans, 
2004). Following the broad failure of MOs’ governance reforms, development and 
institutionalist scholars have suggested that international actors adopt a range of new approaches 
to institutions in the countries where they intervene. Some argue that actors should recognize the 
functionality of informal institutions and the circumstances under which they can complement, 
and even reinforce, official state institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2012). Others have argued for 
focusing on positive outcomes of institutions and seeking to understand why these outcomes 
occur (Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Grindle, 2004; Tendler, 1997). Most change, they argue, is 
incremental and driven primarily by local actors, especially elites (Wild et al., 2015). By building 
on existing institutional arrangements and partnering with local reform-minded actors, 
international actors can contribute to longer-term transformation toward more effective, 
accountable, and equitable systems in recipient countries (Levy, 2014). 
This dissertation explores the issue of informal power in climate finance, particularly how 
informal institutions shape equity in internationally financed adaptation. It is comprised of three 
separate analyses, each of which examines informal power at a different scale: global, national, 
and sub-national. It focuses on international public finance for climate change: the mobilization 
of financial resources in support of the public policy purpose of mitigating climate change and 
adapting to its impacts. The second chapter takes a broad view of the overall architecture of 
climate finance. The third and fourth chapters look specifically at projects implemented with 
financing from the Adaptation Fund, a multilateral climate fund under the UN Climate 
 6 
Convention that is guided by the principle of supporting adaptation among the “particularly 
vulnerable.”  
Chapter 1 identifies opportunities for new approaches to informal power emerging within the 
global architecture of climate finance. I first revisit the literature on the “institutional turn” in 
development aid, in which international actors sought to reform governance in recipient 
countries. Drawing on this literature, I argue that governance reforms largely failed to drive 
institutional change because these organizations were unable to recognize and grapple with how 
power, especially informal power, actually operates in many of these countries. I then 
demonstrate how climate finance differs from development aid and highlight how these 
structural differences create space for experimentation with new approaches to informal 
institutions and governance, including approaches proposed by development scholars. 
Chapter 2 investigates the circumstances that generate equitable outcomes in internationally 
financed adaptation. In a comparative case study, I examine the implementation of Adaptation 
Fund projects targeted at the “particularly vulnerable” in Mauritius and Madagascar. Drawing on 
105 interviews with policymakers and Adaptation Fund actors in each country, I seek to 
understand how informal power – specifically systems of clientelism and neopatrimonialism – 
shape government decision-making, distribution of project benefits, and equity of project 
outcomes. Do government decision-makers target the most vulnerable, as mandated by the 
Adaptation Fund? Or do they distribute benefits narrowly to political supporters, as is generally 
expected in clientelistic and neopatrimonial systems? Based on the findings, I argue that a “good 
enough” approach to internationally financed adaptation, which focuses as much on equitable 
outcomes as inequitable ones, may represent a viable pathway to build much needed alternative 
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institutional structures that challenge and bypass current entrenched systems of 
neopatrimonialism, clientelism, and rent-seeking.  
Chapter 3 illustrates how neglecting informal power risks reinforcing inequality in targeted 
communities. I employ a mixed-methods approach to examine community-level implementation 
of the Adaptation Fund project in Madagascar. I seek to measure distributional outcomes in the 
project’s primary implementation sites in the Alaotra-Mangoro region, specifically the 
relationship between household benefits and politically connectivity. Using a multilevel model, I 
analyze 599 household surveys collected from both participating and non-participating 
households. I consider the findings in the context of arguments for localizing and democratizing 
adaptation and argue that equitable outcomes can still emerge even in highly inequitable 
environments.  
Overall, I argue that international climate finance can advance equity in adaptation, 
particularly among socially disadvantaged and politically marginalized groups. To do so, 
however, international actors should approach informal institutions with nuance, recognizing 
how different institutional forms influence decision-making. Adaptation scholars and 
practitioners should focus as much on what is working as what is not working, especially the 
circumstances under which informal institutions can contribute to relative equity. Such an 
approach will enable international actors to develop concrete strategies to make adaptation more 
equitable within current frameworks, while also making progress towards transforming 
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Chapter 2 Rethinking Governance in International Climate 
Finance: Structural Change and New Approaches 
 
Introduction 
International public finance plays an increasingly prominent role in global efforts to combat 
climate change, especially in low- and middle-income countries.2 Under the UN Climate 
Convention (UNFCCC), “developed” countries pledged to provide financial support to 
“developing” countries’ efforts to mitigate emissions and adapt to negative climate impacts 
(UNFCCC, 2015).3 In the 2015 Paris Agreement, developed countries reaffirmed a pledge to 
mobilize $100 billion annually, and many vulnerable countries have come to rely on this 
financing to support a range of climate programs (UNFCCC, 2009). Some have gone so far as to 
say that this pledge, if met, would represent the largest sustained international wealth transfer in 
history (Ferrey, 2012). Though there is reason to question whether donor countries will meet 
their commitments, climate finance has grown rapidly in its scope and impact (Carty & Le 
Comte, 2018; Weikmans & Roberts, 2018).  
 
 
2 Although private finance comprises a significant portion of overall climate finance, I exclude it from this analysis 
because it is rarely accompanied by the sort of governance standards that are common in public finance. 
3 Under the UN Climate Convention (UNFCCC), countries are classified as either “developed” (Annex I) or 
“developing” (Annex II). I believe this to be an outdated paradigm that does not reflect the dynamism of countries’ 
economies, cultures, values, and capacities. Nevertheless, it is preserved not just in the language of the UNFCCC, 
but in its operational structure. I prefer to use the terms “donor” and “recipient,” which more accurately reflects 
countries’ relative positions in the architecture of climate finance, and international public finance at large. 
Throughout this paper I will use the terms “donor” and “recipient,” except when referring directly to the UNFCCC, 
or when the language reflects that of previous scholarship on the topic. 
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As international climate finance grows, it faces the familiar challenge of governance. In 
recent years, multilateral organizations (MOs) tasked with oversight have faced growing pressure 
to not only prevent corruption and financial mismanagement of international resources, but also 
to ensure equity in their distribution (Khan, Robinson, & Weikmans, 2019). At first glance, 
MOs’ approach appears to be continuation of policies developed during decades of international 
aid, in particular interventions that promoted “good governance” and “institution building.” 
These reforms – which focused on reconfiguring public institutions in recipient countries into 
rule-bound systems – are now seen as largely ineffective in generating change (Booth, 2012; 
Evans, 2004; Repucci, 2012). 
The assumption that the approach to governance in climate finance is unchanged, however, 
overlooks important structural differences between climate finance and development aid. 
Arguing on the grounds that climate finance is restitution, not aid, recipient countries have forced 
a meaningful shift in decision-making authority away from traditional-donor recipient 
frameworks. This shift has disrupted the established channels through which international public 
finance flows into national governments. It has opened up new forums, dominated by recipient, 
not donor, countries, offering spaces for experimentation with new approaches to governance.  
In order to understand the significance of these new opportunities, the first section of this 
paper reviews literature that evaluates what led to the ineffectiveness of governance reforms tied 
to development aid. Critiques of these reforms vary, but a consistent thread emerges: MOs and 
development agencies (DAs) have been unable to recognize and grapple with how power 
actually works in recipient countries. Dominated by the perspectives of donors, they relied on a 
narrow understanding of governance grounded in a Western, liberal-rational worldview. This 
worldview led them to base their interventions on assumptions about the relationship between 
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the individual, society, and the state that applied to few, if any, of the countries receiving aid. 
Governance interventions focused on formal, rather than informal power, rewriting rules and 
altering incentives that did little to change the behavior of citizens or government officials, 
resulting in ineffective reforms and superficial institutional change.  
In the second section, I demonstrate how international climate finance is different. I argue 
that the shifts in decision-making power and structural changes in climate finance create specific 
opportunities for recipient country representatives to experiment with ways to engage with 
informal power in governance. I first highlight three new principles underlying climate finance: 
(1) that it is restitution not aid; (2) that recipient countries should control financing; and, (3) that 
decision-making should be driven by climate-specific criteria. I illustrate how each new principle 
has produced shifts in decision-making power away from donor and toward recipient countries, 
and how each creates new opportunities to develop and deploy alternative approaches to 
governance, some of which can be drawn from the development literature. I conclude by 
considering the limitations of these opportunities, including the most important: donor country 
willingness to cede the space for experimentation and to tolerate imperfect governance.  
 
The “Institutional Turn” in Development 
Development has not always focused on governance. The Bretton Woods organizations – 
including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)4 – were founded on 
explicitly apolitical mandates that prevented them from making lending decisions on any criteria 
other than economic, and from interfering in member states’ political affairs (Thirkell-White, 
 
 
4 I have excluded the World Trade Organization from this review because it does not provide development aid. 
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2003; Thomas, 2007).5 These mandates aligned well with the era of neoclassical economic 
thinking, when development reforms focused on “rolling back” the state to prevent it from 
interfering in markets (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004). 
Events of the 1980s, however, forced a reckoning. High profile cases of corruption 
embarrassed donors, while the collapse of Soviet power made them less inclined to turn a blind 
eye to abusive regimes (Doornbos, 2004; Weiss, 2000). At the same time, the widespread failure 
of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Policies forced the World Bank to acknowledge that they 
were not just poorly implemented, but also poorly conceived (Leftwich, 1993). The World Bank 
concluded that the failure could be largely attributed to “institutional weakness” in recipient 
countries, especially poor legal systems and inadequate contractual enforcement which acted to 
deter investment and credit (Mkandawire, 2007).  
As the World Bank began to consider how institutional and political factors shaped 
development, it moved away from its apolitical mandate (Kulshreshtha, 2008; Thomas, 2007). A 
series of watershed reports signaled this shift, beginning with a 1989 report that identified a 
“crisis of governance” as underlying African countries’ development problems. A staff paper 
shortly thereafter recognized external agencies as “potentially key players capable of exerting 
considerable influence in promoting good or bad governance” (Landell-Mills & Serageldin, 
1991). The shift culminated in the World Bank’s 1997 “World Development Report,” which 
declared improving governance and “reinvigorating” public institutions as key to successful 
development (Landell-Mills & Serageldin, 1991, 13). 
 
 
5 Article III, Section 5 and Article IV, Section 10 (“Articles of Agreement,” n.d.) 
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Following the lead of the World Bank, and later in the decade, the IMF, development 
thinking thus moved from a neoliberal focus on “getting prices right” to “getting institutions 
right” (Mkandawire, 2009; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). The resulting governance 
agenda encompassed a wide range of reforms and interventions. A key focus was on 
reconfiguring public institutions, agencies, and processes – the judiciary, civil service, and public 
service delivery – into rule-bound systems. Particular emphasis was placed on public financial 
management: internal accounting and auditing systems, budgeting mechanisms, and anti-
corruption measures. Reforms were often implemented by attaching conditionalities to loans and 
project grants. In addition to reform within public institutions, MOs and DAs sought to bolster 
forms of democratic governance: promoting transparency, inclusion of civil society in public 
decision-making, and respect for human rights (Leftwich, 1993). By the end of the millennium, 
the World Bank was investing a significant portion of its resources into promoting good 
governance and institution building. Between 1995-1997, for example, the World Bank 
committed a quarter of all funding ($5-7 billion annually) to institutional reform (Kulshreshtha, 
2008).  
Scholarship focusing on the institutional ‘turn’ mostly agrees that despite the vast resources 
poured into governance reforms, they have been largely ineffective (Booth, 2012a; Evans, 2004; 
Repucci, 2012; Unsworth, 2010). Even when adopted, governance-related conditionalities have 
not produced the expected results. Economic growth has likewise remained uneven 
(Mkandawire, 2009). “Aid as such,” concludes Booth (2012, 537), “is probably on balance bad 
for the institutional fabric of poor developing countries.” In this context, the question of why 
powerful organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks, and 
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development agencies have failed to produce the expected changes in governance remains 
relevant.  
Scholars and practitioners of development have debated this question since the governance 
agenda began to pick up steam in the 1990s. Many focused on the causal relationship between 
institutions, governance, and economic growth: Do strong institutions and good governance 
promote economic growth? Or does economic growth contribute to the development of strong 
institutions? While large ‘n’ cross-sectional studies have consistently found a strong positive 
relationship between indicators of governance and economic growth (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002; 
Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido, 1999), many have pointed out the methodological shortcomings and 
assumptions of these analyses (Lindauer & Pritchett, 2002; Mkandawire, 2009). Studies focused 
on the correlation of specific indicators have shown that higher levels of development aid are 
actually associated with declines in governance quality (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Busse & 
Gröning, 2009; Subramanian & Roy, 2001). Overall, there continues to be a lack of evidence of a 
strong causal link between aid and development outcomes (Booth, 2012a).  
In addition to failing to trigger economic growth, the governance agenda has also been 
ineffective, in many cases, in meaningfully altering the institutions targeted by reforms (Booth, 
2012; Evans, 2004; Repucci, 2012). The explanations put forward for this ineffectiveness are 
myriad. Observers have criticized the weakness of the conceptual underpinnings of “good 
governance” in the first place (Andrews, 2008; Bøås, 1998; Gisselquist, 2014; Harrison, 2005; 
Kapur & Webb, 2000). The concept, they argue, is so broad as to encompass nearly everything, 
making it difficult to operationalize. Little attention has been paid to prioritizing and sequencing 
reforms (Grindle, 2004; Repucci, 2012). Likewise, there has been little realistic engagement with 
the actual capacity of recipient country governments, and little recognition of the limitations of 
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development aid, and how it might conflict with other political imperatives (e.g., promoting arms 
control while continuing arms sales) (Grindle, 2011; Moore & Robinson, 1994; Nunnekamp, 
1995).  
Others, however, have argued that the ineffectiveness of the governance agenda has deeper 
roots. Technical issues, in their view, are secondary to a fundamental misunderstanding of how 
power, particularly informal power, operates in recipient countries. The next section reviews 
these critiques.  
 
Governance Reforms and Informal Power: Four Insights 
The development literature on the role of informal power in governance reforms can be 
summarized in four main points. 
 
(1) Governance reforms were based on assumptions about individuals, society, and the state 
that are rooted in a Western, liberal-rational worldview. 
Despite nurturing the appearance of political and ideological neutrality, MOs and DAs are 
political actors, guided by their own brands of political thought (Harrison, 2005). Multilateral 
organizations, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, have their roots in Western history. 
Their governance structures, which award decision-making authority based on financial 
contributions and economic clout respectively, strongly favor donor and Western countries 
(Thomas et al., 2006; Leech & Leech, 2009). They remain responsive primarily to Western 
political audiences: not only donor country governments, but also Western academic 
communities and NGOs (Thirkell-White, 2003). As a result, MO governance reforms have been 
grounded in a liberal-rational worldview that combines elements of neoliberal economic theory 
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with post-WWII concepts of democracy, pluralism, and civic participation (Bøås, 1998; 
Harrison, 2005; Williams & Young, 1994). 
This liberal-rational worldview leads MOs and DAs to base their governance reforms on a 
series of assumptions about: a) the individual, civil society, and the state; b) the relationship 
between society and the state, and between the state and the market; c) the functioning of 
institutions; d) how power operates in recipient countries; and, lastly e) how reforms will alter 
these relationships and the operation of power (summarized in Table 2.1).  
In his critique of the World Bank, Harrison (2005) argues that its development interventions 
have been influenced by three main strands of political thought. The first is the theory of rational 
choice, which sees individual behavior as guided by consciously-held preferences. Society is an 
aggregation of these individual preferences and the state is institutionally structured to 
incentivize desirable (honest and equitable) behavior. The second strand is new public 
management, which sees the ideal state as interfering in the economy as minimally as possible 
(McCourt & Minogue, 2013). The behavior and performance of state agents, in this view, is 
shaped by the institutional structures in which they are embedded. Finally, the third strand, 
institutionalism, sees the state as playing a narrow, complementary role to the market (North, 
1990). Taken together, these approaches drive the World Bank’s theory of political action, in 
which “political agency is individualized, and motivated by a balance of preferences, costs, and 
benefits” (Harrison, 2005, 245-246). In other words, the World Bank’s interventions are 
predicated on the assumptions that the state and the market are complementary and that reforms 
will yield positive sum outcomes from which all in society benefit.  
Similarly, Williams and Young (1994) saw the World Bank’s interventions as based on three 
slightly different foundational beliefs of liberal theory. The first is a belief in the state as a 
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neutral framework through which different groups pursue their ideas of what is “good.” The 
second is a belief in civil society as a liberal public sphere, a space for interactions free of state 
intervention and based upon the values of pluralism and tolerance. The third is a belief in the 
individual as the “liberal self,” which assumes that individuals share universal characteristics and 
engage in universal economic behavior. These beliefs led the World Bank to make assumptions 
about individual behavior that undergirds state-society interactions, especially the notion that 
society would function to hold the state accountable for its performance.  
Additionally, some have argued that the liberal-rational worldview also led MOs and DAs to 
rely implicitly on Weberian notions of the state and bureaucracy, which view state power as 
rooted in rational-legal authority (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004). In the Weberian view, power is 
formal and rules-bound. The civil service is professionalized and meritocratic, providing public 
goods in a top-down, uniform, and impersonal manner. Decisions are made based on objective, 
pre-set criteria (Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews, 2013). 
Others have gone further, arguing that this worldview is better understood as neoliberal-
rational or liberal-capitalist (Doornbos, 2004; Nanda, 2006). They argue that the limitations of 
the World Bank and IMF’s mandates led them to define governance narrowly, in technical and 
economic terms, “to manage the economy effectively” (Tuozzo, 2004, 106). Focusing on 
economic, rather than political, dimensions of governance also provided MOs an avenue for 
reconciling institutionalism with the neoclassical economic agenda that had preceded it. The 
focus was on building the effectiveness of public sector management, fostering competition, and 
providing a stable and predictable policy environment for market-led development. 
“Governance” thus became a tool for the creation of neoliberal state-market relations and 
“market friendliness” (Doornbos, 2004; Mkandawire, 2009). 
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MOs and DAs’ governance reforms were thus based primarily on the assumption that 
rewriting rules and altering institutions would restructure incentives. They expected the change 
in incentives to spur more desirable behavior in individuals, altering the relationship between 
society and the state. The public would demand improved performance from the government in 
the supply of public goods, and state agents would respond by improving delivery. Incentives 
would encourage a proper (limited) relationship between the state and the market.  
Table 2.1. Liberal-rational Assumptions about the Operation of Power in Countries Receiving 
Development Aid  
  Relationships of individuals, 
state, and society in a liberal-
rational worldview 
Relationships of individuals, 
state, and society in recipient 
countries 
a. Individuals Isolated, utilitarian 
Share universal economic 
characteristics 
Respond rationally to incentives 
Individualized political agency  
Members of affective, often ethnic, 
reciprocity networks  
Communal political agency  
Civil Society Comprised of contractual, non-
affective groups 
Comprised of affective, often 
ethnic, groups 
State Neutral framework 
Upholds rule of law 
Impersonal, professional 
bureaucracy 
Broad public service programs 
benefit all 
Non-neutral framework 
Frequent exemptions to rule of law 
Public office used as private 
resource 




Public monitors state performance 
State agents respond rationally to 
public monitoring 
Public does not monitor state 
performance 
State agents do not always respond 




State plays minimum role to 
provide stability and foster 
competition 
Intertwined 
Political and economic power 
united 
c. Institutions Structure incentives to encourage 
desirable behavior 
Embedded within larger societally-
structured power relation 
d. Power Formal, rules-bound 
Exercised through legal-rational 
authority 
Informal, personal 
Exercised through personal 
authority 
e. Governance Reforms Rewriting rules and altering 
institutions will restructure 
incentives 
Must address informal as well as 
formal incentives  
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It is important to note some limits of generalizing analyses that focus largely on the World 
Bank and IMF to all MOs and DAs. The World Bank and IMF are themselves large and diverse 
organizations, with different branches often acting on different principles. There is further 
heterogeneity between regional development banks and other MOs, like UN agencies, and of 
course between bilateral DAs which respond primarily to domestic political audiences. Leftwich 
(1993) has pointed out, for example, that good governance has historically carried geopolitical 
implications for the World Bank and Western governments. The economic clout of the World 
Bank and IMF, however, have made them leaders in development thought, to the extent that the 
liberal-rational worldview has come to pervade the development field at large, with the concept 
sharing a “common underlying shape” (Leftwich, 1993, 611). Nevertheless, context plays an 
important role in shaping how this worldview has been interpreted and implemented by different 
MOs and DAs (Bøås, 1998; Nelson, 2000).6 
 
(2) The liberal-rational worldview prevented MOs and DAs from recognizing the prevailing 
power structures of recipient countries, and the political relationships that create and 
maintain them. 
Contrary to the assumptions of MOs and DAs, power is not always formal and rules-bound 
(Thomas, 2007). In many countries informal power – based on implicit and unwritten 
 
 
6 Bøas (1998) illustrates this point in his case studies of the how the governance agenda took shape at the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In contrast to the World Bank and the IMF, 
the governance structures of these regional development banks cede significant power to borrower countries. As a 
result, the two banks were caught between the will of the donors (pushing governance reform) and their borrower 
countries (resisting the intrusion). At ADB, borrowers objected to a conceptual grounding of governance in 
individual political rights, preferring a framing of governance as “sound development management” grounded in 
economic principles and collective rights. At AfDB, which is formally controlled by African countries, the outcome 
was an ill-defined but politically convenient governance agenda.  
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understandings that reflect sociocultural norms and routines – prevails (Helmke & Levitsky, 
2006; North, 1990). Likewise, power is often personal, vested not in rules but in individuals, 
often at all levels of authority (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2005; Hyden, 2008). The political 
systems of many recipient countries are clientelistic or patrimonial (van de Walle, 2003). A 
leader’s ability to stay in power depends on his or her distribution of patronage, in the form of 
government contracts, jobs, or other perquisites. In such systems it is customary (even expected) 
for people to use their power to help their family and friends (Thomas, 2007). Such patronage 
distorts the civil service in particular, as public office is used for personal gain through politics 
for pay, promotion, and employment status (Repucci, 2012).  
In many countries formal and informal institutions coexist, in what Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith 
(2005) termed “institutional dualism.” This dualism is most clearly manifested in neopatrimonial 
systems, where leaders use patronage to secure political support within the legal-rational 
structure of the state (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994). Neopatrimonial regimes are fundamentally 
incompatible with the rule of law, both because political supporters demand patronage rather 
than enforcement of rules, and because leaders often distribute exemptions from the law as a 
form of patronage (Thomas, 2007). 
Harrison illustrates the weakness of MOs and DAs’ assumptions underpinning governance 
reforms by contrasting the World Bank’s theory of political change with two prevailing schools 
of thought about the African state. The first, “class-based,” school sees the African state as 
shaped by its subordinate position in an imperial world system. In this view, the African state is a 
product of intervention, its political authority shaped by interactions with wealthier and more 
powerful (Northern) states (Moore, 2001). As a result of this subordination, the state remains 
“politically underdeveloped,” with the elites primarily using public office, and the state at large, 
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as a private resource. In this context, he argues, politics is not positive sum, as the World Bank 
expects, but zero sum, as access to a political office necessitates excluding others and leaving 
them economically vulnerable. Rather than complementarity between state and market, there is a 
unity of political and economic power.  
A second, post-structural, school sees the African state as part of a historical continuum, with 
its dynamics shaped by entrenched socioeconomic and political interests. Political characteristics 
often negatively attributed to “tribalism” or “instability” actually reflect the linkage of customary 
African institutions to the (alien) institutions of the post-colonial state (Chabal & Daloz, 2000). 
In what Bayart (1989) famously characterized as a “rhizomatic” form of power, the official 
politics of the African state are intertwined with complex clientelistic networks, often based in 
ethnic social relations. There is thus a “radical disjuncture” between formal and informal power, 
and formal and informal institutions (Harrison, 2005). For this reason, Harrison argues, 
institutional change is often not what it appears to be. 
Williams & Young (1994) also argued that liberal theory – and the inherent contradictions 
therein – hobbled the World Bank’s governance agenda. While the World Bank relied on the 
notion of a neutral state, its interventions in recipient countries were based on its own prior 
conceptions of what is “good.” In this case, the “good” was the market economy and a state that 
ensured its smooth functioning by upholding property rights and contractual agreements. While 
the World Bank relied on the notion of a liberal civil society, it found that community in many 
recipient countries was built not on contractual relations but instead on affective, often ethnic, 
ties. Finally, while the World Bank relied on the notion of a “liberal self,” Williams & Young 
argue that this recent Western construct has proved an unreliable guide for individual behavior.  
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Following the lead of the World Bank, MOs and DAs collectively failed to comprehend both 
the prevailing power structures of recipient countries, and the political relationships that create 
and maintain them. Individuals are not universal, utilitarian actors but are instead members of 
affective, often ethnic, networks of reciprocity. Civil society, likewise, is comprised of ethnic and 
affective groups. The state is not neutral and frequently grants supporters exemptions to the rule 
of law. Public office is often used as a private resource. The civil service is not meritocratic and 
impersonal. State agents focus not on the public, but on their superiors who can reward them. 
Instead of providing broad programs that benefit all according to objective criteria, the 
government provides benefits narrowly to supporters. Political agency is communal, not 
individualized. Society does not always hold the state accountable. The public does not 
necessarily expect and monitor state performance; state agents do not respond to public 
monitoring. The state and the market are not complementary but intertwined, with economic and 
political power frequently united. Power is often informal and personal. Informal power 
networks exist beneath and beside formal institutions. Institutions are embedded in larger 
societally-structured power relations (Evans, 2004). 
 
(3) Institutional reforms failed to “take” because they focused narrowly on formal rather 
than informal institutions, and because they replicated institutional form rather than 
altering institutional function. 
Many governance interventions were based on an underdeveloped theory of change 
(Unsworth, 2009). MOs and DAs assumed that by properly designing institutions (and 
incentives), reforms would alter individual behavior and, in turn, the relationship between 
society and the state (Andrews, 2013; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). They focused their 
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reforms on the organizational realm where they would have the most traction: rewriting the rules 
of formal institutions (Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews, 2013). They overlooked the complex 
interplay of formal and informal institutions, failing to recognize how individuals, in both society 
and the state, are bound up in affective relations and informal power networks. These individuals 
respond to the incentives of informal institutions instead of, or in combination with, those of 
formal institutions (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). As a result, reconfiguring formal 
institutions and incentives alone did not prompt the expected changes in behavior (Harrison, 
2005).  
Above all, MOs and DAs misunderstood the incentives of leaders and elites. Reforms were 
predicated on the expectation that leaders and elites would prioritize long-term development 
objectives (Booth, 2012a). But the primary goal of most governments is to remain in power. In 
many cases, political survival depends on support from informal networks as much, if not more, 
than the formal power vested in leaders by the state (Thomas, 2007). In clientelistic and 
patrimonial systems, political survival demands the distribution of patronage (Thomas, 2007). 
Reforms that limit state control over economic assets and limit the government’s discretion to 
award supporters threaten patron-client relations (Thomas, 2007). Leaders and elites are unlikely 
to undermine the status quo or disassemble the structures that keep them in power (Collins, 2012; 
Hyden, 2008). Development aid in many cases contributed to perverse incentives for elites, 
deterring collective action and facilitating patronage (Booth, 2011a; Cooksey, 2002).  
A second reason that institutional reforms did not “take” is that they largely replicated 
institutional form rather than altering institutional function (Andrews, 2013). Despite rhetorical 
recognition of the need to adapt reforms to “context” and “national circumstances,” interventions 
focused on creating centralized, professionalized bureaucracies following a common mold 
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(Kulshreshtha, 2008; Pritchett et al., 2013). Reforms were based on the assumption that since 
such bureaucracies underpin industrialized states, their “institutional blueprints” would facilitate 
similar development elsewhere. Criticized as “institutional monocropping” (Evans, 2004) and 
“skipping straight to Weber” (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004), the approach also assumed that 
society would demand and monitor the provision of public goods in similar ways across different 
contexts. In doing so, these reforms overlooked how interactions between the public, the state, 
and service providers differ across contexts. 
Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews (2013) attributed the persistent failure to build 
administrative capacity in such transplanted institutions to “isomorphic mimicry.” Government 
agents and service providers, they argued, replicated the form but not function of Weberian 
institutions. Rather than exhibiting the “entrepreneurial bureaucratic behavior” needed to adapt 
institutional forms to new contexts, they mimicked expected behaviors in order to maintain 
legitimacy (Buntaine, Parks, & Buch, 2017; Samuel, 2014). The result has often been a dual 
system in which reforms produced a shell of “proper governance” – formal institutions existing 
to placate donors and uphold the appearance of development – while informal institutions 
continue to act as the primary influence on behavior and state-society relations.  
 
(4) MOs and DAs remain ill-equipped to facilitate governance reform in recipient countries. 
Alternative approaches are possible, but require ceding decision-making power and 
tolerating imperfect governance.  
Governance reform in many recipient countries would require nothing short of fundamental 
change in the relationship of state and society. It has proven insufficient to simply change the 
rules of formal institutions without addressing the informal power structures beneath (Hoff & 
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Stiglitz, 2001). MOs and DAs now broadly recognize the need to improve their understanding of 
institutional dynamics and some have adopted political economy approaches (Booth & Faustino, 
2014; Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 2009). Their use, however, remains limited and contested (Booth, 
2012b; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Hout (2012) argues that MOs and DAs are trapped in a 
paradox in which they recognize the need for such analyses but face “insurmountable difficulty 
in taking political assessments seriously” (407). Constraints within these organizations – 
including prevailing “mental models” of development and career pathways that disincentivize 
country-specific expertise –prevent them from applying the insights of political economy 
approaches (Booth & Faustino, 2014; Unsworth, 2009; Wild et al., 2015). The result has been an 
“almost revolution,” in which shifts in tone have not translated into concrete changes in policy-
making (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 2015). Without grappling with 
prevailing power structures, reforms are likely to continue to be ineffective.  
Some have argued for alternative approaches. One option is to cede space to allow 
endogenous institutional change, rather than to continue to attempt to drive such change 
exogenously. A number of prominent scholars have argued that governance and institutional 
reforms have not only been ineffective but have inhibited development in recipient countries 
(Rodrik, 2000). The institutional models imposed over the past decades were not the same as 
those that characterized industrialized countries during their periods of rapid economic growth 
(Booth, 2011a). Imposing these models has been akin to “kicking away the ladder,” denying 
recipient countries the opportunity to experiment with their own development trajectories 
(Chang, 2003).  
In this view, substantive institutional change must be grounded in local decision-making 
(Rodrik, 2000; Sen, 1999b). Restoring space for recipient countries to experiment with 
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endogenous institutions would enable these institutions to rebuild context specificity and 
legitimacy (Dunning & Pop-Eleches, 2004; Mkandawire, 2009). What matters is how institutions 
actually function: “who they help, who they hurt, and how much” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 
2005). Informal systems are not always negative, and different institutional forms can deliver 
similar institutional performance levels (Pritchett et al., 2013). Evans (2004) argues in particular 
for strengthening “thick institutions” that can improve citizens’ abilities to make their own 
choices. A variety of forms of public discussion and interchange can contribute to making 
effective institutions accountable to citizens (Sen, 2000). Such approaches would require MOs 
and DAs to cede power to local leaders who can build contextually appropriate institutions 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Dunning & Pop-Eleches, 2004; Subramanian & Roy, 
2001). 
Additionally, some have argued for the need for experimentation on the part of MOs and 
DAs. Andrews (2013) recommends a “problem driven, iterative adaptation” approach based on 
experiential learning, feedback, and “purposive muddling.” Building on the strengths of existing 
institutions arrangements will enable the emergence of “hybrid solutions” that combine local 
institutions with professional standards (Andrews, 2013; Booth, 2012b). Booth and Unsworth 
(2014) highlight cases in which on-the-ground staff facilitated problem solving through 
“politically smart” approaches. They emphasize the importance of the bureaucratic environment 
within MOs and DAs, and the need to allow room for innovation and experimentation. In 
particular, they highlighted funding modalities that enabled staff to “work at arm’s length” from 
donors (22). Incremental reforms, these scholars argued, could cumulatively drive slower, but 
longer-term, institutional change (Levy, 2014).  
 29 
Such alternative approaches and experimentation would require a tolerance for risk-taking 
and imperfect governance. Some have argued for engaging realistically with the incentives that 
shape the decision-making of leaders and elites. Booth (2011b, 2012b) calls for identifying the 
most stable regimes – those able to centralize management of major economic rents and adopt a 
long-time horizon – through a form of “development patrimonialism.” Similarly, Wright (2008) 
has argued for the need to recognize how the time horizons of autocratic governments shape their 
incentives in the use of development aid. There is tension between these strategies, which 
concede that not all governments will behave democratically, and the broader recognition that 
participatory political institutions are necessary to build better institutions in the long-run. 
Different MOs and DAs likely have different capacities for experimentation and risk-taking, as 
well as differing levels of tolerance for imperfect governance.  
Others have argued for bypassing dysfunctional and non-democratic national governments 
altogether. Brinkerhoff & Johnson (2009), writing about fragile and post-conflict states, suggest 
empowering local governments in delivering public services. They argue that local government 
can, among other things, mitigate zero sum politics and allow for natural political experiments, 
with faster feedback loops. Some have argued that empowering citizenry, through monitoring 
and participatory budgeting practices, can also improve public services (Abers, 1998; Fox, 
2001). Others have argued, controversially, for privatization and contracting out of public 
services (Grindle, 2004). Ultimately, however, strategies that circumvent national institutions are 
likely to prove only a short-term substitute for a functioning central government (Grindle, 2004).  
One concrete option for working within, rather than around, national institutions emerges 
from scholarship on organizational culture. Case studies have shown that certain institutions can 
effectively deliver public services, even when they are embedded within ineffective governments 
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(Tendler, 1997). Drawing on a number of comparative cases, Grindle (1997) attributed this 
effectiveness to a shared sense of mission, dedication, and autonomy among the workers 
themselves. Rational choice theory, which saw individuals as motivated by private incentives, 
could not explain such “public spirited bureaucratic behavior.” She and others have argued that 
promoting such positive organizational characteristics could be the “missing ingredient” to civil 
service reform (Grindle, 1997; Owusu, 2012).  
 
Climate Finance: Structural Change, Alternative Approaches 
The ineffectiveness of governance reforms in development aid illustrates the need for MOs to 
recognize and grapple with the nature of informal power in recipient countries. In this section, I 
argue that climate finance presents opportunities for a new approach to governance. I advance 
this argument in three parts (summarized in Table 2.2). In each part, I first introduce a principle 
underpinning climate finance that differs from traditional development aid. These differences, 
which are derived from the emerging literature on and practice of international climate finance, 
are: (1) that climate finance is restitution, not aid (Khan & Roberts, 2013; Roberts, 2009; 
Pickering & Barry 2012; Müller 2009; Scoville-Simonds 2020; Moore 2012b); (2) that recipient 
countries should exercise direct control over financing (Lombo et al., 2016; Persson & Remling 
2014; Bird & Peskett 2008); and, (3) that decision-making should be driven by climate-specific 
criteria. These principles do not encompass all the ways that climate finance differs from 
development aid, only the key ways that drive structural change. It is important to note that these 
principles are not universally accepted. In fact, they are highly contested and constantly evolving 
through negotiation and practice. Despite being contested, these principles have been 
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operationalized in ways that alter the provision of finance (Moore 2012b; Schalatek 2019; 
Persson 2011). 
Following each principle, I describe how it has driven structural innovations in the 
architecture of climate finance, and meaningfully shifted decision-making authority at global, 
regional, and national levels. I then suggest how each of these structural changes opens spaces 
for climate finance organizations to develop and deploy new governance strategies, some of 
which can be drawn from the development literature. I conclude with a brief discussion of the 
limitations of these opportunities.  
 
Traditional and Innovative Channels in Climate Finance 
There are six main channels of international public financing for climate mitigation and 
adaptation: bilateral finance, multilateral development banks, multilateral climate funds, national 
and regional climate funds, sovereign risk pools, and market-based mechanisms (Watson & 
Schalatek, 2020) (see Figure 2.1). The first two channels rely on traditional donor-recipient 
frameworks established under development: donor countries retain full authority over decision-
making and financial management. The latter four are newer, more innovative financial 
mechanisms. The new principles and associated structural changes that I describe here are 
limited to these innovative mechanisms. I exclude the last of the four channels – market-based 
mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism –from the argument because these 
mechanisms rely primarily on carbon market finance and therefore do not employ donor-




Figure 2.1 Six Primary Channels of International Climate Finance 
 
 
The financing that flows through innovative channels currently represents a small but 
growing portion of overall climate finance. Multilateral climate funds operate by aggregating 
funding from donor countries and disbursing it to recipient countries. Although most of these 
funds operate under mandates from the UNFCCC, some operate outside its guidance. The 
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) managed by the World Bank are an example of the latter. 
Many countries have also established national and regional climate funds as “national hubs,” 
designed to capture finance from a range of multilateral and bilateral sources (Gomez-Echeverri, 
2013). The largest of these, Brazil’s Amazon Fund, has a commitment of $1.2 billion. Finally, 
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sovereign risk pools are currently operating in the Pacific, Caribbean, and African regions. As 
insurance entities that distribute risk across a group of countries, risk pools offer a new approach 
to adaptation. The initial capital provided by donor countries subsidizes member countries’ 
access to insurance, though they also pay premiums to participate (McGee, Phelan, & Wenta, 
2014).  
 
Table 2.2 New principles, structures, and opportunities in international climate finance 
New Principle Structural Change in 
Financial Mechanisms 
Opportunities for New Approaches to Governance 
Climate financing 
should be 
restitution, not aid. 
Equal or majority 
decision-making power 
for recipient countries in 
multilateral, regional, 
and national governance 
boards.  
 
Recipient country representatives exercise greater 
power to shape governance protocols.  
 
Opportunities to develop new governance policies and 





Recipient countries have 
direct access to and 
direct management of 
financing.  
Recipient country institutions have greater power to 
shape governance policies at the national level.  
 
Opportunities to recognize prevailing power structures 
and ground institutional change in local decision-
making.  
 
Opportunities to improve feedback mechanisms to 




should be driven 
by climate-
specific criteria.  
Financing channeled 




exercised by new actors 
within these ministries.  
 
Dislodge established routines and relationships around 
traditional finance channels.  
 
Opportunities to establish new relationships within 




First New Principle: Climate finance should be restitution, not aid. 
Recipient countries and civil society advocates have long fought in the UNFCCC 
negotiations to establish the “polluter pays” principle: the concept that because industrialized 
countries bear responsibility for the bulk of historical emissions, they have an obligation to not 
only rapidly reduce their emissions but also to compensate low-emitting and vulnerable countries 
for the damage caused (Gaines, 1991; Khan & Roberts, 2013; Roberts, 2009). This 
compensation, or restitution, should take the form of both technology transfer (to enable 
emissions reductions) and financing to support adaptation to adverse impacts (Pickering & 
Barry, 2012). Though recipient countries have not succeeded in enshrining this principle in the 
Convention itself, and claims of restitution remain highly politicized, they have succeeded in 
operationalizing it within some channels of climate finance (Harmeling & Kaloga, 2011; Moore, 
2012; Persson, 2011; Schalatek, 2019). The norms that guide the provision of finance under 
these mechanisms thus differ from the “charity” or “gift-giving” norms of development, in which 
aid is seen as voluntary payment (Moore, 2012b; Müller, 2009; Scoville-Simonds, Jamali, & 
Hufty, 2020).  
The operationalization of this principle of restitution has produced structural shifts in 
decision-making authority within the architecture of climate finance. Within the UNFCCC, 
recipient countries have negotiated equal or majority representation on the boards of several 
multilateral funds (Table 2.3). The Adaptation Fund was the first multilateral finance board 
whose members include a majority of recipient country representatives, enabling their “genuine 
ownership” of the instrument (Harmeling & Kaloga, 2011; Müller, 2009, 4). The board of the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF), the largest and most important of the funds under the Paris 
Agreement, has equal representation of donor and recipient countries (Green Climate Fund, 
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2013). Significantly this shift has extended to funds operating outside the UNFCCC. The CIFs – 
worth approximately $8 billion – have equal representation on all decision-making committees 
and sub-committees (Climate Investment Funds, 2021). National and regional climate funds are 
largely independent entities. Though they differ in their governance structures, they are 
controlled in most cases by recipient country governments (Gomez-Echeverri, 2010) (Table 2.4). 
The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund, for example, operates under the “full 
ownership and leadership of the Government of Bangladesh,” with a governing council and 
management committee comprised solely of national representatives (World Bank, 2021). 
Likewise, the governing boards of all three active sovereign risk pools have majority 
representation of member countries (Table 2.6). 
 
Table 2.3 Board Composition of Multilateral Climate Funds 
(blue denotes donor country majority, orange recipient country majority, and yellow equal 
representation) 
 
Multilateral Climate Funds Funds Pledged  
(US$ million) 
Governing Board, Council, or Assembly 
Composition 
Green Climate Fund 20,320.28 24 Members: 12 donor country; 12 recipient 
country  
Clean Technology Fund 5,404.31 16 Members: 8 donor country; 8 recipient country 
Global Environment Facility 4,052.99 32 Members: 14 donor country; 16 recipient 
country; 2 economies in transition 
Strategic Climate Fund7  2,646.27 16 Members: 8 donor country; 8 recipient country 
Least Developed Countries 
Fund 
1,686.42 Under GEF Governance 
Adaptation Fund 1,039.20 16 Members: 5 donor country; 11 recipient 
country 
Adaptation for Smallholder 
Agriculture Programme 
406.49 36 Members: 24 donor country; 12 recipient 
country 
Special Climate Change Fund 379.04 Under GEF Governance 
 
 
7 The SCF is one of two funds under the Climate Investment Funds. It oversees the activities of three programs: the 
Forest Investment Partnership (FIP), the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP), and the Pilot Program on 
Climate Resilience (PPCR). 
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Table 2.4 Board Composition of National and Regional Climate Funds 





Governing Board or Management Committee 
Composition 
Amazon Fund 1,288.23 23 Members: 8 national government; 9 states; 6 
civil society 
Brazilian National Fund on 
Climate Change 
478.76 7 Members: 7 national government  
Guyana REDD+ Investment 
Fund 
250.00 8 Members: 4 national government; 4 donor 
country 
Central African Forest Initiative  244.36 7 Members: 7 donor country 
Congo Basin Forest Fund 186.02 6 Members: 2 donor country; 4 recipient country 
Bangladesh Climate Change 
Resilience Fund 
170.00 15 Members: 7 national ministries; 4 national 
secretaries; 2 donor country; 2 civil society 
Climate Resilient Green 
Economy (Ethiopia) 
200.00 N/A 
Rwanda’s Green Fund 50.00 10 Members: 7 national government; 1 donor 
country; 1 private sector; 1 civil society 
Mali Climate Fund 28.17 10 Members: 5 government; 5 technical and 
financial partners 
Indonesia Climate Change 
Trust Fund 
26.17 11 Members: 4 donor country; 7 recipient country 
Cambodia Climate Change 
Alliance Trust Fund 
11.00 8 Members: 4 national government; 4 donor 
country 
Ecuador Yasuni ITT Trust Fund 10.58 5 Members: 3 national government; 2 donor 
country; 1 civil society 
Maldives Climate Change Trust 
Fund 
10.30 N/A 
Mexico Climate Change Fund N/A 9 Members: 9 national government 
Philippines People’s Survival 
Fund 
N/A 8 Members: 5 national government; 1 academic; 1 
business; 1 NGO  
 
Table 2.5 Board Composition of Sovereign Risk Pools 
Sovereign Risk Pools Board Composition 
African Risk Capacity 8 Members: 7 recipient country; 1 World Food 
Program 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility  6 Members: 4 recipient country; 2 donor country 
Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and 
Financing Initiative  
9 Members: 5 recipient country; 4 donor country 
 
This shift in decision-making authority means that donor country perspectives no longer 
dominate the leadership forums of many climate finance organizations. Recipient country 
representatives exercise greater power to set priorities, allocate funding, and, most importantly in 
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this case, shape governance protocols. Under development frameworks, an imbalance of 
decision-making authority contributed to governance policies shaped predominantly by the 
Western, liberal-rational worldview (Harrison, 2005; Williams & Young, 1994). Under new 
climate finance frameworks, recipient country representatives are empowered in these 
organizations to draw on non-Western forms of political thought. They are no longer bound by 
narrow assumptions about the nature of state-society relations in recipient countries.  
This new balance of authority opens opportunities to develop alternative approaches to 
governance. The governing boards of multilateral and regional climate funds can create space for 
experimentation with endogenous institutions – domestic institutions that may be more 
legitimate and contextually appropriate – by ceding some power to local leaders (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001; Dunning & Pop-Eleches, 2004; Mkandawire, 2009). They could develop more flexible 
governance policies that focus on the services that informal institutions deliver, rather than their 
form, or allow for the emergence of “hybrid institutions” (Andrews, 2013; Booth, 2012b; 
Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2005). Endogenous institutions could prove more effective, for 
example, in building resilience to climate impacts. A variety of “thick” participatory institutions 
could facilitate discussions and interchange around long-term planning and adaptation (Evans, 
2004). Governing boards could also develop approaches that engage realistically with the 
incentives of leaders, accounting for how their time horizons may influence their willingness to 
reduce emissions (Wright, 2008).  
 
Second New Principle: Recipient countries should own climate financing. 
The second principle flows directly from the first. If climate finance is restitution, not aid, 
then recipient countries should be granted greater control over it (Lombo et al., 2016; Persson, 
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2011; Persson & Remling, 2014). “Country ownership” has long been a point of emphasis in 
development, where MOs and DAs viewed a lack of ownership among recipient country leaders 
and institutions as a hindrance to effective programs (Booth, 2012a; Hyden, 2008). Ownership in 
this sense related to program design and implementation, rather than direct control over 
financing. This approach aligned with the “gift-giving” norms of development aid, in which 
donor countries saw it as their right to oversee the use of “their” money (Moore, 2012b). Under 
the restitution framing of climate finance, recipient countries reject such conditionalities on 
funding (Bird & Peskett, 2008; Moore, 2012b; Müller, 2009; Schalatek, Bird, & Brown, 2010). 
The principle that recipient countries should own funding has driven structural change in 
how climate financing is managed at the national level. Recipient country institutions directly 
manage funding received through national and regional funds, as well as any pay-outs from 
sovereign risk pools. Brazil’s Amazon Fund, for example, is administered by the Brazil National 
Development Bank, rather than an MO. A number of multilateral climate funds under the 
UNFCCC have implemented procedures, known as “direct access modalities,” that empower 
national and regional institutions to directly manage financing (Afful-Koomson, 2015; Scoville-
Simonds, 2016). In contrast to traditional donor-recipient frameworks, in which funding is 
channeled largely outside of national budgetary systems, direct access devolves financial 
management to the national level (Bird, Billett, & Colόn, 2011). The Green Climate Fund, for 
example, has additionally launched an “enhanced direct access” pilot program, which further 
devolves oversight responsibilities to the national level (Schalatek & Watson, 2019). 
This shift in control of financing to the national level means that actors in recipient country 
institutions exercise greater authority to shape governance policies. In contrast to MOs and DAs, 
which persist in their technocratic orientation and exhibit weak knowledge of local contexts, 
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these actors are well-positioned to recognize prevailing power structures contexts (Hout, 2012; 
Unsworth, 2009; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Indeed, they are embedded within these structures, 
both formal and informal. National actors and institutions can draw on this knowledge to develop 
more nuanced theories of change, based on a more accurate understanding of individual and 
collective incentives. For those who have argued that substantive institutional change must be 
grounded in local decision-making, this could represent an opportunity for experimentation with 
endogenous institutions (Rodrik, 2000; Sen, 1999b). 
It also presents an opportunity to improve the feedback mechanisms that link locally-relevant 
knowledge to global policymaking. This feedback could include not only more nuanced 
information about the socio-political relationships that shape governance, but also results from 
endogenous experimentation. Both climate finance organizations that directly fund programs, 
like the GCF, and MOs that partner with national governments, like the World Bank, would 
benefit from strengthening these mechanisms. Governing boards with equal or majority recipient 
country representation are well-positioned to utilize this knowledge in shaping governance 
policies.  
 
Third New Principle: Decision-making should be driven by climate-specific criteria.  
The third new principle does not flow directly from the first and second, but instead relates to 
the nature of the funding itself. Climate finance is motivated by more specific objectives than 
development. For mitigation, the goal is to reduce emissions. For adaptation, the goal is to foster 
preventive, responsive, and adaptive action. In some contexts, the goal is to target support to 
vulnerable groups. This is the case, for example, for the Adaptation Fund, which follows a 
mandate to direct funding to the “particularly vulnerable” (Adaptation Fund Board, 2012). These 
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specific objectives are significant because they require a new set of criteria to guide decision-
making (e.g., emissions scenarios, vulnerability assessments). These criteria in turn demand a 
new set of expertise of the actors implementing climate programs.  
The demand for new expertise has led climate finance organizations to direct funding 
through new institutions and new actors at the national level. Development organizations 
primarily channeled aid through Ministries of Finance (Bulíř & Hamann, 2008; Harmeling & 
Kaloga, 2011). Climate finance, in contrast, is often channeled through sector-specific ministries 
and agencies, such as Environment, Meteorology, or Agricultural Extension Services. In some 
cases, recipient countries have created entirely new ministries with the intent of capturing 
climate finance, such as Climate or Blue Economy in small island states (see Table 2.6). These 
new channels are frequently institutionalized by direct agreements between ministries and MOs, 
thereby bypassing the Ministries of Finance and stripping them of their gatekeeper roles. This 
flush of financing into new and previously under-funded ministries empowers the actors within 
them, through both their increased budgets and their enhanced connections to the international 
community.  
As climate finance flows through new institutions and to new actors, it disrupts the 
established channels by which international public financing enters recipient country 
governments. Under development frameworks, routines and relationships built up around these 
traditional channels. Actors associated with these traditional channels are likely to resist change, 
but new actors, housed in new and historically under-funded ministries, are more likely to 
participate in new and experimental approaches to governance. They are also better positioned to 
think creatively and deploy sector-specific approaches. This disruption is another opportunity to 
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build new relationships on both sides of international public finance: not only among national 
actors, but also between national actors and those in global and regional institutions.  
 
Table 2.6 Ministries of Climate Change in Recipient Countries 
Country Ministry 
Argentina Secretariat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Innovation 
Bangladesh Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change 
Belize Ministry of Sustainable Development, Climate Change, and Disaster Risk 
Management 
Burkina Faso Ministry of Environment, Green Economy, and Climate Change 
Ethiopia Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change 
Gambia Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, and Natural Resources 
Grenada Ministry of Climate Resilience 
India Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change 
Jamaica Ministry of Land, Water, and Climate Change 
Malaysia Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment, and Climate Change 
Mauritius Ministry of Environment, Solid Waste Management, and Climate Change 
Oman Ministry of Environment and Climate Affairs 
Pakistan Ministry of Climate Change 
Seychelles Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Change 
Solomon Islands Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management, and 
Meteorology 
Tonga Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, 
Environment, Climate Change, and Communication 
United Arab Emirates Ministry of Climate Change and Environment 
 
The disruption of climate finance presents in particular the opportunity to alter the routines 
by which national institutions have imitated the form but not function of Western bureaucracies. 
New approaches could promote positive organizational cultures, encouraging the 
“entrepreneurial bureaucratic behavior” that many institutions currently lack (Grindle, 1997; 
Pritchett et al., 2013; Tendler, 1997). Sector-specific ministries – such as Climate, Environment, 




It is important to recognize limitations on the opportunities outlined here. Breaking away 
from traditional donor-recipient frameworks and financial channels is a contested process at all 
governance levels. Donor countries have not willingly conceded authority to recipient countries. 
They continue to dominate decision-making in the most significant channels: bilateral finance 
and multilateral development banks. In some cases they have circumvented forums where 
recipient countries exercise majority power, such as the Adaptation Fund, preferring to funnel 
financing through the channels where they exercise greater control (Harmeling & Kaloga, 2011). 
Donor and recipient country representatives on the board of the GCF have frequently 
deadlocked, delaying funding decisions and raising concerns over the future of the fund 
(Schalatek & Watson, 2019). 
Even where recipient countries directly manage global financing, oversight mechanisms 
remain. In the case of direct access, recipient country institutions must apply for accreditation 
and partner with MOs, like UN agencies. For many national and regional funds, and sovereign 
risk pools, MOs serve as interim trustees, with the intent of devolving administration to national 
institutions. Finally, at the national level, inter-ministerial politics and conflict over resources 
may limit the transfer of decision-making power to new ministries and actors. Reforms continue 
to pose a threat to the vested interests of leaders and elites, and therefore will not go 
unchallenged. Donor countries’ unwillingness to concede power over international funds 
significantly limits the space for experimentation. 
Nevertheless, the shifts in decision-making authority described here are uncommon in 
international public finance. Restitutional norms have rarely been applied at the international 
level (Moore, 2012). The disruption is far from total, but it provides pockets of opportunity to 
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think differently about how to engage with informal power. Given these limits, the most 
promising spaces for experimentation could be those that link leadership forums where recipient 
countries are empowered at multiple levels: large multilateral funds like the CIFs, and especially 
the GCF’s “enhanced direct access” program. Other promising spaces are those where decision-
making authority is closest to local levels – national and regional climate funds, and sovereign 
risk pools – and therefore most likely to produce substantive institutional change.  
The most significant limit to these opportunities, however, is whether donor countries are 
willing to provide financing through channels in which experimentation occurs. The tensions of 
development aid – between recognition that not all governments behave democratically and the 
importance of building equitable institutions in the long run – are now manifest in climate 
finance. Donor countries provide funding under a deliberately vague mandate (Khan et al., 2019; 
Weikmans & Roberts, 2018). They retain the option to withdraw it entirely, or from any 
particular channel. Engaging with informal power – such as the time horizons of autocratic 
leaders or the informal incentives within patrimonial regimes – will require a tolerance of 
imperfect governance and institutional difference. As this review has shown though, efforts to 
mold recipient countries in the image of Western democracies and economies have been largely 
ineffective. Allowing for experimentation, and closely monitoring the results of alternative 
approaches, could yield surprising results broadly relevant across international public finance. 
 
Conclusion 
Governance in recipient countries remains a challenge for MOs involved in international 
climate finance. This chapter reviewed literature on the “institutionalist turn” in development aid. 
I drew four key insights from this literature that help explain why governance reforms largely 
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failed to generate meaningful institutional change. In short, MOs and DAs struggled to recognize 
and grapple with how power, particularly informal power, operates in many countries receiving 
development aid.  
Climate finance has the potential to be different. It is guided by different principles than 
development aid. The resulting shifts in decision-making authority at global and national levels 
are opening spaces for experimentation with new approaches to governance. The shift to equal or 
majority representation of recipient countries on the boards of multilateral, regional, and national 
climate funds is particularly significant. These spaces offer opportunities to deploy a number of 
approaches suggested by scholars of development, such as building off endogenous institutional 
forms, encouraging “hybrid” or “thick” participatory institutions. MOs can also enable 
experimentation through iterative and “politically smart” approaches that allow in-country actors 
to operate at arm’s length from donors.  
These spaces for experimentation remain small within the overall architecture of 
international climate finance. Limited funding flows through the innovative channels described 
here, and donor countries continue to retain significant control and oversight. The development 
of new approaches will require donor countries to cede space for risk-taking and local 
ownership. Small spaces, however, might be the right spaces for experimentation. It is broadly 
agreed that the past approaches of MOs to governance have fallen short. Even as MOs and DAs 
have come to recognize the nature of power in recipient countries, their own constraints have 
prevented them from changing course. Fresh approaches, tested in the context of climate finance, 
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Chapter 3 Informal Institutions and Equity in Internationally 
Financed Adaptation in Mauritius and Madagascar 
 
Introduction 
International financing for adaptation has increased rapidly over the past decade (Watson & 
Schalatek, 2020). A range of international actors – “adaptation organizations” – are funding, 
planning, and implementing initiatives to support adaptation in communities worldwide, often in 
partnership with national governments. Concern is growing, however, that the benefits of these 
initiatives are not reaching those most vulnerable to negative climate impacts (Berrang-Ford, 
Ford, & Paterson, 2011; Persson & Remling, 2014; Sovacool, Linnér, & Goodsite, 2015). To 
achieve equity, some have argued, international support must target the most disadvantaged and 
politically marginalized (Mikulewicz & Taylor, 2020; Pelling & Garschagen, 2019). 
Adaptation organizations face significant obstacles, however, in targeting resources to the 
most vulnerable communities, households, and individuals. A number of recent studies have 
illustrated how pre-existing unequal power relationships distort the outcomes of internationally 
financed adaptation initiatives (Eriksen et al., 2021; Mikulewicz & Taylor, 2020; Taylor, 2014). 
Several have identified entrenched systems of clientelism and patronage as facilitating elite 
capture and inequitable distribution of project benefits (Artur & Hilhorst, 2012; Nightingale, 
2017; Sovacool, 2018). Such informal institutions – unwritten codes and conventions of behavior 
– remain influential in many contexts (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; North, 1990). Often these 
informal institutions co-exist with official state institutions, shaping government decision-
making and distribution of public resources (Scheye, 2009; Thomas, 2007; van de Walle, 2003). 
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By incentivizing decision-makers to direct resources narrowly to political supporters, clientelism 
and patronage are generally seen to contribute to inequity, but they have also been shown to 
reinforce official institutions and contribute to equity under some circumstances (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2012). 
Observing the inequity of internationally financed adaptation, many have advocated for a 
fundamental reworking of current frameworks of intervention (Eriksen et al., 2021; Ireland & 
McKinnon, 2013; Taylor, 2014). Research to date, however, has focused largely on negative 
outcomes. Others have illustrated how focusing on positive outcomes that emerge in inequitable 
environments can generate important insights (Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Grindle, 1997; Tendler, 
1997). These scholars often point towards a “good enough governance” approach to the analysis 
of national level institutions, one that focuses on equitable outcomes as much inequitable ones 
(Grindle, 2004; Tendler, 1997). By focusing on what has worked scholars could foster better 
understanding of the interventions and pathways that could be implemented to challenge “poor” 
governance. Similarly, in the context of adaptation, by improving understanding of the 
circumstances that contribute to equity, such an approach has the potential to inform concrete 
strategies for adaptation organizations to navigate unequal power relationships in recipient 
countries.  
Following this approach, this study compares the implementation of internationally financed 
adaptation projects in two countries in the Western Indian Ocean. From 2012-2019, Mauritius 
and Madagascar were among the first countries to implement projects financed by the UN 
Adaptation Fund (AF) (Adaptation Fund, 2018).8 One of several multilateral climate funds under 
 
 
8 Mauritius’ AF proposal was the 11th funded (in September 2011). Madagascar’s proposal was the 14th funded (in 
December 2011). 
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the UN Climate Convention, the AF is distinguished by its mandate to target the “particularly 
vulnerable” (Adaptation Fund Board, 2012). In Mauritius, the Ministry of Environment 
implemented an AF project focused on building resilience to erosion and flooding in three 
coastal communities (Proposal for Mauritius, 2011). In Madagascar, the Ministry of 
Environment sought to improve the resilience of rice agriculture, targeting low income farmers 
for agricultural support in an economically vital region (Proposal for Madagascar, 2011). 
Though the governments had primary decision-making control, the AF required oversight in 
each country from a multilateral organization (MO): the UN Development Program (UNDP) in 
Mauritius, and the UN Environment Program (UNEP) in Madagascar. 
Drawing on 105 interviews with national level policymakers, civil society representatives, 
and AF project actors in both countries, I sought to understand how informal institutions shape 
government decision-making and distribution of project benefits. Did funding reach the most 
disadvantaged and marginalized, as dictated by the AF’s mandate? Or were benefits directed 
narrowly to political supporters, as is generally seen to be case with patrimonial and clientelistic 
institutions? Ultimately, what can be learned about the institutional arrangements and 
partnerships that facilitate more equitable outcomes in internationally financed adaptation? 
 
Literature Review  
Equity in International Climate Finance: It is broadly accepted under the UN Climate 
Convention (UNFCCC) that climate finance is a key element of a just and equitable response to 
climate change. Article 3 of the Convention establishes a broad principle of equity, with parties 
agreeing that they should “protect the climate system for the benefit of future and present 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
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differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, 1992). In the context of 
climate finance, the principle of equity is generally considered to have two components, deriving 
from procedural and distributive justice (Grasso, 2010). Procedural justice entails fair 
representation in the international negotiations that establish the framework for climate finance. 
An equitable process underpins the legitimacy of decision-making and allocation of funding 
(Shue, 1993). Many have argued that the UNFCCC does not facilitate a procedurally just 
process, as vast discrepancies in resources and representation inhibit equitable access to 
negotiation forums (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015; Schroeder, Boykoff, & Spiers, 2012). 
Distributive justice, in contrast, entails the fair allocation of funding. Following the principles of 
historical responsibility and restitution, most agree that the proportion of funding should be 
provided relative to the level of vulnerability (Grasso, 2010). Though this is the prevailing 
interpretation, some have argued that funding should be allocated following the principle of 
equality (equal funding to all recipients, regardless of differences in vulnerability) or efficiency 
(funding based on greatest expected impact) (Brechin & Espinoza, 2017; Rübbelke, 2011; 
Stadelmann et al., 2014). 
Even when applying the lens of distributive justice to climate finance, a number of potential 
principles can be used to guide allocation. Persson & Remling (2014), for example, distinguish 
between prioritarianism (the worse off should receive more than the better off), 
sufficientarianism (which places importance on people reaching a certain sufficient threshold), 
and the leximin principle (step-wise levelling off of groups, starting with the worst off). One 
must further distinguish between international equity (balanced allocation between countries) 
and sub-national equity (balanced allocation between sub-national groups). The Paris Agreement 
appears to support allocation based on the principle of prioritarianism. Article 11 designates that 
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capacity-building resources, including access to climate finance, should be directed to countries 
with the least capacity, including those that are “particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change” (UNFCCC, 2015, 15). Vulnerability is not defined under the Convention, 
however, and critics have argued that the commitment can be so broadly construed as to include 
nearly all countries classified as “developing” (Khan & Roberts, 2013). Interpretation of how 
vulnerability should be defined also varies widely, with some arguing it equates to lack of human 
security (Grasso, 2010) and others to social disadvantage and political marginalization 
(McNamara & Buggy, 2017; Pelling & Garschagen, 2019). 
Various actors and organizations in climate finance choose to operationalize equity in 
different ways. Take the example of allocation of funding under the GCF, the largest multilateral 
climate fund. The Fund’s “allocation parameters” appear to be driven by both the principles of 
equality – balanced funding between adaptation and mitigation – and equity – a minimum of 
50% of adaptation funding for countries that are particularly vulnerable. The Fund’s “investment 
criteria,” which also guide allocation, appear to follow the principle of efficiency, including 
“impact potential” and “efficiency and effectiveness” but not vulnerability (GCF, 2020). The 
World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), which operate outside the UNFCCC, appear to 
focus more on procedural equity. Though the CIFs have “equitable governance,” in the form of 
equal representation between donor and recipient countries, equity is not included in the 
evaluation ranking criteria (Climate Investment Funds, 2021). Even the AF – which follows an 
overarching mandate to target the “particularly vulnerable,” specifically the “most vulnerable 
communities in developing countries” – does not clearly define vulnerability (Horstmann, 2011). 
Empirical studies indicate that most international allocation of climate finance reflects the 
principles of equality and efficiency (Persson & Remling, 2014; Stadelmann et al., 2014). 
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Studies of sub-national allocation are rare, but in at least one case, vulnerability appears not to 
have influenced the distribution of funding (Barrett, 2014). 
 
Informal Institutions and Equity in Adaptation: With a lack of agreed criteria, concern is 
growing over the equity of climate finance, particularly internationally financed adaptation at a 
sub-national level (Pelling & Garschagen, 2019). Structural inequality within countries shapes 
not only who is vulnerable to climate impacts, but also who has access to resources that enable 
adaptation (Adger, 2006; Blackburn & Pelling, 2018; Eriksen, Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015; 
McNamara & Buggy, 2017). A growing body of empirical research has found that 
internationally financed adaptation can reinforce and even exacerbate this structural inequality 
(Artur & Hilhorst, 2012; S. Eriksen et al., 2021; Mikulewicz & Taylor, 2020; Nightingale, 2017; 
Sovacool, 2018) (see also Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of this literature). Research 
to date, however, has focused largely on negative outcomes: circumstances in which 
international support increased inequality in targeted communities. An alternative approach is to 
focus analysis on positive outcomes: circumstances in which international support advanced 
equity in adaptation (Bedran-Martins & Lemos, 2017; Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Wild et al., 
2015). An example of such an approach is Tendler’s (1997) analysis of “good government” in 
public sector reform, in which she examined institutions that effectively delivered public goods 
even when embedded within ineffective governments. Similarly, Grindle (2004, 2011) advocated 
for a “good enough governance” approach, focused on identifying improvements that occurred in 
public service and the conditions under which they occurred. She argued that by paying as much 
attention to what is working as what is not working, research could inform more effective 
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strategies for international actors to engage the institutions in place, and make progress towards 
reducing poverty. 
Entrenched, unequal power relationships are broadly seen to contribute to inequitable 
outcomes in internationally financed adaptation. Recent studies have drawn attention in 
particular to how forms of clientelism – the exchange of goods for political support – and 
patronage – the recruitment and promotion of government workers for partisan connections – 
distort the outcomes of international interventions meant to foster adaptation among vulnerable 
groups (Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013; van de Walle, 2009). Sovacool (2018), for example, 
illustrated how predatory patron-client relationships enabled land grabbing in National 
Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) projects in Bangladesh. Likewise, Nightingale (2017) 
analyzed how political party patronage in Nepal enabled wealthier and higher-caste landowners 
to capture benefits from international adaptation projects.  
Patronage and clientelism are informal institutions: socially shared rules that are “created, 
communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, 
725). Informal institutions take many forms, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to 
forms of customary governance (North, 1990). In contrast to formal institutions, in which power 
is grounded in legal-rational authority and prescribed by written rules, power in informal 
institutions is often based on implicit, unwritten understandings (Carey, 2000; North, 1990; 
Weber, 1946). In many countries, patterns of clientelism and patronage co-exist with official 
democratic, market, and state institutions, as is the case in neopatrimonial regimes (Bratton & 
Van de Walle, 1994; Helmke & Levitsky, 2012). Often, the incentives of these institutions shape 
government decision-making and distribution of resources. While the rules of formal institutions 
usually dictate that the state provide public goods impersonally, based on objective and 
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transparent criteria, goods in clientelistic and neopatrimonial systems tend to be distributed 
narrowly to political supporters (Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews, 2013; Williams & Young, 
1994). These “particularist” institutions – so-called because they favor some over others – are 
thus generally seen to contribute to inequality (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; O’Donnell, 
1996). MOs in particular have tended to see them as inherently dysfunctional and corrupt 
(Harrison, 2005; Williams & Young, 1994) (see also Chapter 1). 
Despite this, there is evidence that informal institutions can help solve problems and 
contribute to equitable outcomes under some circumstances (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; 
Jörgel & Utas, 2007; Kpundeh, 2000; Taylor-Robinson, 2006; Unsworth, 2010). Helmke & 
Levitsky (2012) theorize that what matters for outcomes of informal institutions is how they 
interact with formal ones. Where formal institutions are effective, informal institutions can 
complement and accommodate them; where formal institutions are ineffective, informal often 
substitute and compete. Others have drawn attention to how formal and informal coalitions of 
actors can contribute to positive outcomes, even in contexts of entrenched, unequal power 
(Bedran-Martins & Lemos, 2017; Booth & Faustino, 2014; Grindle, 1997). Tendler (1997) 
highlighted, for example, how partnerships between central government, local government, and 
civil society actors played an important role in cases of “good government.” Incremental reform, 
many have argued, can cumulatively produce transformation in inequitable systems (Grindle, 
2004; Levy, 2014).  
As evidence mounts that international financing for adaptation can reinforce unequal power 
relations – including informal power relations – many have called for a fundamental shift in 
frameworks of intervention (Eriksen, Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015; Eriksen et al., 2021; Ireland & 
McKinnon, 2013; Taylor, 2014). To achieve equity, they assert, adaptation organizations must 
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challenge structural inequality and the political processes that perpetuate it (Eriksen et al., 2015; 
Nightingale, 2017). Many advocate for localizing and democratizing decision-making at the 
community level (Ireland & McKinnon, 2013; Marino & Ribot, 2012; Mikulewicz, 2018; 
Swyngedouw, 2013; Tschakert et al., 2016). Adaptation organizations, however, face significant 
constraints in challenging and overturning unequal power relationships in the countries and 
communities where they intervene (Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 2015; Wild et al., 2015; Yanguas & 
Hulme, 2015). An improved understanding of the circumstances that contribute to equity – 
particularly the institutional arrangements and partnerships of actors – could inform realistic 
strategies for adaptation organizations to engage with the institutions in place and advance equity 
within current frameworks.  
 
Understanding Informal Power on the Ground – Project Implementation in Mauritius and 
Madagascar: Mauritius and Madagascar are particularly good sites for comparative analysis of 
how informal institutions shape decision-making and equity of internationally financed 
adaptation. As island states in the Western Indian Ocean, their governments are responding to 
similar climate hazards: shifting precipitation patterns, increasingly severe cyclones, sea level 
rise, and ocean acidification (Ragoonaden et al., 2006; Tadross et al., 2008). Both countries 
feature “particularist” institutions organized along ethnic lines: clientelistic networks in 
Mauritius and institutionalized patronage in Madagascar (Kasenally & Ramtohul, 2020; Marcus, 
2016). In both islands, these informal institutions have historically influenced government 
decision-making and the channels through which state resources are distributed (Bunwaree & 
Kasenally, 2005; Razafindrakoto, Roubaud, & Wachsberger, 2013). In addition to featuring these 
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distinct forms of particularism, Mauritius and Madagascar differ widely in the perceived quality 
of their overall governance.   
 
Political Clientelism and Private Interests in Mauritius: Mauritius is broadly hailed as a 
model “development state” (Goldsmith, 2007; Sandbrook, 2005). Despite inauspicious 
circumstances at independence – geographic isolation, a monocrop economy, and deep ethnic 
divisions – Mauritius achieved democratic stability and economic growth (Miles, 1999; 
Subramanian & Roy, 2001). Political observers frequently note that Mauritians chose “the ballot 
over the bullet” (Kasenally, 2011, 160). Many have attributed Mauritius’ success to strong 
formal institutions: elements of a consociational political system that ensure representation from 
all ethnic groups in governance (Brautigam, 1997; Darga, 1998), a meritocratic civil service 
(Carroll & Carroll, 1997), and a strong social welfare system that redistributes wealth and targets 
disadvantaged groups (Greig, Turner, & D’Arcy, 2011; Phaahla, 2019; Sandbrook, 2005). Others 
note the importance of a politically-engaged populace and dynamic civil society (Carroll & 
Carroll, 2000; Darga & Joomun, 2005). Additionally, an early separation of political and 
economic power, with a Hindu majority dominating the government but Franco-Mauritians 
maintaining majority land ownership, contributed to a balance of interests in the political process 
(Bunwaree & Kasenally, 2005; Sandbrook, 2005). 
Despite its reputation for “good governance,” informal networks of clientelism remain 
integral to the Mauritian political process (Kasenally & Ramtohul, 2020). Mauritius is a 
complex, ethnically-fractionalized state comprised of Indo-, Franco-, and Sino-Mauritians, as 
well as a large Creole population descended primarily from Africans brought to the island in 
slavery (Carroll & Carroll, 2000; Carroll & Carroll, 1997). Appeals not only to ethnicity, but also 
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caste and religious identity, remain key to gaining and maintaining political support (Kadima & 
Kasenally, 2005; Kasenally, 2011). Often these appeals take the form of quid pro quo exchanges 
linked to electoral cycles. In exchange for political support, candidates provide basic goods or 
make promises about jobs, plots of land, and permits and licenses (Darga, 1998; Kasenally & 
Ramtohul, 2020). Clientelism functions to balance interests and redistribute wealth across ethno-
religious groups, as is broadly expected by the populace in this socialist state (Sandbrook, 2005). 
Some have argued, however, that official multi-culturalism and power-sharing arrangements 
have obscured continuing marginalization of the Creole population (Boswell, 2005; 
Lallmahomed-Aumeerally, 2017).  
Mauritian scholars have expressed concern that the narrative of the model “development 
state” has led to complacency about threats to the democratic process. The private sector 
exercises increasing influence in politics, including through opaque campaign financing 
(Ramoly, 2007). Recent research has shown that collusion between political and economic elites 
is contributing to an “accelerated presence of clientelism” and undermining a political system 
built on redistributive equity (Bunwaree, 2014; Kasenally & Ramtohul, 2020, 3). Inequality is 
rising, especially in the context of land ownership (Bunwaree, 2014; Bunwaree & Kasenally, 
2005; Police-Michele, 2007). Lower income groups, primarily Creole, are less likely to own land 
and disproportionately occupy government housing, often living in “precarious housing 
conditions” on marginal lands prone to flooding (Chacowry, McEwen, & Lynch, 2018; Truth & 
Justice Commission, 2011). Lack of transparency around land ownership and coastal 
development has prompted fierce civil society backlash (Prang, 2016; Ramtohul, 2016). Creole 
groups, long poorly represented in civil society, have been particularly active in opposing resort 
development schemes linked to the conversion of former sugar plantations (Carroll & Carroll, 
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2000; Ramtohul, 2016). They have also challenged the role of MOs in “green-washing” the 
government’s development agenda (Burn, 2019).  
 
Elite Disconnect and Institutionalized Patronage in Madagascar: In contrast to Mauritius, 
Madagascar is widely seen as suffering from chronically “poor governance,” with an unstable 
democracy and weak institutions. Observers note that Madagascar is the only country in the 
world to become poorer since independence without experiencing a major civil conflict (Pilling, 
2018). Phases of robust economic growth have been short-circuited by periodic political crises, 
in what Razafindrakoto et al. (2013) call the “Malagasy Paradox.” The most recent undemocratic 
transfer of power in 2009 triggered the withdrawal of most international aid, upon which the 
government had relied heavily to provide basic social services (International Crisis Group, 
2014). Many attribute the country’s political and economic inequality to corruption and weak 
formal institutions of democratic governance (Hinthorne, 2013; Jones et al., 2019). 
Consequently, the populace has grown increasingly disillusioned with the political process 
(Kohnert et al., 2008; Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003; Wachsberger, 2007). 
The Malagasy political system is characterized by an increasing concentration of political 
and economic power among a narrow group of elites (Marcus, 2010; Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 
2005). With weak intermediary bodies (political parties, civil society, local authorities), these 
elites are also increasingly disconnected from the broader populace. Political parties serve as 
vehicles of elite interest and ambition and rarely represent the concerns of the country’s large 
rural population (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005). Civil society is also disconnected from the 
broader populace and rarely holds the government to account (Rafitoson, 2019). Successive 
changes in the constitution have stripped local and customary authorities of meaningful power 
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(Marcus, 2016). As a result, political leaders and government decision-makers act without much 
consideration for constituents (Razafindrakoto et al., 2013). 
The Malagasy government is frequently characterized as neopatrimonial, acting foremost a 
vehicle of patronage (Marcus, 2016). Positions in the civil service are awarded not on merit, but 
on partisan connections. Officeholders use their positions to consolidate and exercise power, as 
well as to pursue personal profit and prestige (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005). State resources 
are often distributed through personal connections or to build political capital (Moser, 2008). 
Though scholars disagree on the extent to which ethnicity animates Malagasy politics, most 
agree that a single “ethno-political cleavage” divides one group, the Merina, from all others 
(Lambek, 2001; Razafindrakoto et al., 2013; Veriza, 2018). Merina decision-makers use their 
dominant position in the government to direct state resources, including those derived from 
international aid, to political supporters and favored ethnic groups (Koter, 2013; Moser, 2008; 
Stifel, Forster, & Barrett, 2010). This phenomenon is most pronounced in the southern regions of 
Madagascar, which strongly differ culturally from the Merina government and have long resisted 
integration into the Malagasy state (Healy, 2017; Middleton, 1999). Though these regions pay a 
higher proportion of taxes, they have been systematically deprived of state resources (Marcus, 
2007). This trend has continued even as the south has faced drought, widespread famine, and the 




I present a comparative, qualitative case study focused on the national governments of 
Mauritius and Madagascar (Yin, 1994). I examine decision-making, resource-distribution, and 
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the equity of outcomes associated with the implementation of the AF project in each country 
(Table 3.1). Employing an in-depth, qualitative, and comparative approach offers two key 
advantages over previous studies of equity in climate finance. First, it allows insight into the 
decision-making processes of policy-makers and AF project actors. This focus on depth differs 
from previous studies of equity in climate finance that focused on breadth, analyzing outcomes 
across a portfolio of projects (Barrett, 2014; Persson & Remling, 2014). The second advantage is 
that it enables a nuanced comparison of how different particularist institutions shape decision-
making and distributional outcomes, in response to similar climate hazards.  
Table 3.1 Adaptation Fund Projects 
 Mauritius Madagascar 
Adaptation Fund 
Project 
Climate Change Adaptation 
Programme in the Coastal Zone of 
Mauritius 
Promoting Climate Resilience in the 
Rice Sector through Pilot Investments 
in Alaotra-Mangoro Region 
Executing Agency Ministry of Environment and 
Sustainable Development9 
Ministry of Environment, Ecology, 
and Forests10 
Implementing Agency United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) 
United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) 
Years 2012-2019 2012-2019 
Budget $9,119,240 $5,104,925 
Primary Intervention 
Sites 
Three coastal communities (Mon 
Choisy, Riviere des Galets, Quatre 
Soeurs) 
Three communes in the Alaotra-






Development of storm surge early 
warning system, improved 
institutional capacity in coastal 
modelling and cost-benefit 
analysis, policy mainstreaming 
Development of “resilient rice 
model,” improved institutional 
capacity in forecasting and 




Improved resilience to erosion and 
storm surges through installation 
of coastal infrastructure and refuge 
centers 
Improved yields of low-income 
farmers though agricultural support 
and trainings, investment in 




9 The name has since changed to the Ministry of Environment, Solid Waste Management, and Climate Change. 
10 During the implementation of the AF project in Madagascar, the Ministry of Environment was known as the 
Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Ecologie, et des Forêts. The name has since changed to Ministère 
l’Environnement et du Dèveloppement Durable.   
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I followed a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Pidgeon & Henwood, 2004). 
I initially sought to explore how the differing national governance environments of the two 
countries shaped implementation of internationally financed adaptation. I focused on the AF, 
first, because its emphasis on “country ownership” of funded projects cedes significant decision-
making power to national policymakers. Second, the AF’s unique guidance to target the 
“particularly vulnerable” provided an opportunity to examine how national governance shaped 
the distribution of project resources.  
I employed the same two-phase methodology in each site. The goal of the first phase was to 
explore and characterize each country’s broad governance environment, with a focus on how 
these characteristics shape policymaking for climate change. In the first phase, I interviewed 
policymakers, civil society organizations, and representatives of MOs and adaptation 
organizations in each site. These interviews were coded using NVivo software following an 
open-ended coding scheme. This approach allowed categories of governance to emerge in each 
case, and ensured that analysis would be grounded in the contemporary governance environment 
and thus not overly reliant on published literature. Two significant themes emerged from first-
phase interviews in both cases: the influence of informal, particularist institutions; and actors’ 
varying interpretations of equity and vulnerability in the context of climate change.  
The goal of the second phase was to investigate how categories of governance derived from 
the first phase influenced the design, implementation, and outcomes of the AF projects. I 
interviewed individuals directly involved in each project: members of the project team within the 
Ministries of Environment, representatives of other government ministries and agencies involved 
in implementation, UNEP and UNDP officials, NGOs, private contractors, and international and 
domestic consultants. In Mauritius, I also interviewed residents and business owners in 
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intervention sites. Categories derived from phase one were used to design the semi-structured 
interview guides. In analyzing the AF project outcomes, I follow the prioritarian framing of the 
AF, focusing on whether the project targeted and benefited the most vulnerable communities. In 
the absence of an agreed definition of vulnerability, I define vulnerable communities as the most 
socially disadvantaged and politically marginalized, following McNamara & Buggy (2017). 
In Madagascar, I conducted 65 total interviews over a 10-month period, 28 of which were 
with project actors. I conducted the majority of interviews in Malagasy, with a minority in 
English. In Mauritius, a research assistant and I conducted 40 interviews over a 12-month period, 
18 with project actors. Because the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted fieldwork in Mauritius after 
two months, the final 28 interviews were completed either remotely by the researcher or by a 
research assistant in Mauritius. I conducted the majority of interviews in English. A small 
minority were conducted by the research assistant in Creole.  
All interviews were semi-structured, with most interviewees consenting to be recorded. All 
recorded interviews were transcribed and, if necessary, translated from Malagasy and Creole in 
to English by a research assistant. Findings from the interviews are supplemented by analysis of 
AF project documents – some publicly available, some shared privately by project actors. A 
number of other government and civil society documents were also analyzed. In Madagascar, I 
also conducted participant observation at the AF project’s closing workshop. Findings in 
Madagascar were additionally supplemented by household surveys collected in project sites in 




Findings and Analyses 
(See Appendix A for detailed qualitative evidence associated with each section) 
Clientelism and Private Sector Interests in Mauritius: Clientelism and informal private sector 
lobbying both played roles in the Mauritian Ministry of Environment’s selection of the AF 
project sites. The first site, Riviere des Galets, is a small fishing community on the island’s 
southern coast. A 2003 government report on coastal erosion, which served as the basis for site 
selection, identified it as a high priority site for intervention (Baird, 2003). Periodic storm surges 
over-topped a failing sea wall, flooding homes and forcing inhabitants to evacuate to higher 
ground (Gemenne & Magnan, 2011). Project actors indicated, however, that the main reason the 
Ministry of Environment selected the site was the widespread incidence of asbestos that needed 
to be addressed because of health implications. Riviere des Galets includes a number of homes 
constructed as part of a state housing project known as Cité EDC.11 Built following a devastating 
cyclone and intended to temporarily house the most disadvantaged, many EDC houses were 
constructed with asbestos paneling (Hérisson, 2011; National Action Plan on Asbestos, 2002; 
Ramsamy-Iranah et al., 2020). As the AF project was under design, the government of Mauritius 
faced increasing pressure from opposition politicians and civil society organizations to replace 
the housing or relocate residents (Lalit, 2018; Truth & Justice Commission, 2011).  
Local politicians promised relocation for residents of Riviere des Galets before the AF 
project began. The government had already reached an agreement with a nearby sugar plantation, 
the largest land owner in southern Mauritius, to provide a relocation site (Azor & Ramoo, 2019). 
 
 
11 Cité EDC, is also known as EDC/Ex-CHA housing: “European Development Community/Ex-Central Housing 
Authority.” Riviere des Galets is one of 59 EDC sites in Mauritius. Estimates of the number of EDC houses built 
with asbestos paneling range between 2,000 and 3,000 (Lalit, 2018; National Action Plan on Asbestos, 2002). 
 70 
The estate would “donate” the land, likely in exchange for tax breaks on a real estate 
development.12 As one consultant said: “nobody gives land that close to ocean for free.” Despite 
the fact that the 2003 report recommended upgraded coastal protection works, the government 
established an expectation for relocation, both among the community and the consulting team 
contracted to recommend a course of action. As one domestic consultant described, the residents 
believed they would get “a house, a plot of land, and compensation.” The Terms of Reference for 
the project required that a “managed retreat” be evaluated among the options (UNDP, 2014). 
Several members of the consulting team noted that the main challenge the community faced was 
not storm surge but asbestos and resulting incidences of “lung disease.” As one detailed: “The 
government was much more concerned about the asbestos.” The consultant continued:  
[Relocation] is what the government wanted, and it was because of the asbestos in the homes. They 
wanted to promise. And, of course, you have the local politicians saying: if you vote for me, we will 
give you a new home and it is going to be in the sugar plot area. So, you are very close to where you 
were, and we are going to call it “managed retreat.” 
 
The consulting team rejected relocation as an option, arguing that it triggered UNDP and AF 
social safeguards.  
Interviews also revealed that private sector interests influenced selection of a second project 
site, Mon Choisy. Unlike Riviere des Galets, which is in the island’s less prosperous south, Mon 
Choisy is located in the prosperous and tourism-focused northwest. Though many project actors 
observed that the area experienced high rates of erosion, the 2003 government report did not 
identify it as a priority site (Baird, 2003).13 Mon Choisy was, however, an important area for real 
estate development, particularly a large resort and golf course that broke ground soon after the 
 
 
12 St. Felix sugar estate submitted a proposal for a development under the Integrated Resort Scheme in 2003. 
13 The report did identify neighboring Grand Baie as a priority site, but this site is distinctly separate from Mon 
Choisy.  
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AF project was initiated. A number of project actors and civil society representatives highlighted 
the influence of private sector interests, particularly real estate, in shaping government policy. As 
one domestic consultant described: “The private sector, with their investment and their links into 
the government, has a major say on what happens on the coast and in terms of future 
development.” Another explained: “The cabinet has their arms twisted behind their back by the 
private sector.” 
According to an international consultant, hotel interests played a significant role in steering 
site selection: “They are doing this property development, this golf course near Mon Choisy…a 
lot of money is going up there to develop the area, so let’s make it a nice beach.” A UNDP 
official confirmed that Mon Choisy was selected for “tourist values.” Private interests also 
shaped project implementation. The Terms of Reference for the consulting team emphasized the 
importance of “preserv[ing] economic activities” linked to the beach (UNDP, 2014). The 
government rejected recommended measures – including an artificial reef that would extend 
above the ocean surface, the replanting of seagrass, and a reduction in motorized boat activity – 
that would reduce erosion but leave the beach less aesthetically appealing, especially to foreign 
tourists. The government also warned the consulting team not to recommend the removal of 
private infrastructure that exacerbated erosion, for example cement berms installed by resorts 
under ambiguous legality. 
 
Institutionalized Patronage in Madagascar: The Malagasy Ministry of Environment, like 
most branches of the government, is part of a broad system of state patronage in Madagascar in 
which employment, contracts, and other perquisites are distributed based not on merit but on 
partisan connections (Marcus, 2016; Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005). An unpublished 2018 
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report from the Committee for Protection of Integrity14 – an internal governance initiative – 
found that more than 600 individuals collected a salary from the Ministry despite having neither 
offices nor portfolios. According to this report, around a third of all positions in the Ministry are 
sinecures (Rapport d’Enquete Tenant Lieu d’Etat Initial de la Gouvernance au Sien du Secteur 
Environnement, 2018). To decision-makers in the Ministry, responding to the incentives of this 
institutional environment, AF funding represented an opportunity for patronage and profit.  
Throughout the seven-year implementation of the AF project, the Ministry of Environment 
increasingly consolidated decision-making and financial power. Following the 2009 political 
crisis, the government of Madagascar was, in the words of one international consultant, 
“resource starved.” Inter-ministerial competition over financial resources was fierce, and climate 
finance represented a novel and significant form of income. The AF proposal framed the project 
as “inter-sectoral:” a partnership across government ministries, agencies, and parastatal 
organizations. As it unfolded, however, the Ministry of Environment stripped these other 
ministries and agencies of decision-making power, and in some cases of their roles entirely. For 
example, the Ministry of Agriculture, which traditionally received a far larger share of 
international aid than that of Environment, retained only nominal involvement despite the 
project’s heavy agricultural focus (Adaptation Fund, 2018). The International Rice Research 
Institute, which played a prominent role in the project’s original design, was removed entirely for 
what several UNEP officials and international consultants described as “political reasons.” The 
Meteorological Agency’s role was limited to a “formality,” according to a Meteorology official, 
installing weather stations, without a budget for either maintaining them or analyzing the data 
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collected. As an international consultant described: “The Ministry of Environment, traditionally 
very weak and traditionally resource-poor, did not want to hand over any of the climate 
resources.” 
As the Ministry of Environment stripped other ministries and agencies of their roles, the 
tasks were transferred to consultancies.15 The gradual restructuring enabled actors within the 
Ministry to collect kickbacks on these contracts in several ways. First, through what one 
domestic consultant referred to as the “tuition and fee system,” actors within the Ministry could 
demand a portion of external consultancy fees. From a $70,000 contract, a consultant might 
pocket as little as $15,000. Second, tasks originally intended to be completed by civil service 
employees in their official capacity were converted to private consultancies taken under their 
personal names.16 Finally, members of the AF project team were subject to salary kickbacks. 
Members of the team, who were paid from AF funds, were required to pay part of each paycheck 
to their immediate director and part to the director above him or her. 
The AF project also invested in infrastructure in project sites, enabling further patronage in 
the distribution of construction contracts. In the case of a number of large irrigation 
infrastructure contracts, a UNEP official acknowledged: “It was quite clear that there were, you 
know, pushes and pulls from very high up in the Ministry that were influencing that process.” 
The same official said the pressure could come from as high as the Minister of Environment. In 
one case, a contract for the construction of community granaries was initially awarded to several 
companies that had been created just days before and were all owned by a single individual. 
 
 
15 Annual project reports show that as much as 83% of the project budget was dedicated to consultancies and private 
contracts (see Appendix H). 
16 The agricultural extension agency, FOFIFA, secured a number of these contracts. 
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Public versus Private Project Benefits: The AF projects in Mauritius and Madagascar 
differed significantly in the nature of the benefits each government chose to distribute, especially 
within project sites. In Mauritius, all benefits were collective. The AF project prioritized coastal 
infrastructure – including revetments and artificial reefs, mangrove plantations, and refuge 
centers – that benefited entire communities. The project also developed an Early Warning 
System for storm surges that covered the whole island of Mauritius, as well as the remote outer 
islands of Rodrigues and Agalega (Bogaard et al., 2016). In contrast, in Madagascar, many of the 
project benefits were individualized. Households in Alaotra-Mangoro received valuable rice 
seed, seedlings, and agricultural tools on an individual basis. Most infrastructure, including 
investments in irrigation and reforestation, benefited only some within communities and 
contracts were structured to enable private kickbacks to Ministry officials. As described above, 
the project itself was also increasingly privatized within the government.  
The two cases also differed in the concentration of project resources, both financial and 
technical. Funding was highly centralized in Madagascar, with little of the budget reaching 
households in Alaotra-Mangoro. Because project actors sought to retain decision-making and 
financial control, they avoided collaboration and information sharing with other agencies, not 
only within the government, but also externally. A number of international organizations were 
active in Alaotra-Mangoro and a representative of one organization reported that the government 
rebuffed a proposal to collaborate. In contrast, in Mauritius, most project funding was dispersed 
to communities in the form of coastal infrastructure. The AF project collaborated and shared 
resources with other agencies. Instead of contracting out capacity-building trainings to 
consultants, they provided the funding to the University of Mauritius.  
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Vulnerability and Equity: The AF mandates that projects target the “particularly vulnerable.” 
It does not, however, clearly define vulnerability on either the global or national level, granting 
governments significant leeway in selecting which communities to target (Harmeling & Kaloga, 
2011; Persson & Remling, 2014). Mauritius and Madagascar face a similar range of climate 
hazards, but each government utilized different framings of vulnerability in rationalizing site 
selection. These frames contributed to the relative equity of project outcomes in each case. 
The government of Mauritius framed the AF project around public values, economic impacts, 
and “life or death situations” (Proposal for Mauritius, 2011). Though it chose to focus the 
project in the coastal zone – the country’s “economic engine,” in the words of one UNDP official 
– project actors repeatedly emphasized the importance of reaching the most socially vulnerable. 
As a domestic consultant described the failed attempt to relocate the residents of Riviere des 
Galets: “It was mainly to save their lives. Not their livelihoods, but their lives.” Mauritius’ 
unpublished National Coastal Zone Strategy found the coastline near Riviere des Galets and the 
project’s third site, Quatre Soeurs, to be among the island’s most socially vulnerable, as 
measured by education, income level, and land ownership (AGRER, 2019). Inhabitants of 
Riviere des Galets, predominantly Creole, are also among the most politically marginalized. 
Though the third project site, Mon Choisy, is relatively prosperous and features influential hotels 
that target foreign tourists, its beach is also among a dwindling number that allow public access. 
Members of the project team acknowledged an effort to balance public and private interests: “We 
really wanted to look at two different kinds of things. One where the local population is 
vulnerable. The second one where the hotels are there at the public beach.” Additionally, the 
focus on dispersed goods in project sites spread benefits relatively equally within communities.  
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The government of Madagascar framed the AF project around economic value and 
agricultural productivity (Antilahy Herimpitia, 2017; Proposal for Madagascar, 2011). Alaotra-
Mangoro is less socially vulnerable than many other regions of Madagascar, with higher per 
capita income and employment levels (Borgerson et al., 2018; Sulla & D’Hoore, 2014). 
Universally, project actors stressed the region’s importance as the country’s “breadbasket” and 
“first granary.” In contrast, Malagasy policymakers, including AF project team members, 
characterized the southern regions – then facing drought, famine, and out-migration – as “always 
in crisis.” One said that (s)he saw the distribution of state resources to the south as a “waste.”  
Unlike the project sites in Mauritius, Alaotra-Mangoro is a politically important region. The 
location of the AF project followed a pattern of political and ethnic patronage in the distribution 
of state resources. Located in the highlands, Aloatra-Mangoro is populated primarily by the 
Sihanaka ethnic group, which is among the groups that benefit from cultural and geographic 
proximity to the Merina (Stifel et al., 2010). At the time of project design, many in the region 
were disenchanted with the central government.17 In an indication of the project’s political 
importance, the Prime Minister visited the launch workshop by helicopter, a level of political 
engagement that a UNEP official described as “completely unprecedented.” Furthermore, 
measurement of distributional outcomes in Alaotra-Mangoro found that project participation was 
strongly associated with higher levels of household political connectivity rather than 
vulnerability (see Chapter 4).  
In Madagascar, the privatization and concentration of resources within the Ministry of 
Environment also undermined capacity-building in other ministries and agencies, a primary 
 
 
17 Both elites and voters in Alaotra-Mangoro had strongly supported the former president, Ravalomanana, who was 
unlawfully removed from power in 2009.  
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project objective. For example, the government mapping agency, FTM,18 was originally tasked 
with developing vulnerability maps. After an early workshop, however, the agency was removed 
from the project and the contract privatized. FTM – whose representatives said they never 
learned why they lost their role – still lacks the capacity to develop these maps. The skill is now 
privately held, and commodified by, a private consultant. The focus on consultancies also 
inhibited the dissemination of information, including project results such as the resilient rice 
model. Many of the research documents the project claims to have produced are either publicly 
unavailable or non-existent. In Mauritius, in contrast, collaboration and information sharing 
enabled capacity-building across government and non-government agencies. A number of non-
project actors noted that the government is already replicating project results in other sites. The 
University of Mauritius continues to offer some courses developed with project funding. Most, 
though not all, project documents are publicly available and accessible.  
 
Recognition and Intervention of Oversight Agencies: UNDP and UNEP were differently 
situated in their oversight roles in Mauritius and Madagascar. UNDP had an office in Mauritius 
that employed a largely Mauritian staff. Its long history in the country gave UNDP officials 
contextual knowledge of the sociopolitical dynamics. This knowledge enabled officials to 
specifically recognize how the “culture of clientelism” shaped project implementation and 
outcomes. International staff and consultants pointed to the important mediating role that 
Mauritian staff played between the Mauritian government, UNDP, and consultants. UNDP 
officials intervened when informal power threatened to undermine the project’s equity. For 
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example, the UNDP rejected the relocation of the community in Riviere des Galets on the 
grounds that “this is not so much a managed retreat as a resettlement.” They enforced the AF and 
UNDP’s social safeguards, citing divided support within the community, especially linked to the 
differences in wealth. At the same time, UNDP officials tolerated trade-offs between public and 
private interests, as at Mon Choisy where the influence of local hotels prevailed. 
In contrast, UNEP was not well-situated to mediate between informal power and formal 
governance requirements. Without an office in Madagascar, UNEP officials would usually visit 
for one or two short stints a year. None of the officials or international consultants spoke 
Malagasy. Though UNEP officials recognized that informal power shaped project 
implementation, they were unable to diagnose the specific mechanisms or to understand the 
incentives of government actors. They acknowledged “procurement problems,” “corruption,” 
“improper influence,” and “political decision-making,” but not patronage. As a result, they 
intervened only in circumstances where violations of formal governance requirements would be 
visible on a global level, for example through audit reports. In the case of the contract granted to 
newly created companies, UNEP officials insisted the below-standards granaries be demolished 
and the contract re-issued. They did not intervene, however, in the more systemic manifestations 
of patronage, such as salary kickbacks. As an international consultant explained: 
Because there was no way we were going to change that. And the only thing that was going to happen 
is that it was going to cost people their jobs, you know? For talking. There would be, there would 
definitely be les représailles, you know? So we didn’t pursue.  
 
Largely unable to steer the project towards more equitable outcomes, UNEP was, as a domestic 




A “Good Enough” Approach for Equity in Adaptation: Most of the discussion around how to 
make internationally financed adaptation more equitable has centered around calls for a 
fundamental shift in current frameworks. Eriksen et al. (2021) recently argued, for example, for a 
“transformation in adaptation organizations” rooted in questioning the “fundamental and 
unacknowledged assumptions that underpin development” (11). Many have asserted that only by 
localizing and democratizing decision-making will international interventions challenge 
structural inequality and achieve equitable adaptation (Eriksen et al., 2015; Ireland & McKinnon, 
2013; Mikulewicz, 2018; Mikulewicz & Taylor, 2020). 
Though I agree that more localized and democratized forms of adaptation are ideal, there is 
little indication that such a fundamental shift is underway. International support directed through 
the UN Climate Convention and multilateral funds like the AF is guided by a principle of 
“country ownership” that locates primary decision-making authority with national governments 
(Harmeling & Kaloga, 2011; Schalatek, 2019). This arrangement makes it difficult to bypass 
national bureaucracies and provide financing directly to local governments and communities, as 
some have suggested for international aid (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009). In Mauritius and 
Madagascar, at least, national level decision-makers delegated no meaningful authority over 
project decisions or finances to local entities, though this may not be the case in all contexts. 
Likewise, despite decades of criticism, adaptation organizations have shown little inclination to 
cede decision-making authority to local levels, or to challenge entrenched and unequal power 
relationships (Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 2015; Wild et al., 2015; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Indeed, 
Eriksen et al. acknowledge that such thinking has “yet to penetrate into development practice” 
(11). While I have argued elsewhere that innovative spaces within the architecture of climate 
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finance offer potential to generate new approaches to informal institutions, any experimentation 
would likely start small and develop slowly (Chapter 1).  
Given the resilience of current frameworks, I argue that adaptation scholars and practitioners 
should consider the value of a “good enough” approach to equity in adaptation (Grindle, 2004, 
2011). Rather than focusing solely on negative outcomes, such an approach would entail 
identifying the cases where internationally financed adaptation has yielded relatively equitable 
results, especially cases where funding has benefited socially disadvantaged and politically 
marginalized groups. Analyzing the circumstances that contributed to positive outcomes can 
yield insights and inform strategies that advance equity within current frameworks. I apply this 
approach to the institutional arrangements in Mauritius and Madagascar below.  
 
Circumstances that Enable Equity: Informal institutions are deep-rooted in many contexts. 
These comparative cases demonstrate that government decision-makers in both Mauritius and 
Madagascar channeled AF project benefits through informal channels and used them as part of 
broader efforts to build and maintain political power. This occurred in both “good” and “poor” 
governance environments. Despite the fact that both clientelism and patronage are generally 
expected to contribute to inequity, the AF projects diverged significantly in the equity of their 
outcomes. In Mauritius, project benefits were shared broadly and partially targeted socially 
disadvantaged and politically marginalized groups. In Madagascar, project resources were 
privatized and largely benefited the politically favored, especially a narrow elite in and around 
the Malagasy government. I identify two primary characteristics of the national institutional 
environment that explain this divergent outcome: (a & b) the interaction of informal institutions 
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with formal mechanisms of accountability; and (c), the alignment of formal and informal 
incentives for national-level decision-makers to advance equity.  
 
(a) Interaction of Informal Institutions with Downward Mechanisms of Accountability: 
Particularist institutions are broadly seen, especially by MOs, as competing with or undermining 
formal institutions. In some contexts, however, clientelism has reinforced official state 
institutions (Jörgel & Utas, 2007; Kpundeh, 2000; Taylor-Robinson, 2006). Helmke & Levitsky 
(2012) theorized that what matters for outcomes is how informal institutions interact with formal. 
In particular, they argued that the effectiveness of formal institutions is critical. I argue that how 
informal institutions interact specifically with formal mechanisms of accountability is key to 
equity in internationally financed adaptation. I distinguish here between downward mechanisms 
of accountability to citizens and upward mechanisms of accountability to the global level.  
Mauritius and Madagascar differ in the strength of the formal institutions that enable 
government accountability. In Mauritius, clientelism is intertwined with the electoral system 
(Kasenally & Ramtohul, 2020). Though the system is flawed, it nevertheless functions to 
represent the interests of Mauritian citizens, who are engaged in the political process and vote at 
exceptionally high rates (Phaahla, 2019; von Borzyskowski & Kuhn, 2020). The populace 
broadly expects a redistribution of wealth, particularly to the socially vulnerable (Sandbrook, 
2005). If government decision-makers do not meet this expectation, opposition political groups 
offer a meaningful alternative (Kadima & Kasenally, 2005). On the other hand, the system of 
patronage in Madagascar is isolated from what are relatively weak formal mechanisms of 
accountability. With political power concentrated among a narrow elite, government decision-
makers do not see themselves as accountable to citizens, who are largely disengaged from the 
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political process and vote at low rates (Wachsberger, 2007). Elites themselves expect, even 
demand, inequitable distribution of state resources through patronage (Thomas, 2007). 
Opposition parties are unlikely to represent the interests of the country’s large, rural population, 
let alone politically marginalized groups (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005).  
Formal institutions (e.g., those that ensure transparency, open information, freedom of 
speech) enable citizens and civil society to hold government decision-makers to account. In 
Mauritius, civil society is active and empowered. Civil society organizations represent a broad 
set of interests, including the Creole population (Burn, 2019). Some of these organizations 
specifically scrutinize and critique the government’s use of international public finance, 
including the role of UNDP in supporting environment and development projects (Unit, 2020). 
Malagasy civil society, in contrast, represents primarily elite interests (Rafitoson, 2019). Civil 
society organizations rarely scrutinize the government’s use of international public resources or 
criticize the role of MOs. 
 
(b) Interaction of Informal Institutions with Upward Mechanisms of Accountability: Though 
Helmke & Levitsky’s framework is useful, it does not consider the interaction of formal and 
informal institutions across governance scales. Given that international climate finance is guided 
by formal norms established at the global level (in this case, the AF) and enforced by MOs (in 
this case, UNDP and UNEP), I would add that the effectiveness of formal mechanisms of 
accountability at the global level also shapes the equity of outcomes. UNDP and UNEP differed 
in their capacity to enforce formal governance requirements. In Mauritius, the contextual 
knowledge of UNDP officials enabled them to recognize the dynamics of clientelism and 
intervene to make the project more equitable, as was the case in Riviere des Galets, where a 
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forced relocation of a divided community risked exacerbating inequality. In Madagascar, UNEP 
officials’ lack of contextual knowledge and limited on-the-ground presence made it difficult for 
them to diagnose the specific operation of patronage within the Ministry of Environment. As a 
result, they intervened only in circumstances that would be visible in audits, but not in more 
systemic manifestations of patronage (such as kickback schemes) that arguably exacerbated 
inequality on a larger scale.  
 
(c) Alignment of Formal and Informal Incentives for Equitable Adaptation: The incentives of 
both formal and informal institutions shaped the behavior of decision-makers within the 
Mauritian and Malagasy governments (Helmke & Levitsky, 2012; North, 1990). Only in 
Mauritius, however, were those incentives largely aligned. Ethno-religious clientelism functions 
in Mauritius to balance interests and redistribute wealth across a fractionalized population 
(Bunwaree & Kasenally, 2005; Kasenally & Ramtohul, 2020). Government decision-makers 
were thus incentivized to spread benefits broadly across constituency groups. The formal 
electoral system likewise encouraged them to redistribute resources and to target disadvantaged 
groups in society (Sandbrook, 2005). The nature of the project goods themselves – coastal 
infrastructure, refuge centers, an early warning system – further facilitated a broad distribution of 
the benefits within communities. While government decision-makers steered some benefits to 
special interest groups (i.e., influential hotels and private developers in Mon Choisy), an engaged 
populace and active civil society ensured the project reflected an overall balance of public and 
private interests. Thus, both formal and informal incentives aligned with the Adaptation Fund 
requirements to benefit the “particularly vulnerable.” 
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In Madagascar, formal and informal incentives for equity were misaligned. The patronage 
system within the Malagasy government encourages actors to build power and pursue personal 
profit through the distribution of jobs and contracts (Marcus, 2016; Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 
2005). Decision-makers were thus incentivized to distribute AF project resources narrowly 
within the government, and to well-connected elites: Ministry officials, consultants, and private 
contractors. To the degree that project resources had to be distributed outside of elite networks, 
they were deployed to a relatively prosperous and politically important region in order to 
consolidate the government’s hold on power. Within project sites, politically connected 
households disproportionately benefited. Though the incentives of the formal democratic system 
may have encouraged a fair distribution of resources to disadvantaged groups, such as those in 
the southern regions then facing drought and famine, government decision-makers did not see 
themselves as accountable to this system. The informal incentives of patronage thus conflicted 
with the formal requirements of the AF.  
 
Insights of a “Good Enough” Approach in Mauritius and Madagascar: Focusing on the 
equitable outcome in Mauritius, and comparing it to the inequitable outcome in Madagascar, 
offers some clues as to how adaptation organizations can more effectively navigate informal 
institutions. First, they should recognize the operation of different types of informal power 
within and around national governments. These cases illustrate informal institutions are 
influential in both “good” and “poor” governance environments. They are likely to shape equity 
in most, if not all, countries receiving climate finance. A “good enough” approach means 
recognizing both the characteristics of these institutions and the circumstances under which they 
produce more equitable outcomes. These cases are generalizable in the sense that they represent 
 85 
common ‘particularist’ forms. Informal institutions, however, come in many forms and co-exist 
with formal institutions in many ways (Helmke & Levitsky, 2012).  
Recognizing these different forms may require adaptation organizations to be better 
contextually situated. UNDP and UNEP officials differed significantly in their knowledge of 
each country’s sociopolitical dynamics, which influenced their ability to mediate between formal 
and informal power. UNDP officials, especially local Mauritian staff, were able to build alliances 
between actors inside and outside the government to steer more equitable outcomes (Booth & 
Faustino, 2014; Tendler, 1997). This is hardly a new argument. More than a decade ago, 
Unsworth (2009) identified a lack of expertise on sociopolitical dynamics among the intellectual 
and institutional barriers to a “politically-grounded” approach to development. Yet, there is little 
sign that adaptation organizations have made significant investments in this expertise (Hout, 
2012; Unsworth, 2015; Wild et al., 2015; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Such a longer-term shift in 
the “mental models” of these organizations could be a first step in driving the broader paradigm 
shift that many scholars of adaptation are eager to see (Unsworth, 2009). 
Second, these cases indicate that adaptation organizations should pay close attention to the 
incentives of informal institutions. Some have noted how these organizations’ lack of 
understanding of the incentives of leaders and elites has hobbled development initiatives (Booth, 
2012; Thomas, 2007; Wright, 2008). To avoid repeating this mistake, these organizations should 
consider how formal and informal incentives, including incentives from the global level, align 
for government decision-makers. Adaptation organizations can also enable formal mechanisms 
of accountability. Community oversight has improved institutional performance and outcomes in 
a range of contexts (Levy, 2014; Tendler, 1997). Though it is likely outside the scope of most 
interventions to bolster formal democratic institutions (e.g., electoral systems), organizations can 
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still enable citizen and civil society scrutiny of projects through transparency. This could be 
achieved through publication of all project materials, including mid-term and final reviews in 
local languages.  
Finally, adaptation organizations should recognize the reality of trade-offs in national 
decision-making. They should expect that governments, and actors within those governments, 
will use international climate finance to build and consolidate power, as demonstrated by these 
cases and others (Nightingale, 2017; Sovacool, 2018). They should be willing to accept trade-
offs that produce relatively equitable outcomes, as was the case in Mauritius, where private 
sector interests were balanced by public benefits and other aspects of the project that targeted 
disadvantaged groups. By focusing on the outcomes of informal institutions, as well as their 
characteristics and circumstances, adaptation organizations can advance equity with current 
frameworks of intervention. 
 
Conclusion 
This comparative case study sought to understand how informal institutions of clientelism 
and patrimonialism shaped government decision-making and distribution of benefits in 
internationally financed adaptation projects. I examined the implementation of UN Adaptation 
Fund projects targeted at the particularly vulnerable in Mauritius and Madagascar. Drawing on 
105 interviews with national policymakers, civil society representatives, and AF project actors, I 
investigated the equity of project outcomes, with particular attention to if and how they benefited 
socially disadvantaged and politically marginalized groups in each country. 
I found that informal institutions influenced government decision-making in contexts of both 
“good” governance in Mauritius and “poor” governance in Madagascar. Government decision-
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makers in both cases distributed benefits through informal channels and used them as part of 
broader efforts to build power. Despite these similarities, the outcomes of the two AF projects 
differed significantly in their equity, especially in terms of the social disadvantage and political 
marginalization of the communities targeted. While project goods in Madagascar largely 
benefited a narrow elite at the national level and politically connected households at the local 
level, project goods in Mauritius were balanced between public and private interests and partially 
targeted particularly disadvantaged groups. I identified two primary characteristics of the 
national institutional environment that explain these divergent outcomes: the interaction of 
informal institutions with formal mechanisms of accountability, and the alignment of formal and 
informal incentives for government decision-makers to advance equity. 
I argued that these findings illustrate how a “good enough” approach to adaptation – focusing 
on positive outcomes for equity – can yield insights that inform realistic strategies for navigating 
unequal power relations, including entrenched forms of informal power, in international 
interventions. By shedding light on how informal incentives shaped government decision-
making, these findings also contribute to research that has shown that informal institutions are 
not inherently dysfunctional, as generally perceived by MOs, but can deliver equity under some 
circumstances. In particular, the relatively equitable outcomes in Mauritius reinforce theories 
that where formal institutions are effective, informal institutions can complement them. In the 
case of international climate finance, this includes mechanisms of accountability at both national 
and global levels. Given these findings, I suggested that adaptation organizations should 
recognize the operation of different types of informal power in and around national governments, 
pay close attention to the incentives of government decision-makers, enable community 
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oversight through transparency, and recognize the reality of trade-offs in decision-making for 
adaptation. 
Though this study generated insights into which circumstances can contribute to equity, 
patronage and clientelism are just two of many forms of informal institutions, and informal 
institutions are just one of many ways in which unequal power manifests. More research is 
needed on how different types of informal institutions shape national decision-making, and how 
different arrangements of power at national and local levels shape access to international 
resources. Equity is also only one aspect of just and effective adaptation to climate change. A 
“good enough” approach, focusing on analysis of effective outcomes of internationally financed 
adaptation, also has the potential to yield insights into the circumstances that best foster 
adaptation among disadvantaged and marginalized communities.  
My argument here has been that a “good enough” approach can help adaptation organizations 
to navigate current institutional arrangements to make adaptation more equitable. The larger 
question remains, however, of the role these organizations can play in enabling long-term 
transformation of inequitable institutions. These organizations have shown little willingness or 
capacity to challenge and overturn structural inequality in the countries and communities where 
they intervene. Beyond navigating the status quo to advance equity, international organizations 
should also seek to build on the strengths of existing institutions, empower equity-oriented 
actors, and enable community oversight and accountability. Through such incremental changes, 
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Chapter 4 Advancing Equitable Adaptation in Inequitable 
Environments: The Adaptation Fund in Madagascar 
 
Introduction 
As efforts to mitigate climate change have fallen short, adaptation has moved closer to the 
center of climate governance worldwide (Persson, 2019; Schipper, 2006). With higher-income 
countries pledging $100 billion annually to help low-income countries mitigate emissions and 
adapt to negative impacts through the UN Climate Convention, adaptation has also become 
increasingly intertwined with international financing (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015). One 
important and distinct feature of global adaptation financing is a focus on providing support 
specifically to vulnerable communities in low- and middle-income countries (Schalatek, 2019). 
International actors, such as UN climate funds, the World Bank, bilateral development agencies, 
and private entities like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are funding and directing 
adaptation interventions in vulnerable communities worldwide (Watson & Schalatek, 2020). 
Concern is growing, however, that this international funding is not reaching the most vulnerable 
in society (Berrang-Ford, Ford, & Paterson, 2011; Pelling & Garschagen, 2019; Sovacool, 
Linnér, & Goodsite, 2015). 
Some argue that a continuing reliance on models of development aid prevent international 
actors from recognizing and challenging entrenched power structures that shape unequal 
vulnerability and capacity to adapt to climate hazards (Arnall, Kothari, & Kelman, 2014; Ireland 
& McKinnon, 2013; Ribot, 2011; Taylor, 2014; Warner, Wesselink, & Geldof, 2018). A number 
of recent qualitative studies have shown that external adaptation interventions can actually 
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reinforce and even exacerbate inequality in targeted communities (Artur & Hilhorst, 2012; 
Eriksen et al., 2021; Mikulewicz & Taylor, 2020; Nightingale, 2017; Sovacool, 2018). Though 
critical adaptation scholars are divided on how to best account for power in internationally 
financed adaptation, they broadly agree that localizing and democratizing decision-making is an 
important first step (Eriksen, Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015; Marino & Ribot, 2012; McCarthy, 
2014; Swyngedouw, 2011). Yet, there is relatively little evidence of how this localization and 
power redistribution happens in practice. Empirical research from similar decentralization 
governance efforts suggests that despite a growing focus on institutional arrangements to support 
localization, democratization at the local level is far from straightforward (Agrawal, Perrin, 
Chharte, Benson, & Kononen, 2012).  
This study contributes to this growing body of work on power in adaptation by quantitatively 
analyzing the distributional outcomes of a UN Adaptation Fund (AF) project in the Alaotra-
Mangoro region of Madagascar. One of several multilateral climate funds established under the 
UN Climate Convention to support adaptation in low-income countries, the AF is distinguished 
by a unique mandate to target the “particularly vulnerable.” The Malagasy Ministry of 
Environment designed and implemented one of the first AF-financed projects from 2012-2019, 
with oversight from the UN Environment Program (UNEP). The project’s primary goal was to 
improve the resilience of rice agriculture among low-income farmers in an economically vital 
region. To this end, the Malagasy government developed and distributed adapted rice seed, 
conducted agriculture and land-management trainings, and disseminated updated weather 
forecasts and agricultural calendars to farmers in Alaotra-Mangoro. 
I employ a mixed-methods approach to explore how the Malagasy government sought to 
implement the AF project across different scales of decision-making, especially focusing on the 
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AF requirements for the inclusion and support of vulnerable communities. I investigate whether 
and how formal requirements to target the “particularly vulnerable” influenced the distribution of 
project benefits in primary intervention sites in Alaotra-Mangoro. I first draw on 63 interviews 
conducted with national-level policymakers and project actors to develop hypotheses and inform 
data collection. I then use a multi-level model to analyze 599 household surveys to compare the 
political connectivity of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households.  
This study not only contributes to ongoing dialogue about ways to rethink equity in 
internationally financed adaptation, but also advances the discussion by unpacking how 
household-level political power shaped access to project benefits. Though many have noted 
cases of “elite capture of adaptive action” and “accumulation by adaptation” in international 
interventions, I theorize that in this case power also operated below the level of elites, shaping 
unequal access to benefits through informal community networks (Eriksen et al., 2021; Yates, 
2014). Though I conclude that prospects for democratizing adaptation decision-making in 
Madagascar are slim, I point to a surprisingly equitable outcome of the project as evidence that, 
by also focusing on what works, critical adaptation scholarship can generate insights into the 
circumstances that can lead to more equitable outcomes in inequitable contexts.  
 
Literature Review  
The Trouble with Internationally Financed Adaptation: As adaptation has become more 
prominent in global dialogue, it has also grown increasingly associated with international climate 
finance (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2013; Roberts, 2011). Under the UN Climate Convention, 
high-income countries have pledged $100 billion annually to support low- and middle-income 
countries’ efforts to mitigate emissions and adapt to impacts (United Nations, 2015). Partially as 
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a result of this pledge, the number and scope of internationally financed climate interventions has 
increased significantly. A range of international organizations – including multilateral 
organizations (MOs), bilateral agencies, private foundations, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), which I will refer to collectively as “adaptation organizations” – are 
planning and implementing projects to foster adaptation among low-income and vulnerable 
communities (Watson & Schalatek, 2020). 
However there is concern that, even as it grows, international financing is not reaching those 
who need it the most to adapt (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; Pelling & Garschagen, 2019; Sovacool 
et al., 2015). Explanations vary from inadequate funding from high-income countries, to a lack 
of empowerment of national actors, to a lack of clarity on what successful adaptation even entails 
(Eriksen et al., 2021; Omari-Motsumi, Barnett, & Schalatek, 2019; Roberts et al., 2021). Some 
have pointed, however, to a more fundamental problem in international adaptation frameworks: a 
blindness to how power shapes vulnerability, capacity to adapt, and access to international 
resources (Eriksen et al., 2021; Ireland & McKinnon, 2013; Mikulewicz, 2018; Taylor, 2014). 
Politics, they argue, are embedded in society’s response to change (Blackburn & Pelling, 2018; 
Eriksen, Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015). Vulnerability is shaped not only by exposure to natural 
hazards, but also by social and political processes (Adger, 2006; McNamara & Buggy, 2017). 
Capacity to adapt – the ability not just to back bounce back from climate shocks but also to move 
to an improved state – is likewise influenced by political power, social capital, and differentiated 
access to resources and information (Adger, 2003; Eakin, Lemos, & Nelson, 2014). 
Internationally financed adaptation evolved largely out of development aid, and includes 
many of the same actors. Unsurprisingly, most adaptation frameworks remain rooted in 
developmentalist logic and methods of intervention (Eriksen et al., 2021; Ireland & McKinnon, 
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2013). This logic leads international actors to implicitly rely on technocratic framings of climate 
change as an outside threat to an otherwise well-functioning society (Eguaoven et al., 2013; 
Taylor, 2014). As a result of this framing, actors tend to overlook the social and political 
underpinnings of vulnerability (Arnall et al., 2014; Ribot, 2011; Warner et al., 2018). By 
“depoliticizing” adaptation, such approaches bound the dialogue around appropriate responses to 
climate change and inhibit transformational adaptation that challenges entrenched power (Alam 
et al., 2011; Swyngedouw, 2011; Taylor, 2014). 
As I argued in Chapter 1, international actors’ apolitical approaches have particularly 
inhibited them from recognizing and engaging with informal institutions: unwritten codes and 
conventions that structure behavior (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; North, 1990). Recent studies 
indicate that adaptation organizations may be repeating this mistake, failing to recognize in 
particular how entrenched forms of patronage can enable elite capture of international resources 
for adaptation (Nelson & Finan, 2009; Nightingale, 2017). Patronage systems – in which 
government workers are recruited for partisan reasons and often use public office for private gain 
– remain common (Hicken, 2011). Sovacool (2018), for example, illustrated how a neo-feudal 
patronage system in Bangladesh enabled elites to “enclose” land they expected would become 
valuable under internationally financed adaptation programs. Artur & Hillhorst (2012) similarly 
demonstrated how well-connected elites captured the largest plots and best locations for housing 
under a flooding relocation plan in Mozambique. Eriksen et al. (2021) call this “accumulation by 
adaptation,” and argue that blindness to these types of unequal power relationships is one of the 
ways international actors inadvertently reinforce structural inequality in targeted communities. 
Though critical adaptation scholars broadly recognize that apolitical interventions risk 
inequitable outcomes, they are divided about how adaptation organizations should better account 
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for unequal power. Some argue for a transformation, a complete shift beyond development 
paradigms (Lindegaard, 2018). To be a source of social transformation, they assert, interventions 
must challenge unequal power structures, both locally and nationally (Eriksen et al., 2015; 
Eriksen & Lind, 2009). Ireland & McKinnon (2013), for example, argue for a “post-
development” approach that focuses on localizing adaptation, with no expectation of scaling up 
to broader policy. Eriksen et al. (2012) go further, arguing for a “post-adaptation” approach: a 
fundamental rethinking of the current architecture to make it “more reflexive, multi-scalar, and 
inclusive of learning and evaluation processes” (3). Others argue that a complete paradigm shift 
is unrealistic and that adaptation scholars and practitioners should work within existing 
socioeconomic structures to make adaptation more equitable (Mikulewicz, 2018). Though they 
disagree on the methods, all agree that democratizing adaptation decision-making is an important 
first step toward more equitable outcomes, or at least to avoiding reinforcement of inequity 
(Eriksen et al., 2015; Marino & Ribot, 2012; McCarthy, 2014; Mikulewicz, 2018; Mikulewicz & 
Taylor, 2020; Swyngedouw, 2013). 
As I described in Chapter 2, this debate broadly echoes arguments made in the field of 
development studies. As post-development scholars argued for a paradigm shift, others argued 
for working within development structures to build on existing institutional arrangements 
(Escobar, 2011). Some of the latter have proposed focusing on positive outcomes – in terms of 
effective public service delivery and poverty reduction – and understanding the circumstances 
under which these outcomes emerge (Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Grindle, 2004; Tendler, 1997). 
By building on institutional strengths, international actors could “thicken” participatory 
institutions, or facilitate the emergence of “hybrid” forms that combined local institutions with 
international standards (Andrews, 2013; Booth, 2012). Some propose leap-frogging national 
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governments and working directly with local governments and institutions (Brinkerhoff & 
Johnson, 2009). Incremental change, many of them argue, could produce a longer-term 
transformation toward more effective and accountable institutions (Wild, Booth, Cummings, 
Foresti, & Wales, 2015).  
 
The Adaptation Fund in Madagascar: Madagascar is among the world’s most vulnerable 
countries to climate change (Sönke et al., 2020). Increasing temperatures and shifting 
precipitation patterns threaten agriculture, especially rice, the primary food source for most 
Malagasy households (Tadross et al., 2008; Ziska et al., 2018). The island nation’s location in the 
Western Indian Ocean exposes it to increasingly severe cyclones (Hochrainer-Stigler, Mechler, 
& Mochizuki, 2015). Sea level rise and ocean acidification imperil small-scale fisheries along its 
extensive coastline (Ragoonaden, 2007). A large percentage of the population is chronically food 
insecure, especially during the rainy season (Harvey et al., 2014; Minten & Barrett, 2008). 
In late 2011, Madagascar became the 14th country to have a project proposal approved by the 
newly-established Adaptation Fund (AF) (Adaptation Fund, 2018). The AF was born out of a 
broader political struggle for “developing” countries to exercise greater control over climate 
finance (Harmeling & Kaloga, 2011). It is guided by an ambiguous mandate to direct funding to 
those that are “particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change,” a group that the 
Fund’s board has declined to define (Adaptation Fund Board, 2012, 2; Persson & Remling, 
2014). Because it also emphasizes “country-ownership” over project decision-making and 
finances, recipient country governments have significant leeway in targeting communities and 
beneficiaries. The AF requires only that they justify site selection in the project proposal 
(Adaptation Fund, 2017). 
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The $5 million AF project in Madagascar – “Promoting Climate Resilience in the Rice Sector 
through Pilot Investments in the Alaotra-Mangoro Region,” known locally as “AFRice” – was 
implemented from 2012-2019 by the Ministry of Environment. As with many AF projects, the 
Malagasy government was required to partner with an MO, in this case UNEP, which oversaw 
project implementation and assumed fiduciary responsibility (Adaptation Fund Board, 2012). 
The project focused on improving the resilience of rice agriculture, Madagascar’s staple crop. At 
the national level, the primary objectives were to: a) develop a “resilient rice model” that could 
be broadly replicated, b) enhance institutional capacity-building in forecasting and vulnerability 
mapping and c) promote policy mainstreaming. The Ministry of Environment chose a key rice-
growing region, Alaotra-Mangoro, as the primary intervention site (Adaptation Fund Board, 
2011) (Figure 4.1). There the project targeted low-income farmers in four communes, providing 
both tangible benefits (e.g., adapted rice seed, compost, agricultural implements, seedlings) and 
intangible (opportunities to participate in agricultural trainings and community activities) (Bégat, 
2020). It was also designed to generate indirect benefits across the broader region, including 
upgraded infrastructure, reforestation, and the dissemination of improved climate forecasts and 
agricultural calendars (Adaptation Fund Board, 2011). Originally proposed to last five years, the 
AFRice project was granted multiple extensions and was in its final phases during my fieldwork 
in Madagascar in 2019. 
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Figure 4.1 AFRice Intervention Sites in the Alaotra-Mangoro Region of Madagascar 
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The Absent State and Local Informal Governance in Madagascar: Politically, Madagascar is 
characterized by an extreme disconnect between a narrow, governing elite, concentrated in the 
capital, and a rural, agriculturally-dependent population dispersed across a large, poorly-
connected country (Razafindrakoto, Roubaud, & Wachsberger, 2013). Political and economic 
power at the national level is held among competing factions of elites, mostly from a single 
ethnic group, the Merina (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005). The government is often 
characterized as neopatrimonial, functioning primarily as a patronage system, with employment, 
government contracts, and other benefits distributed largely to political supporters and through 
affective networks (Marcus, 2016; Marcus, 2010). State resources are tightly concentrated in and 
around the government, with little of the national budget distributed beyond the capital of 
Antananarivo and its environs (Marcus, 2016). Governing elites have historically treated 
international aid, on which the government is highly reliant, as a rentiers resources, often with 
the tacit cooperation of international actors (Corson, 2016; Duffy, 2006; Horning, 2008).  
In most rural areas, the state is defined by its absence. The Malagasy government exhibits 
little capacity to provide social services or enforce rule of law (Marcus, 2016). In the absence of 
the state, informal institutions of customary governance are the dominant force structuring social 
and political life at the local level. Fokonolona (traditional community forums), tangalamena 
(traditional village heads), and dina (local codes of conduct) regulate relationships within and 
between rural Malagasy communities (Gaudieux & Ramiaramanana, 2014; Rakotoson & Tanner, 
2006; Rasamoelina, 2017). Noting low rates of political participation, some have claimed that 
Madagascar lacks a “deep democracy” (Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003). But there is evidence 
of strong democratic and cooperative traditions at local levels (Hinthorne, 2013; Wachsberger, 
2007). Rural communities exhibit high levels of social cohesion, with reciprocity and 
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redistribution common in extended kinship networks (havana) (Desplat, 2018; Fritz-Vietta et al., 
2011). Customary institutions, however, are far from egalitarian (Serre-Ratsimandisa, 1978). 
Though all community members theoretically have the right to participate in fokonolona, women 
and youth are often excluded (Rasamoelina, 2017; Smith, Shepherd, & Dorward, 2012). Only 
men can be tangalamena. Broader gender inequities in access to and control of land and other 
sources of wealth make women more vulnerable (Farnworth, 2007; Jarosz, 1991; Widman, 
2014). 
In many areas, informal institutions of customary governance interface awkwardly with the 
formal administrative structure of the Malagasy state. Chiefs fokontany (the appointed heads of 
the smallest administrative unit) often share power informally with fokonolona and tangalamena 
(Burnod, Gingembre, & Andrianirina Ratsialonana, 2013). As the official political-legal system 
does not function in many areas, dina sometimes contradict, and prevail over, official law 
(Baker-Médard, 2019; Rakotoson & Tanner, 2006). International interventions – particularly 
those related to efforts to conserve biodiversity – often overlook local forms of governance and 
create competing, parallel institutions (Fritz-Vietta et al., 2011; Pollini & Lassoie, 2011; Scales, 
2012). Because of the extreme centralization of state finances and capture at higher governance 
levels, few resources filter down to rural areas (Francken, Minten, & Swinnen, 2005). Official 
positions at lower levels of the state hierarchy (e.g., district, commune, and fokontany positions, 
as well as regional branches of Ministry offices) are often obtained through patronage. 
Officeholders often use their positions to distribute state resource selectively within local patron-
client and extended family networks. Members of security forces likewise often use their 
positions to pursue personal political and economic incentives (Jütersonke & Kartas, 2011). 
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Given these dynamics, it is unsurprising that elite capture has been observed in the distribution of 
international resources at local levels (Poudyal et al., 2016; Sommerville et al., 2010).  
 
Methods  
Mixed-Methods Design: This study follows a mixed-methods, case study approach (Fetters, 
Curry, & Creswell, 2013; Yin, 1994). As part of a broader comparative study, I first conducted 
63 interviews at the national level. The goal of this phase was to characterize Madagascar’s 
governance landscape and to investigate how it shaped AFRice project design, implementation, 
and outcomes. I conducted general interviews with 35 Malagasy policymakers, civil society 
organizations, and representatives of MOs and development agencies. I additionally conducted 
28 interviews with individuals directly involved in AFRice: members of the project team within 
the Ministry of Environment, representatives of other government ministries and agencies 
involved in implementation, UNEP officials, NGOs, private contractors, and international and 
domestic consultants. All interviews were semi-structured and conducted by the researcher in 
Malagasy. The majority of interviews were recorded, with the participants’ permission, 
transcribed, and translated into English by a research assistant. The researcher coded the 
transcripts for themes using NVivo software. Findings from the interviews are supplemented by 
analysis of project documents, as well as participant observation at the AFRice closing workshop 






Figure 4.2 Survey Sites in Alaotra-Mangoro 
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Household Surveys: The goal of the household surveys was to measure the distributional 
outcomes of the AFRice project in its primary intervention sites.19 Qualitative data collected at 
the national level informed hypothesis development, survey design, and data collection (Fetters 
& Freshwater, 2015; O’Cathain, Murphy, & Nicholl, 2010). A survey team collected 599 surveys 
from the project’s intervention sites. Officially, the project targeted three communes: 
Manakambahiny Andrefana, Ambohijanahary, and Bemaitso. Unofficially, it targeted a fourth 
commune, Andilamena (Figure 4.2).20 Project documents and interviews with local project 
representatives indicated that about half of fokontany in each commune were selected to 
participate, with only a select number of households participating within each fokontany. Cluster 
sampling was used to identify a representative sample of three different subject groups in these 
communes: beneficiary households in beneficiary fokontany, non-beneficiary households in 
beneficiary fokontany, and non-beneficiary households in non-beneficiary fokontany (see 
Appendix B for detailed sampling design). 
Survey questions captured household wealth (as measured by key assets and socioeconomic 
indicators), education level, land ownership, ethnicity and immigration status, food insecurity, 
coping strategies, and adaptive capacity. They also measured household political connectivity as 
a product of household and extended family members’ (havana) positions in government, 
institutions of customary governance, security forces, and community-level leadership, as well as 
household members’ participation in local committees (Figure 4.3). This measurement of 
 
 
19 The AFRice project included a later “upscaling” phase, which focused on extending findings from the Alaotra-
Mangoro region to two additional regions: Vakinakaratra and Itasy. Due to time and resource constraints, this study 
focuses on the distributional outcomes in Alaotra-Mangoro only.  
20 Interviews revealed that a number of the project benefits intended for Bemaitso had been redirected to a fokontany 
in Andilamena, outside the official intervention sites. The sampling design was altered to account for the additional 
project site (see Annex A for more detail). 
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household political power draws on the concept of communities as networks: “structured by 
unequal power relations and unequal access to knowledge, resources, and decision-making” 
(Yates, 2014). Specifically, this measurement is predicated on the notion that access to state 
resources in rural Madagascar is shaped by family connections to both formal and informal 
institutions, especially positions within the state patronage structure. Power is a complex concept 
and measuring it is inherently problematic (Hydén, 2006). I recognize that power is not 
necessarily embodied only in the positions captured, and instead treat the political connectivity 
measure as a proxy: a snapshot of how a given household’s network interfaced with the state 
apparatus at the time the survey was conducted. 
Figure 4.3 Household Political Connectivity Measured Along Four Dimensions 
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Finally, the survey captured forms of household participation in the AFRice project: how 
beneficiaries heard of it and were selected to participate; the direct benefits received by 
beneficiary households, both tangible (e.g., adapted rice seed) and intangible (e.g., agricultural 
trainings); and the indirect benefits theoretically accessible to all households in the project sites 
(e.g., benefits from improved infrastructure or access to improved forecasting). Survey questions 
– particularly the food security index and socioeconomic indicators – were refined to local 
context through focus group feedback in the three official communes (Appendix C). The survey 
was additionally tested over two days of survey team training in the regional capital, 
Ambatondrazaka. It was administered by a small team of local enumerators, in local dialects of 
Malagasy, over a two-month period (October-November 2019). Respondents received no 
compensation.  
 
Understanding Distributional Outcomes: I used a Multi-Level Model (MLM) to explore 
differences between households that benefited from AFRice and those that did not. MLMs allow 
the researcher to analyze data in which one set of units is clustered within another set of units 
(Krull & MacKinnon, 2001). In this case, the households represent the first level of analysis 
(Level 1) clustered within the secondary level of fokontany (Level 2). The data collected 
represent 599 Level 1 units and 24 Level 2 units.21 
 
 
21 Clustered data present methodological challenges when approached with standard regression techniques, 
including misestimation of standard errors at the higher level of analysis and violations of the assumption of 
independence of errors at the lower level of analysis. Applying an MLM to the data collected accounts for 
“clustering effects,” allowing for variability between and within villages. This estimation of shared variance leads to 
improved precision. 
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The MLM incorporates index variables for food insecurity, household assets, political 
connectivity, and three different measures of AFRice project benefits (Table 4.1). Other 
variables in the model include: household land ownership (measured in total hectares), 
household head education level (measured in years), and village distance from a national 
highway (a mean of all household responses in a given village, measured in minutes walking). 
Additional sensitivity analyses were conducted using different measures of land ownership (such 
as potential agricultural value) but none improved model fit. All control variables, except for 
village distance, are grand mean centered to ease interpretation. 
Table 4.1 Index Variables 
Index Variable Method Appendix 
Short Term Food 
Insecurity 
Frequency of a household’s use of food insecurity coping 
strategies in past week multiplied by severity weight of each 
strategy. Strategies identified and weighted in focus groups.  
D 
Assets Combined value of household’s durable goods and livestock, 
divided by number of household members. 
E 
Political Connectivity Number of household and extended family connections to 
political positions (formal and informal) and committee 
participation (current and previous). Household and family 
positions consolidated into hierarchy levels. Number of 
connections at each level summed and weighted according to 
Principle Component Analysis. 
F 
Level of AFRice 
Participation 
Number of forms of direct benefit a household received from 
participation in AFRice, including tangible (e.g., adapted rice 
seed) and intangible benefits (e.g., participation in trainings and 
community activities). 
G 
Value of AFRice 
Benefits 
Estimated value of direct benefits a household received from 
AFRice, based on an assumption of a minimum amount 
received. 
G 
Level of AFRice 
Indirect Benefits 
Number of forms of indirect benefit a household received from 
participation in AFRice, such as upgraded infrastructure for 
improved irrigation and access to updated weather forecasts. 
G 
 
There are three main caveats to the use of an MLM to analyze the survey data. First, the 
model described below is relational, not causal. It enables the comparison of two groups 
(beneficiary and non-beneficiary) in terms of the outcome variable, political connectivity, 
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accounting for the nested structure of the data and controlling for other variables. The model 
does not evaluate how households changed over time nor how they changed as a result of 
participation in AFRice. Adaptive capacity, for example, might be higher among beneficiary 
households but, through this model, it is not possible to know whether this difference in capacity 
was the result of participation or of other factors. Political connectivity, however, was unlikely to 
be altered by project participation.  
The second caveat is that, due to the lack of baseline information, the data collected 
represents only a snapshot in time. The model provides only information about how the two 
groups compared in the final months of the AFRice project in 2019. This limitation also affects 
specific variables. Food security, for example, fluctuates seasonally in Alaotra-Mangoro (Dostie, 
Haggblade, & Randriamamonjy, 2002). The seven-day recall window of the food insecurity 
index, which respondents preferred for accuracy, might limit the comparability across the 60-day 
survey period. It is important to note, however, that the survey was conducted during a relatively 
stable season for food security, just before the “lean period” (Minten & Barrett, 2008). 
Finally, the sampling method, which relied on local informants to identify a sufficient 
number of beneficiary households, prevented the use of other village-level variables. Data on 
household wealth, for example, was not randomly selected from the full sampling frame, and 
therefore cannot be utilized as an L-2 variable. This limits the utility of the model to analyze 
cross-level interactions. Village distance from a national highway, however, did not rely on 
random sampling for accuracy and is used as an L-2 indicator of geographic isolation.  
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Findings and Analyses 
Indications of Inequity: Interviews revealed that throughout the course of the AFRice project 
decision-makers within the Ministry of Environment moved to centralize and privatize project 
resources (see Chapter 2). They stripped other ministries and agencies of decision-making power 
and financial control, and rebuffed opportunities to collaborate with external agencies. Through a 
series of kickback schemes, officials involved in the project directed a significant portion of 
AFRice resources to narrow elites within and closely connected to the government: high-level 
bureaucrats within the Ministry of Environment, consultants, and private contractors. UNEP 
officials, tasked with project oversight, recognized that patronage shaped project 
implementation, but struggled to effectively intervene to steer more equitable outcomes. Though 
they invoked fiduciary standards to rectify the most extreme instances of financial 
mismanagement, they did not address the more systemic manifestations of patronage, such as 
salary kickback schemes. As little as one-fifth of the overall project budget reached the 
intervention sites in Alaotra-Mangoro.  
Interviews also indicated that, despite targeting low-income farmers, informal networks 
influenced the distribution of project benefits as much as any criteria of income or vulnerability. 
Many project documents that could have informed analysis of AFRice’s equity – such as 
workshop attendance sheets – were either missing, incomplete, or publicly unavailable. Those 
that were available lacked transparent criteria for vulnerability and the selection of households 
for participation. Local project representatives could not describe the process by which target 
groups were determined. Several project actors said that benefits had been distributed through 
“self-designation” and “word of mouth.” The project’s final evaluation noted that though “the 
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project aims to support the livelihood of low income farmers, [it] does not distinguish between 
income levels among beneficiary groups” (Bégat, 2020, 102).  
International and domestic consultants acknowledged that political influence had likely 
played a role, especially chiefs fokontany who had significant leeway to distribute resources. A 
domestic consultant claimed that most of the project’s benefits went to elites: the project was for 
those with “good connections” and therefore “increased the gap between the richest and 
poorest.” During preliminary site visits, the survey team discovered that many of the project 
benefits intended for the commune of Bemaitso had been re-directed to another fokontany in a 
neighboring commune, entirely outside of official project sites. The survey team also observed 
that valuable tools appeared to have been distributed to the wealthiest households in project sites.  
Survey design and data collection were driven by four main hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
was that beneficiary households would have higher levels of political connectivity than non-
beneficiary households. Other hypotheses were: (H2) that households with higher levels of 
participation would have higher political connectivity, (H3) that the more valuable the benefits 
received from AFRice, the more politically connected the household, and (H4) that access to 
indirect benefits of the project, theoretically available to all households in project sites, would 
also be positively associated with political connectivity. The following household characteristics 
were also expected to influence household political connectivity: socioeconomic status, 
education level, land ownership, household vulnerability, and geographic isolation. 
 
Household Characteristics: Appendix I provides the characteristics of surveyed households. 
The majority of respondents belonged to the Sihanaka ethnic group, though other ethnic groups 
enjoyed a significant presence. Surveyed households were low-income by international 
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standards, with average value of selected assets estimated at $1,514. They demonstrated wide 
variation, however: the asset value of the poorest household in the sample was estimated at $1.30 
(the cost of a flashlight); in contrast, the asset value of the wealthiest household was estimated at 
$21,361. Education levels were low at 6.6 years average, but relatively high when considering 
that 58% of Malagasy citizens have not completed primary school (National Education Profile, 
2018). Other variables of interest also varied widely, including land ownership, geographic 
isolation, and food insecurity. Most households had experienced some form of food insecurity in 
the past seven days. Though leasing and share-cropping rates were high, they do not necessarily 
indicate poverty as reverse tenancy is common in Alaotra-Mangoro (Bellemare, 2009). 
In addition to low measures of general adaptive capacity (e.g., wealth and education), 
households demonstrated low specific capacity, characteristics that are necessary for managing 
climate threats (Eakin et al., 2014). They had limited access to banking and use of crop insurance 
was rare. A significant percentage of households, however, accessed and used weather forecasts 
(60% and 41% respectively). Household livelihood strategies were relatively diverse, with an 
average of 4.3 different forms of income. Nevertheless, most households (82%) had relied on 
some form of long-term coping strategy in the previous calendar year.  
By design a third of the sample participated in the AFRice project. Of beneficiary 
households, 55 received the most valuable benefit, adapted rice seed. 164 households received 
the least valuable benefit, payment for tree planting. There was wide variation in level of 
participation, value of benefits received, and level of indirect benefits. The majority of 
beneficiaries reported hearing about AFRice from a local official (n=79) or AFRice 
representative (n = 77). The majority reported volunteering for participation (n =177), with a 
smaller number reporting they were selected to participate by an AFRice representative or local 
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official. 22 Among beneficiary households, 64% believed that participating in AFRice was 
equitable. Only 47% believed that the distribution of benefits was equitable.  
 
Household Differences in Political Connectivity: The model presented below compares the 
political connectivity scores of two groups (beneficiary and non-beneficiary households), 
controlling for other household- and village-level characteristics that I hypothesize also influence 
household political connectivity. The null model for this dataset is: 
POLij = b0j +  g00 + rij + u0 
It demonstrates that the mean political connectivity score of all households in the data set is 
2.341. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) is 0.1964. This ICC indicates that 19.64% of 
the variation in households’ political connectivity is explained by village-level variance, 
supporting the value of using a multi-level technique. 
The model used to compare the political connectivity score of beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households is: 
POLCONij  =  g00 + g01VDIST + g10BEN + g20ASSETS+ g30LAND + g40EDUC + g50FOOD + 
u0j + u1jBEN + u2jASSETS + u3jLAND + u4jEDUC + u5jFOOD + rij 
 
Household wealth, land ownership, education level, food security, and village distance are 
control variables, level-1 and level-2 characteristics that I hypothesize will also influence 
political connectivity. The primary coefficient of interest is project participation (BEN). For the 
 
 
22 Responses reported as raw totals rather than percentages because respondents were able to submit multiple 
responses. 
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primary hypothesis (H1), I expect that the coefficient on the participation variable (g10) will be 
positive. 
The range of each variable is presented below (Table 4.2). After grand-mean centering, the 
mean and standard deviation of the four control variables are not particularly relevant.  
Table 4.2 Grand-Mean Centered Variables 
 POL BEN ASSETS LAND EDUC FOOD VDIST 
Min -2.34 0 -328.03 -3.17 -6.19 -27.02 -119.80 
Max 4.97 1 4584.57 69.23 9.81 130.978 729.86 
Mean 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 
SD  1.67 0.46 527.03 6.83 3.44 27.48 191.22 
 
The correlation between the outcome and predictors are (Table 4.3): 
Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix 
 POL BEN ASSETS LAND EDUC FOOD VDIST 
POL 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
BEN 0.148 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
WEALTH 0.184 0.054 1 -- -- -- -- 
LAND 0.167 0.074 0.209 1 -- -- -- 
EDUC 0.266 0.245 0.230 0.152 1 -- -- 
FOOD -0.060 -0.031 -0.252 -0.106 -0.273 1  
VDIST -0.086 0.199 -0.120 -0.069 -0.076 0.100 1 
 
Table 4.4 displays the primary model output. The expected political connectivity score for a 
household that did not participate in the AFRice project, and has average household assets, 
average land ownership, average education level, average food insecurity, and whose village is 
an average walking distance from a national highway is 2.226. The coefficient on household 
participation indicates that participation in the AFRice project is associated with a 0.338 increase 
in the political connectivity score. The coefficient is statistically significant at p < .05. This 
finding indicates that households that participated in the AFRice project are expected to have 
higher political connectivity than households that did not participate, controlling for other 
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household and village characteristics that might have influenced political connectivity. In terms 
of other predictors, wealth had a small but significant positive effect on political connectivity, 
and education level had a relatively large and significant positive effect. Total land ownership, 
food insecurity, and village distance did not have significant effects. The primary model 
accounted for an additional 31% of the unexplained variance compared to the null model. 
In addition to the primary model, three secondary models predict the association between 
three additional measures of AFRice benefits and household political connectivity. These three 
measures are: a household’s Participation Level (sum of the number of benefits received and 
activities in which it participated); the Value of Direct Benefits received by a household from 
AFRice; and the Level of Indirect Benefits (sum of the number of ways a household indirectly 
benefited from the AFRice project). Table 4.4 also displays the output from these models.  
For all three additional measures of benefits, the coefficient is positively associated with 
political connectivity and statistically significant at p < .05. For Level of Participation, a one-unit 
increase in the form of a household’s direct participation in AFRice is associated with a 0.057 
increase in the political connectivity score. As the scale for this variable is between 0-21, a 
household that participated in every AFRice training and activity, and received every tangible 
benefit, would expect to have a political connectivity score 1.2 points higher than a household 
that did not participate. For Value of Direct Benefits, a one dollar increase in value of benefits a 
household received from AFRice is associated with a 0.004 increase in the political connectivity 
score. As the scale for this variable is between 0-211.2, a household that received the highest 
value of benefits would expect to have a political connectivity score 0.84 points higher than a 
household that did not receive direct benefits. For Level of Indirect Benefits, a one-unit increase 
in the form of a household’s indirect benefits from AFRice is associated with a 0.049 increase in 
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the political connectivity score. As the scale for this coefficient is 0-15, a household that received 
all the indirect benefits of the project would expect to have a political connectivity score 0.74 
points higher than a household that did not indirectly benefit. Other predictors retain their 
positive or negative associations, and statistical significance or insignificance, across the three 
additional models. 
 




 Participation Participation 
Level 
Value of Benefits Indirect Benefits 











     
AFRice Benefits 0.338** 0.057*** 0.004** 0.049** 
 (0.167) (0.016) (0.001) (0.023) 
Household Assets 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Land Ownership -0.018* -0.018* -0.018* -0.020* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Education Level 0.111*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Food Insecurity 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Village Distance -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) 
Constant 2.226*** 2.205*** 2.246*** 2.201*** 
 (0.108) (0.104) (0.101) (0.112) 
Observations 587 584 584 584 
Log Likelihood -1,089.313 -1,085.940 -1,088.736 -1,089.730 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,196.627 2,189.879 2,195.472 2,197.461 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,235.956 2,229.209 2,234.801 2,236.790 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Discussion 
Reinforcing Structural Inequality in Alaotra-Mangoro: Findings from 599 household surveys 
collected across AFRice’s primary intervention sites indicate that households that participated 
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had higher levels of political connectivity than those that did not. This was the case even when 
controlling for other household and village characteristics that could influence political 
connectivity. This finding was robust across three additional measures of project benefits. Not 
only was participation associated with higher political connectivity, but so was the degree to 
which households were involved and the value of the benefits they received. Even benefits that 
were theoretically equally-accessible to all households in project sites – such as improved 
irrigation and access to updated agricultural calendars – were associated with higher household 
political connectivity. Though the model does not allow claims about causality (e.g., that 
households were chosen to participate in AFRice because of their political connections), these 
findings support the hypothesis that households’ informal and formal connections to the state 
apparatus influenced their ability to access AFRice benefits.  
These findings are significant because they indicate that the AFRice project reinforced 
structural inequality within target communities in Alaotra-Mangoro. Despite the fact that AF 
funding is intended for the “particularly vulnerable,” the AFRice project disproportionately 
benefited households that were already better positioned to adapt by virtue of their 
socioeconomic status, education levels, and land ownership. Analyzed within the context of 
national-level qualitative data – which demonstrated that UNEP officials, operating within the 
apolitical framework of the AF, were unable to effectively navigate power relations – this lends 
support to similar qualitative cases where international interventions were found to exacerbate 
inequality in target communities (Artur & Hilhorst, 2012; Mikulewicz, 2018; Nelson & Finan, 
2009; Nightingale, 2017; Sovacool, 2018).   
Additionally, these findings suggest that power operated at two different levels to shape 
household access to AFRice benefits. Eriksen et al. (2021) recently argued that apolitical 
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interventions can contribute to inequality through processes of “accumulation by adaptation,” 
summarized as: “the way in which already powerful members of the community may ‘capture’ 
and monopolize resources, capitalizing on their own privileged access and in so doing, further 
marginalizing the most vulnerable” (Kliemann, 2021, 3). In Alaotra-Mangoro, the association of 
political power and access to project benefits appears to have gone beyond capture by powerful 
elite to include broader uneven distribution of knowledge and information through informal 
community networks.  
At the first level, direct access to AFRice project goods was mediated through patron-client 
relationships connected to the state apparatus. Government and project officials exchanged direct 
benefits for bribes, “hosting” (in which families provided meals and other perks), and political 
support. This assertion is supported not only by the association of direct benefits with household 
political power, but also by interviews that indicated that officials steered benefits to elite 
families and even well-connected communities outside of project sites. Members of the survey 
team also observed that elite households appeared to have disproportionately received the most 
valuable goods (such as agricultural tools). 
Access to project benefits was also shaped, however, by informal power at second, deeper 
level. Information about the project, and knowledge produced by the project, moved unevenly 
through community networks, particularly extended family networks (Yates, 2014). Households 
with more connections to positions of formal and informal power may have been more likely to 
hear about the project, and to learn where and how benefits would be distributed. This second 
level operation of power helps explain why goods that were theoretically accessible to all 
households in intervention sites – such as updated crop calendars – were nevertheless 
disproportionately accessed by better connected households. It also helps explain why the 
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majority of households reported volunteering for participation, rather than being directly selected 
by an individual in a position of power. Differentiated access to project benefits was thus shaped 
by dynamics of both patron-client relations and redistribution through kinship networks.  
 
Prospects for Democratizing Adaptation in Madagascar and Elsewhere: Critical adaptation 
scholars debate how adaptation organizations should account for power and improve equity in 
internationally financed adaptation. Some argue for a fundamental rethinking of current 
apolitical and technocratic approaches (Eriksen et al., 2021; Ireland & McKinnon, 2013; Taylor, 
2014). Others argue that a total paradigm shift is unrealistic and advocate working within 
existing power relations to make adaptation more equitable (Mikulewicz, 2018). Both camps 
agree, however: adaptation decision-making should be more democratic (Eriksen et al., 2015; 
Marino & Ribot, 2012; McCarthy, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2013). Democratization will require 
shifting decision-making to local levels, where international actors design and implement 
adaptation initiatives with local communities as partners rather than beneficiaries (Eriksen et al., 
2015). Such a shift will also require spreading decision-making as evenly as possible within 
communities (Mikulewicz, 2018). 
I argue that prospects for democratizing internationally financed adaptation in highly 
inequitable contexts like Madagascar are bleak for two reasons. First, there is little indication that 
the overall architecture of climate finance is shifting to enable decision-making at local levels. 
Multilateral climate funds under the UN Climate Convention continue to locate decision-making 
primarily at the national level (Schalatek, 2019). In the case of AFRice, decision-makers within 
the Ministry of Environment moved to consolidate decision-making power and privatize project 
resources, delegating only negligible funding and authority to local decision-making bodies. 
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Likewise, international actors operating outside the UN Climate Convention – multilateral 
development banks, bilateral agencies, and private entities – are similarly unlikely to cede 
decision-making authority to local levels. Despite criticism, not just from adaptation scholars but 
also critical development scholars – these actors have shown little inclination to shift away from 
technocratic and apolitical frameworks (Hout, 2012; Unsworth, 2015; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). 
They are unlikely to see it as within their mission to challenge structural inequality in countries 
like Madagascar any time soon. 
Second, the depth of structural inequality in AFRice’s intervention sites in Alaotra-Mangoro 
illustrates the challenge international actors face in democratizing decision-making. Mikulewicz 
(2018) has suggested that they should assist communities in “creating spaces of political 
deliberation that are conducive to inclusive and equitable decision-making and distribution of 
benefits” (27). Development scholars, like Evans (2004), have similarly argued that “thick 
participatory institutions” can improve citizens’ abilities to make their own choices. These 
findings demonstrate, however, that the challenge is more complex than avoiding elite capture 
and elite domination of participatory spaces (McNamara & Buggy, 2017; Tschakert et al., 2016). 
Some households in Alaotra-Mangoro inherently have broader networks, and more connections, 
which enables them greater access to resources, knowledge, and information. At the same time, 
international actors cannot rely on traditional decision-making bodies to enable equitable 
decision-making and outcomes. Research on decentralization in natural resource management 
and development has shown that transferring decision-making power to traditional and informal 
institutions can consolidate existing patterns of inequality, particularly when not accompanied by 
transfers of information, financial, and technical resources (Agrawal et al., 2012). This could be 
the case in contexts like Alaotra-Mangoro, where informal democratic processes remain strong at 
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local levels, but traditional deliberative bodies, such as fokonolona (village councils), are not 
equally accessible to all community members (Rasamoelina, 2017). 
 
Advancing Equitable Adaptation in Inequitable Environments: Though outcomes in this case 
were highly inequitable, these findings nevertheless may point to opportunities to advance more 
equitable outcomes. I argued in Chapter 2 that a “good enough” approach to adaptation – focused 
on identifying positive outcomes and the circumstances under which they occur – could point to 
realistic strategies for adaptation organizations to engage with informal power. In this case, one 
outcome was notably more equitable than the others: weather forecasts broadcast over radio. 
Both beneficiary and non-beneficiary households widely accessed (61%) and used (48%) these 
updated forecasts. In fact, of the indirect benefits AFRice provided, forecasts enjoyed by far the 
broadest reach (Figure 4.4). This is likely because a majority of households (68%) in the sample 
possessed a radio. Further, as an identical number of households reported receiving radio 
broadcasts, this indicates that most if not all households had access, even in the most remote 
sites. 
I argue there are two primary reasons this outcome was more equitable. First, forecasting 
built on existing institutional strengths (Andrews, 2013; Booth, 2011). Madagascar’s 
Meteorological Agency23 already had the capacity to develop and disseminate forecasts. Radio 
ownership is widespread in rural Madagascar (Francken, Minten, & Swinnen, 2012). Low-
income households are also accustomed to accessing and using these forecasts to make decisions 
about when to plant crops, particularly rice. The second reason is that the information itself was 
 
 
23 Direction Générale de la Météorologie 
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democratized. A household’s access to these forecasts did not rely on either connections to the 
state apparatus or dissemination of information through community networks. Thus, in the case 
of Alaotra-Mangoro, democratizing information might offer one path to more equitable 
adaptation.  
Figure 4.4 Percentage of Households Accessing Indirect Project Benefits 
 
 
Radio forecasts, of course, are not a total solution to the challenge of adaptation in 
Madagascar, nor do they offer a comprehensive strategy to make internationally financed 
adaptation more equitable overall. Such insights are necessarily contextual. The potential of 
radio is likely greater in context like Madagascar, where rural communities are disconnected but 
radio usage widespread, than in other contexts. Nevertheless, I highlight this finding to 
demonstrate that adaptation scholars and practitioners, by identifying positive outcomes and 
building on the institutional arrangements that facilitate them, can develop realistic strategies to 
make adaptation more equitable even in highly inequitable environments. 
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Conclusion  
This study measured the distributional outcomes of an internationally financed adaptation 
project in the Alaotra-Mangoro region of Madagascar. Specifically, I examined the equity of 
project outcomes and whether benefits reached “particularly vulnerable” households as mandated 
by the Adaptation Fund. Drawing on findings from 63 interviews at the national level, I 
hypothesized that patronage influenced distribution of benefits to households in the project’s 
primary implementation sites. I used a multi-level model to analyze 599 household surveys and 
compare the political connectivity of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households.  
I found that project participation was strongly associated with household political 
connectivity, as measured by household and family members’ connections to formal and 
informal positions of power. This finding was robust across four different measures of 
participation. I concluded that it is likely that, despite the AF mandate, the project 
disproportionately benefited households already better positioned to adapt. This study provides 
quantitative support for what has previously only been theorized or qualitatively investigated: 
internationally financed adaptation can exacerbate structural inequality in targeted communities. 
Taken together with the national-level findings described in Chapter 2, this illustrates the risks of 
adaptation organizations’ apolitical approaches to intervention, particularly their inability to 
recognize informal institutions and power. 
This study also unpacked how informal power operated at two levels within project sites to 
shape access to benefits. In addition to patron-client relationships enabling elite capture, the 
uneven movement of knowledge and information through informal kinship networks also 
contributed to unequal access. These findings demonstrate the depth of structural inequality 
within these communities and the challenges that adaptation organizations face in democratizing 
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decision-making. I argue, however, that there may still be opportunities to advance equity even 
in highly inequitable environments. By focusing on positive outcomes – such as the broad access 
to and uptake of climate forecasting – adaptation scholars and practitioners can build on existing 
institutional arrangements to understand how these positive outcomes can contribute to making 
internationally financed adaptation more equitable. 
These findings do have limitations. Because the model used here is relational, not causal, the 
quantitative findings alone are insufficient to conclude that political connections played a direct 
role in influencing project participation and distribution of benefits. Considered in the context of 
qualitative findings from interviews and observations, however, the data strongly support a 
causal relationship. It is also important to note the inherent difficulties of measuring power. The 
political connectivity variable is a proxy: a snapshot of a given household’s connections at the 
time the survey was collected. Finally, it is important to note that almost all sampled households, 
including beneficiaries, are vulnerable by international standards: the majority have few assets, 
rely heavily on agriculture, and demonstrate low general and specific capacity to adapt. The 
conclusions drawn here speak to the relative vulnerability of these households, within project 
sites and within Madagascar.  
Providing international support to the most vulnerable communities, and the most vulnerable 
households and individuals within those communities, poses a tremendous challenge for 
international actors. There are no easy answers for how these actors should navigate structural 
inequality within countries and communities. A “good enough” approach offers a first step: 
identifying equitable outcomes and strengthening the institutions that enable them can advance 
equity in internationally financed adaptation short-term. But longer-term, adaptation 
organizations must also develop strategies for expanding out from “islands of effectiveness,” 
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deriving principles for success that can guide efforts to make broader systems more effective, 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation looked at informal power in international climate finance at three scales. At 
the global scale (Chapter 2), I examined the overall architecture of public climate finance, 
focusing on the ways in which it differs from development aid. I found that climate finance is 
grounded in new principles of restitution, country ownership, and the use of climate specific 
criteria in decision-making. As a result, I argued, spaces are emerging within this architecture for 
experimentation and risk-taking with new approaches to informal institutions in countries 
receiving international funding. In particular, shifts in decision-making power from donor 
countries to recipient countries offer opportunities to re-consider approaches suggested in the 
context of development aid. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I empirically investigated how informal institutions of clientelism and 
patronage shaped the equity of internationally financed adaptation projects targeted at the 
particularly vulnerable. At the national level (Chapter 3), I found that government decision-
makers in both Madagascar and Mauritius directed project benefits through informal channels 
and used project resources as part of broader efforts to build political power. Despite these 
similarities, the equity of project outcomes differed in each country. While outcomes in 
Mauritius were relatively equitable, outcomes in Madagascar were highly inequitable. I argued 
that these divergent outcomes can be explained by characteristics of each country’s institutional 
environment, especially the way that informal institutions interacted with formal mechanisms of 
accountability, and the alignment of incentives for government decision-makers. 
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At the sub-national level in Madagascar (Chapter 4), I investigated the distributional 
outcomes of the same internationally financed project in its primary intervention sites. Drawing 
on findings from the national level, I tested the hypothesis that households’ connections to the 
patronage structure of the state influenced access to project benefits. I found that project benefits 
were strongly associated with household political connectivity and concluded that the project 
likely disproportionately benefited households already better-positioned to adapt. I further 
argued that access to project benefits was influenced not only by connections to state patronage, 
but also the uneven movement of information and knowledge through informal community 
networks.  
Overall, the findings from Mauritius and Madagascar illustrate how informal power can 
influence internationally financed adaptation and that current apolitical approaches risk 
reinforcing inequality. New approaches are needed to ensure equity, especially in targeting 
funding to socially disadvantaged and politically marginalized groups. A paradigm shift in 
international modes of intervention is unlikely, however. Adaptation organizations have shown 
little willingness to challenge structural inequality, or to cede decision-making authority to local 
levels. Nor does democratizing decision-making offer a panacea, as decentralization has been 
shown to reinforce inequality in other contexts.  
This dissertation therefore focused on identifying opportunities for and approaches to 
advancing equity within current frameworks. In particular, I argue for a “good enough” approach 
that focuses on equitable outcomes as much as inequitable ones. Such an approach requires 
adaptation organizations to be attuned to different institutional forms and functions. It is 
necessarily contextual, requiring on-the-ground knowledge of sociopolitical dynamics that 
remain under-developed in many organizations. In Mauritius – and other countries where 
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informal institutions have been shown to contribute to equity – this approach might include 
increasing transparency of international interventions, partnering with domestic actors that can 
effectively mediate between formal and informal power, and recognizing the reality of trade-offs 
in government decision-making. In Madagascar – and other countries where informal institutions 
are unlikely to contribute to equity – this approach might entail identifying other opportunities 
(like democratizing information for adaptation through radio) and seeking to build on the 
institutions that enable them.  
Ultimately, a “good enough” approach must not only advance equity for adaptation with 
current frameworks but also contribute to broader efforts to transform inequitable systems. 
Identifying positive outcomes is just the first step for adaptation organizations. The second is to 
strengthen effective and equitable institutions, derive principles from what is working, and seek 
to expand out from “islands of effectiveness.” Current discussions about the need to 
fundamentally rethink modes of international intervention, in addition to being unrealistic, 
overlook how change is usually incremental, and how international actors can play a positive 
role in making systems more effective, accountable, and equitable long-term.  
Finally, this dissertation has shown that spaces are emerging within the overall architecture 
of climate finance to enable experimentation with these types of new approaches to informal 
power. Insights derived from such experimentation could feed back into global policymaking 
and generate a slower, but longer-term shift in international interventions. Taken together, these 
new spaces in the architecture and approaches in recipient countries, have the potential to 




Appendix A. Qualitative Evidence 
 
The tables in this appendix summarize the qualitative evidence supporting the “Findings and 
Analysis” of Chapter 3. In the left column of each table are evidentiary statements from the text. 
Supporting qualitative evidence – drawn from interviews, document analysis, participant 
observation, and external sources – is in the corresponding column on the right. Quotes provided 
in the text are expanded in the right column to provide additional context. Above each table are 
synthesis statements from the text. 
Names and identifying information are redacted to ensure the privacy of interviewees. When 
multiple quotes are attributed to a single interviewee, they are listed under one header. Some 
interviewees requested not to be recorded, others not to be quoted. I have noted this where it is 
the case. 
Table 5. Clientelism and Private Sector Interests in Mauritius 
Synthesis 
Clientelism and informal private sector lobbying both played roles in the Ministry of Environment’s 
selection of the AF project sites in Mauritius. Interviews also revealed that private sector interests 
influenced selection of a second project site. 
Text Source(s) 
The first site, Riviere des Galets, is 
a small fishing community on the 
island’s southern coast. A 2003 
government report on coastal 
erosion, which served as the basis 
for site selection, identified it as a 
high priority site for intervention. 
Document: A 2003 study of coastal erosion commissioned by the 
Ministry of Environment identified critical priority sites for 
intervention in Mauritius coastal zone. It gave Riviere des Galets 
a “high priority rating,” noting its “high exposure to southeast 
trade waves and southerly swell” (Baird, 2003, 4-28). The report 
also noted that the shore is lined with dwellings 15-20 meters 
from the embankment, protected by failed infrastructure” (Baird, 
2003, 4-31).  
 
AF Project Document: The project proposal cites the Baird 
report as the justification for site selection (Proposal for 
Mauritius, 2011, 7-11). 
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Periodic storm surges over-topped 
a failing sea wall, flooding homes 
and forcing inhabitants to evacuate 
to higher ground. 
Document: A 2011 report from the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) noted that Riviere des Galets has “high 
vulnerability to sea-level rise and storm surges. The village has 
been flooded numerous times in recent years” (Gemenne & 
Magnan, 2011, 37). Significant flooding events occurred in 
1987, 2001, 2004, and 2006.  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “You are in a community of, I 
think about, I think its 400 or 500 people in Riviere des Galets. 
It’s a fishing community. And they are right on the shoreline. 
They’ve had several storm surges they’ve survived through 
where they’ve had their homes inundated. Where they’ve had to 
evacuate to high ground.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “At RDG, the case was that just 
before they started writing the project, they had an event that 
happened where houses were flooded, where people would go on 
the radio and say they thought they were going to die.” 
Project actors indicated, however, 
that the main reason the Ministry of 
Environment selected the site was 
the widespread incidence of 
asbestos that needed to be 
addressed because of health 
implications.  
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “So, all of the houses were built 
with asbestos in Riviere des Galets. Literally, and it was kind of 
like in the past 20 years, they’ve realized people are dying from 
asbestosis. Yea, like while I was there, they were showing me, 
one of these women’s husbands was dying, like he was really 
coughing hard. Asbestosis. They are a critical problem with 
asbestosis there, and it was confirmed in the report. I am just 
going to say it. It’s my opinion that the government was much 
more concerned about the asbestosis, you know, this is…every 
house is built with it. It is a material of quite a few of these 
houses. When they have storm surges, or when they have a 
storm, pieces of asbestos break off. And then you know, these 
particles get into the food that they are growing and its spoiled. 
You’ve got children playing with asbestos. You know, they are 
making their own little cubby house, they are being children, 
literally playing with this stuff.” 
 “So my conclusion in doing the consultations there is that: 
asbestos homes were much more serious and imminent cause of 
human loss of life and health than a storm surge that might 
happen, as [redacted] said, the kind of storm surges you would 
see would happen every ten years. People recover from them. 
But of course, if you’ve got asbestos and you’re living in this 
asbestos environment, and continuing to live and not changing 
that, then you’ve got people dying of asbestosis.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Don’t get me wrong. There is 
climate. They are at risk of storm surges. They are at risk of 
losing their life if they do not evacuate during the storm surge. 
So they have their evacuation centers. Of course, it’s not pleasant 
to get your asbestos house flooded. I don’t think that anyone 
wants that. But the more imminent problem was the asbestos, 
and that agreement with the government that that land behind 
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Riviere des Galets was going to be given for this project to 
rebuild on.” 
Riviere des Galets includes a 
number of homes constructed as 
part of a state housing project 
known as Cité EDC. 
Document: A 2018 report from the Mauritian political party Lalit 
identified Riviere des Galets as one of 60 locations of EDC 
estates in Mauritius. It noted that though residents in many 
inland sites were eligible to have their land purchased by the 
Mauritian government, residents of EDC estates in coastal 
regions were not eligible (Lalit, 2018). 
 
Documents: The presence of EDC housing in Riviere des Galets 
is confimed by multiple news reports (Hérisson, 2011). One 
report refers to “77 families living in former working-class 
housing estates” (“Montée des Eaux - Riviére des Galets: 
Residents want to be relocated,” 2010). 
 
Document: A 2011 IOM report included interviews conducted 
among residents of Riviere des Galets. It noted that though most 
residents own their houses, they do not own their land but rather 
rent from the state (Gemenne & Magnan, 2011, 42).  
Built following a devastating 
cyclone and intended to 
temporarily house the most 
disadvantaged, many EDC houses 
were constructed with asbestos 
paneling (Hérisson, 2011; National 
Action Plan on Asbestos, 2002). 
Document: A 2018 report from the Mauritian political party Lalit 
stated that the Ministry of Housing built 60 housing estates, 
commonly known as “Site EDC.” It noted that the “houses made 
of asbestos panels were then leased to those who could not afford 
housing.” Lalit estimated that 2,850 houses with asbestos were 
still in place in Mauritius (Lalit, 2018).  
 
Document: “Between 1963 and 1991, the Mauritian Government 
in partnership with the British Government developed and 
constructed a new housing model called the EDC (European 
Development Community) houses in the southern part of 
Mauritius. The materials used to construct the EDC houses were 
mainly concrete slabs, iron sheet roofs, and asbestos panels: 
these houses were rented at a low cost to those who could not 
afford a house” (Ramsamy-Iranah et al., 2020, 7).  
As the AF project was under 
design, the government of 
Mauritius faced increasing pressure 
from opposition politicians and 
civil society organizations to 
replace the housing or relocate 
residents.  
Document: The independent Truth and Justice Commission, 
established in 2009, explored the impact of slavery and 
indentured servitude in Mauritius. It found that “certain housing 
estates (residences) have been constructed with asbestos, a 
substance known as a serious health hazard” (Truth & Justice 
Commission, 2011, 419). The Commission recommended that 
“these houses should be pulled down on a phase to phase basis 
and other units constructed with proper material” (Truth & 
Justice Commission, 2011, 12). 
 
Document: A 2011 article in Mauritius’ primary newspaper, 
L’Express, noted the increasing pressure on the government to 
address asbestos housing, including calls from the opposition 
party and the Moderator for the Committee for the Banning of 
Asbestos (Hérisson, 2011).  
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Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Of course, in a more innocent 
time, people didn’t know what this did. But we now know. And 
we now know that, you know, thankfully Mauritius does have 
standards. It’s, you know, it’s trying to improve themselves. So 
they know that they’ve got to give these people new homes. Full 
stop. It’s dangerous for them to be living where they are.” 
Local politicians promised 
relocation for residents of Riviere 
des Galets before the AF project 
began.  
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “It was a headache because there 
were numerous arguments, I have heard, and the third party of 
consultants came up with a serious recommendation, best 
practice, cost effective solutions. But no, the decision [to 
relocate] has already been made and they went against that. It 
wasn’t in their interest and they were risking a blow to their own 
budget.”  
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “Clients not knowing what they 
want is still something for Riviere des Galets. The thing about 
relocation, that was something else. Because when we started the 
project, people already knew that, okay, we have the opportunity 
to get relocated. Then we had to tell them: no, this has not been 
decided yet. It is still being investigated, these kinds of things. 
There were things which was a little difficult, that when we went 
into the field, we saw the difficulties…They were already 
building up an expectation that they were getting a house, plot of 
land, and compensation. We had to tell them that: no, still not the 
case, we are investigating.”  
The government had already 
reached an agreement with a 
nearby sugar plantation, the largest 
land owner in southern Mauritius, 
to provide a relocation site (Azor & 
Ramoo, 2019). The estate would 
“donate” the land, likely in 
exchange for tax breaks on a real 
estate development. As one 
consultant said: “nobody gives land 
that close to ocean for free.” 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “It’s like: does it trigger the 
safeguard? Yes? We really can’t do it with this project. Full stop. 
…And then having it used as a political tool, where for me, it’s 
still not clear whether those people would’ve had to have paid 
any kind of rent on that sugar plot that was given to, given for 
the project. And what were the…and nobody gives land that 
close to the ocean for free.” 
 “At the same time, the sugar industry is closing down in 
Mauritius. And behind Riviere des Galets, there is a sugar area. 
It’s like fields that was being marked. This was news to us when 
we arrived to Mauritius. They did not put this in the Terms of 
Reference. They just hid it. They just said: great, you’ve got the 
consultants. We didn’t know we were being used at the time by 
the government. But we were designing the, not a managed 
retreat, a resettlement. And it was, this is where the politics now 
come into play. So, this very influential family was willing to 
donate a plot, a very large area of land behind Riviere des Galets 
where there is sugar being grown at the moment. They were 
willing to donate the land to do the resettlement. And that’s what 
was told to us.” 
 “Because the numbers are fully there, you can see where our 
assumptions are, in terms of the feasibility. Of course the fact 
that you didn’t have to pay the land, made it much more feasible. 
Like, you know, the numbers were: wow. One of the caveats of 
this, and everyone would say: “no, no, no, it’s land, donated for 
free.” And you know better. You know better.” 
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Interview, Domestic Consultant: “Yes, we spoke of relocation in 
RDG and there was at some point talk about it. I never saw 
anything on paper and this was dealt with at the level of the 
Ministry. It was like one of the sugar estates would be providing 
land for the inhabitants. But eventually the land did not come, 
like it was never officialized.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “With the southern one, Riviere 
des Galets, there were a lot of preconceived ideas of what should 
be done there. Partly because it was a squatters colony. With our 
agreement from the agency, we were supposed to be looking at 
what is the best thing to do. But we were being told, straight 
away, that those people had to move off there, straight away.” 
 
Interview, Mauritian Civil Society: “The government would not 
acquire land. The government would negotiate with the sugar 
estates and get a plot of land from them…These guys, what they 
want to do is convert these agricultural lands into residential land 
and normally this conversion of the land is supposed to be taxed. 
So there is a land transfer duty tax – duty, they call it. I think 
these guys negotiate with the government and they don’t pay the 
land transfer duty. And the counter part of this too, normally the 
private sector will give land for the government for social 
development and other things. The land which was valued, say 
for example, 10,000 dollars. They sell it at maybe a number of 
times its actual value. So the value of the land just appreciated by 
10 times the actual price.” 
 “So what these guys do, they call it morecllement in Mauritius. 
They partition the land into smaller parts. The land to middle 
income families. Very small plots as compared to the land that is 
being sold to other people. So it is only a small portion of that 
land and recently they had started to create what we call “smart 
cities.” So smart cities, with a commercial zone, residential zone, 
and other facilities. These smart cities obviously got an 
investment scheme. So people would develop these smart cities 
and they would not pay any tax. So again, they would give 
government a portion of that land for social purpose. It is quite 
controversial. There are some benefits, obviously. It brings 
development. Obviously, when foreign investment is decreasing 
over the years, you have people within the people investing. 
Obviously, that is a good thing. But on the other hand, when you 
see that as people we pay tax directly, so whatever we earn we 
pay. And these guys, they develop but they don’t pay any taxes 
on these “smart cities.” And mostly, these lands, as I said, they 
sell these lands for maybe 10 times, 20 times the real price of 
land.” 
 
Document: A 2016 news report indicated that the residents 
Riviere des Galets were soon to be evacuated to land that 
“belongs to the Saint Felix Sugar Company” and that “the 
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Ministry has taken steps to acquire this plot” (“Des Habitants de 
Riviére des Galets Seront Évacué,” 2016). 
 
Despite the fact that the 2003 
report recommended upgraded 
coastal protection works, the 
government established an 
expectation for relocation, both 
among the community and the 
consulting team contracted to 
recommend a course of action. As 
one domestic consultant described, 
the residents believed they would 
get “a house, a plot of land, and 
compensation.” 
Document: The 2003 report on coastal erosion recommended 
“coastal protection works” to replace the failing infrastructure in 
Riviere des Galets (Baird, 2003, 4-31). 
 
Interview, Resident of Riviere des Galets: “They said they are 
relocating us to a government land, probably a sugarcane estate 
around here.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “Clients not knowing what they 
want is still something for Riviere des Galets. The thing about 
relocation, that was something else. Because when we started the 
project, people already knew that, okay, we have the opportunity 
to get relocated. Then we had to tell them: no, this has not been 
decided yet. It is still being investigated, these kinds of things. 
There were things which was a little difficult, that when we went 
into the field, we saw the difficulties…They were already 
building up an expectation that they were getting a house, plot of 
land, and compensation. We had to tell them that: no, still not the 
case, we are investigating.”  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “It was a headache because there 
were numerous arguments, I have heard, and the third party of 
consultants came up with a serious recommendation, best 
practice, cost effective solutions. But no, the decision [to 
relocate] has already been made and they went against that. It 
wasn’t in their interest and they were risking a blow to their own 
budget.”  
The Terms of Reference for the 
project required that a “managed 
retreat” be evaluated among the 
options. Several members of the 
consulting team noted that the main 
challenge the community faced was 
not storm surge but asbestos and 
resulting incidences of “lung 
diseases.” 
AF Project Document: “The option for managed retreat 
(relocation of the vulnerable communities) at Riviere des Galets 
site shall be explored among other adaptation measures. The 
costing of relocation of community and other recommended 
adaptation measures shall be worked out.” (UNDP, 2014, 30). 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “Many of the houses were built 
in the 1960s. There was a project in the 1960s for some housing 
projects and those projects would make low cost houses for low 
income people. There were, in those houses which date back in 
the 1960s, asbestos, even though we signed a convention on 
asbestos. People are still living in houses made with it. Nothing 
has been done, even though we mentioned it a couple of times in 
the meeting. You know they have parents, children, and some of 
them would be having some kind of lung diseases.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “The government was much more 
concerned about the asbestos.. [Relocation] is what the 
government wanted, and it was because of the asbestos in the 
homes. They wanted to promise. And, of course, you have the 
local politicians saying: if you vote for me, we will give you a 
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new home and it is going to be in the sugar plot area. So, you are 
very close to where you were, and we are going to call it 
“managed retreat.”  
The consulting team rejected 
relocation as an option, arguing 
that it triggered UNDP and 
Adaptation Fund social safeguards. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Now you’ve got this new piece 
of land behind you. This is not so much as a managed retreat as it 
is a resettlement. And at that point, I rang up the UNDP, I said: 
guys, I have actually done a lot of work on social safeguards and 
resettlement before. On hydropower and forests, great ones for 
that. I said: this is not the right mechanism. This is not the right 
fund to do this with.” 
“Now this was, this is when our consulting team and the 
government of Mauritius got into a massive…this is where the 
project kind of faltered. And it was politically driven. And that’s 
why I give you the background of the sugar guys and the 
asbestosis. Because I had to call the UNDP and say, your social 
safeguards are now triggered. Full stop. You have to take action, 
you know.” 
“So to be clear, to be absolutely clear, this part of the project is a 
very good example of how you can politicize climate finance. 
And I take my hat off to the UNDP. They have the safeguards, 
they do have the safeguards that puts the stops on things and say: 
slow down a bit. We’ve got some triggers going on here, so what 
does that mean for us? That’s why we have safeguards.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Our position was, well let’s 
continue to look at what the situation is and what’s the best way 
to do it…right now I am working on a couple of projects in the 
Pacific, one of them is in Tonga, and we are looking at ten and 
thirty years planning horizons, we know that we have to move 
there. They live less than a meter above mean sea level. So we 
are looking at buying land. And that is something we found 
there: at the bare minimum, even if you’re going very, very fast, 
to move a whole village is going to take at least a decade. 
Finding your land, getting your infrastructure, and all the rest of 
that. So that is why in the end, it came back to that: what is best 
way or approach? There’s overtopping and coastal hazard. How 
is it going to get worse with sea level rise? And that was where 
the continuing enlargement, there were already existing 
revetments, so enlarging those, that’s why we chose that.” 
Unlike Riviere des Galets, which is 
in the island’s less prosperous 
south, Mon Choisy is located in the 
prosperous and tourism-focused 
northwest. Though many project 
actors observed that the area 
experienced high rates of erosion, 
the 2003 government report did not 
identify it as a priority site. 
Document: The 2003 coastal erosion report identified Grand 
Baie as a priority site (Baird, 2003, 4-20). The report’s location 
map indicates that the assessed location is in the town’s harbor, 
distinct from the beach of Mon Choisy (Baird, 2003, 4-19). 
 
Mon Choisy was, however, an 
important area for real estate 
development, particularly a large 
Document: Mon Choisy Property Development Limited received 
approval for modifications to the Pamplemousses – Rivière du 
Rempart District Council outline scheme in August 2011, 
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resort and golf course that broke 
ground soon after the AF project 
was initiated. 
enabling the development of an 18-hole golf course. It also 
received approval for the Parc de Mont Choisy Integrated Resort 
Scheme, which enabled the 1200 acre Mont Choisy Golf and 
Beach Estate (Limited, 2014). 
A number of project actors and 
civil society representatives 
highlighted the influence of private 
sector interests, particularly real 
estate, in shaping government 
policy. As one domestic consultant 
described: “The private sector, with 
their investment and their links into 
the government, has a major say on 
what happens on the coast and in 
terms of future development.” 
Another explained: “The cabinet 
has their arms twisted behind their 
back by the private sector.” 
 
Interview, Mauritian Civil Society: “Many of the decisions are 
taken in big boardrooms of corporations. If you look at the EIA 
[Environmental Impact Assessment], for example, if you look at 
the amendments brought to the EIA, they have been brought on 
the basis of challenging what has been done to the different 
projects that have been produced to the EIA. What I mean is that 
the corporations, when they find that their interests are being 
threatened, they take decisions and those decisions are somehow 
brought to the government for them to enact…policy decisions 
are made by, like I told you, they are taken in board rooms and 
then implemented by the different policymakers, Ministers or 
whoever. They are done to favor those corporations and those 
who believe in those kind of development models. I think it is 
important to say that question will be more about why it is so, 
and I think this is so because if we look at our elections, how our 
democracy is being corrupted by money. You just follow the 
money and you see what is the interest behind. And when you 
see the interest behind, then you understand why law is being 
amended and done to favor those who actually put money into 
our election at that period of time.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Another issue is the influence 
the private sector has on any development, any planning decision 
in the country. What that means for economies that are so reliant 
on tourism – regardless of the discussion about blue economy – 
you know tourism will have to be a major part of the plan. So the 
private sector with their investment and their links into 
government has a major say on what happens on the coast and in 
terms of future development. And I have noticed it with a 
number of meetings I had with stakeholders there. Basically, 
from NGOs’ perspective, they say they will do anything they 
want. To the private sector, they say to the government: if we 
were not here then Mauritius would be a lot further behind. You 
know we need money. We provide so much money and so much 
employment. So, the private sector adds a whole dynamic to the 
whole equation. They are very influential to what happens.”  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “When you start to write 
sustainable development plans, you have to really know what 
their expected plans are. And that makes any of the plans so 
difficult to get changes, because you know you have to be able to 
influence the cabinet and the cabinet already have their arms 
twisted behind their back by the private sector.”  
 
Interview, Mauritian Civil Society: “What triggered everything, 
in fact, in Mauritius, was not coastal erosion. It was flooding. It 
was flash floods. So when they started to have flash floods and 
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people, you know, popping out and saying: look, you know, we 
are having problems now. People just died in the tunnel, over 
here. Then people, the government started to wake up…Let’s put 
it like this. The coastal zone is important, but it is still on 
flooding, linked to climate change. So they put a lot of money in 
funding adaptation and then, and they create a kind of emergency 
funding which they can apply directly to the Prime Minister’s 
office…And on top of that the Minister of Environment has put, 
I think, 100 million rupees to cater for coastal erosion. Because 
people also started to complain slowly about coastal erosion. But 
the people complaining about coastal erosion are mainly people 
having private dwellings on the beach, campement owners as we 
call them in Mauritius, or hotels. People that normally have 
money. So are you going to prioritize flooding, which affects 
poor people, or are you going to prioritize beach erosion? The 
only thing is that the tourism sector, which is a pillar of our 
economy, is now threatened.” 
 
Interview, Mauritian Civil Society: “If we take the example of 
hotel building or beach grabbing. If you look at the tourists 
industry, it is designed to benefit mostly big resorts and hotels. 
We could have imagined for example a different kind of tourism 
industry: how do the people as a whole benefit from that 
industry? If we take the example of Rodrigues, which is not 
based on big resorts, but based on benefitting the people and the 
culture over there. It gives a different approach also in regards to 
our environmental and ecological environment. It is not based on 
beach grabbing. If you go to Rodrigues, the beaches are still 
accessible. The beaches are available for local and tourist, which 
is not the case here for Mauritius. If we take that standpoint, 
Mauritius is like our economy. Our so-called development is 
geared toward what the oligarch wants and this we can see in our 
approach to the issue of environment or ecology.”  
According to an international 
consultant, hotel interests played a 
significant role in steering site 
selection: “They are doing this 
property development, this golf 
course near Mon Choisy…a lot of 
money is going up there to develop 
the area, so let’s make it a nice 
beach.” 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “So that’s the reason why, at least 
from my…of course, they are doing this property development. 
Now I remember. They are doing this property development, the 
golf course near Mon Choisy. So, they were also looking at, you 
know, if it’s a place, again, a lot of money is going up there to 
develop the area, so let’s make it a nice beach. You’ve got to 
start somewhere, why not that one? If you can do that beach, it’s 
the hardest one, one of the difficult beaches to restore I think, 
with all of the things that had gone with the removal of the 
seagrass.” 
A UNDP official confirmed that 
Mon Choisy was selected for 
“tourist values.” 
Interview, UNDP Official: “Mon Choisy was about its tourist 
values. If it was lost it would have an impact on the local 
economy.”  
 
Interview, UNDP Official: “I remember that we also had this 




AF Project Document: “The coastal zone of ROM is critically 
important to the economy of the country, in terms of domestic 
and international tourism, as well as fisheries” (Proposal for 
Mauritius, 2011, 41).  
 
AF Project Document: “Mon Choisy is one of the top five beach 
destinations on the island of Mauritius” (UNDP, 2014, 28). 
Private interests also shaped project 
implementation. The Terms of 
Reference for the consulting team 
emphasized the importance of 
“preserv[ing] economic activities” 
linked to the beach. 
AF Project Document: “The proposed adaptation options for 
Mon Choisy should preserve the economic activities linked to 
the public beach” (UNDP, 2014, 8-9). 
 
AF Project Document: “The proposed adaptation options will 
have to cater for existing economic activities,” including 
“ongoing economic activities and nautical activities in the 
lagoon.” (UNDP, 2014, 1). 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “If we are to think about the 
political interests in Mon Choisy, to sum up. You have the hotels 
that were interested in what it would mean for them, especially 
regarding the sea grass and the boats in the lagoon….So there 
you go, you’ve got tourism interests, hotel interests, property 
development interests, fishermen interests, tourist interests, 
public beachgoers interests. And I think that the public 
beachgoer needs to be viewed very differently to a foreign 
tourist. They have a very different value and perception of their 
environment. So a tourist won’t care if the trees are removed. 
The public beachgoer will care if the trees are removed. Lots of 
different interests on this one, and you know it really brought to 
light how hard it is to restore a beach with so many pulling 
interests. You had a lot of opposition to the implementation of 
that project.”  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “In the north it was quite 
different. We did get some resistance from the political side on 
what should be done. Again, from our side, we just try to keep 
out of that. And, yea, go ahead with what we believe should be 
done.” 
The government rejected 
recommended measures – 
including an artificial reef that 
would extend above the ocean 
surface, the replanting of seagrass, 
and a reduction in motorized boat 
activity – that would reduce 
erosion but leave the beach less 
aesthetically appealing, especially 
to foreign tourists. 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “One thing was that for Mon 
Choisy, at first we designed a stretcher that will stop the erosion. 
Literally stop the erosion. So went on and we did our survey, 
modelling, and biological survey….We designed a stretcher that 
would stop the erosion on the beach. And when they had a look 
at the stretcher – it was a very big stretcher, which had to be 
massive to stop the waves and the current from coming in – they 
were a little bit shocked and not very happy it. That was their 
demand: to stop the stretcher….We had some various comments. 
One was like it was a runway for a plane. These kind of things. It 
had to be massive to stop that kind of waves, especially during a 
cyclone…It was not aesthetic for a lagoon at Mon Choisy.” 
 “For Mon Choisy, I am not too sure to what extent it is 
successful. Firstly, we did not get any kind of cyclone to 
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eventually see if the design has been effective and these kinds of 
things. One thing about the design is that, when we had proposed 
the design, we were also asked to modify the design so as to suit 
the project manager. This was some kind of issue like the heights 
of the reef walls. It is a certain height. If it was just slightly 
emerged out of the water, it would have been even more 
effective at times of cyclones, because of the higher water level. 
And it would have been easier to break the waves…So what 
happened was that in committees eventually we were told that 
they want this and this, this, this. They were the clients and we 
had to give them what they wanted, you see. And at the end of 
the day, there was some kind of modification during the 
implementation phase.” 
“It was for aesthetic reasons, navigation and all these things. 
Well, you see some rocks there. What’s wrong with that? When 
you think of how much more efficient it would have been 20-30 
centimeters higher up. It is really – it can be very much more 
efficient but they did not think of it that way. They probably 
wanted less efficiency but more aesthetic.” 
“What I would think was that the clients, the person advising the 
clients who were in the project, they also did not see the 
importance of a few details of the height of the borders. They did 
not see that kind of importance. They placed the importance on 
lots of other things, like they did not see the details like the 
height of the water. They did not see that kind of importance and 
placed the importance on other things such as beach aesthetic, 
beach navigation.”  
 
The government also warned the 
consulting team not to recommend 
the removal of private 
infrastructure that exacerbated 
erosion, for example cement berms 
installed by resorts under 
ambiguous legality. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “We’ve got to work with the real 
environment. And we were told by the government of Mauritius: 
we are not to remove or touch the shrine. There’s a shrine on the 
corner of the beach. It’s a Hindu shrine. So of course we respect. 
And then anything south of that shrine cannot be touched. You 
can’t, we can’t say, guys you need to remove those cement 
structures that are creating a different wave environment that will 
not lead to a full restoration of your environment.” 
 
Table 6. Institutionalized Patronage in Madagascar 
Synthesis 
To decision-makers in the Ministry of Environment, responding to the incentives of this institutional 
environment, AF funding represented an opportunity for patronage and profit. Throughout the seven-
year implementation of the AF project, the Ministry of Environment increasingly consolidated 
decision-making and financial power. 
Text Source(s) 
The Malagasy Ministry of 
Environment, like most branches 
of the government, is part of a 
broad system of state patronage in 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “We understand that the 
governance in the Ministry of Environment as a whole is very 
bad, very poor.” 
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Madagascar in which 
employment, contracts, and other 
perquisites are distributed based 
not on merit but on partisan 
connections. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “They try to orient as much of the 
money to their own interests, notably GEF [Global Environment 
Facility]. Which is kind of a fiasco, allow me to say, where the 
Ministry funds a number of bogus projects, through bogus NGOs, 
which are creations of people in the Ministry to siphon off 
money.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Civil Society: “We do know that there is a 
lot going on within the Ministry of Environment. Like, you know, 
giving permits for people who exploit the forest...This is not 
legal, as officially the Ministry of Mining has suspended all of 
these permits. But behind the woods they are still doing it, 
because of corruption. But once again no one will give evidence 
of this.” 
An unpublished 2018 report from 
the Committee for Protection of 
Integrity – an internal governance 
initiative – found that more than 
600 individuals collected a salary 
from the Ministry despite having 
neither offices nor portfolios. 
According to this report, around a 
third of all positions in the 
Ministry are sinecures. 
Government Document: The Committee’s report aimed to survey 
30% of the Ministry’s staff as an “initial inventory of 
governance.” The report noted: “The lack of staff control is one 
of the major problems identified. Available budget items are used 
without necessarily meeting the actual needs in terms of skill or 
number. The investigators found that the number of staff 
registered at the central level (source list produced by Human 
Resources Directorate) on sites visited, does not always coincide 
with the actual number of staff practicing.” The report 
recommended “standardized recruitment meeting the real needs 
in terms of skill and number,” as well as “the identification of 
[Ministry] staff to ensure attendance, and allocation.” (Rapport 
d’Enquete Tenant Lieu d’Etat Initial de la Gouvernance au Sien 
du Secteur Environnement, 2018) 
The report identified 1,869 Ministry staff. If approximately 600 
of these are without portfolio (see interview below), around one-
third of all positions are sinecures.  
 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “We understand that many 
people are working in the Ministry without any office, any job in 
fact. Six hundred people work in the Ministry without any office, 
job, function. They just take a salary…They have a list of persons 
in the Ministry and many directions, services, like that. Many 
people. And we asked: what do they do? Where are they? Can we 
see them. No, no. No office. They come in the morning: hello, 
hello. And they leave. That’s what the problem is. Not only in the 
Ministry of Environment. We saw that directly. We spoke to the 
responsable in human resources. And he explained himself, what 
is his situation. But we cannot understand how this is possible. 
Who decides?...Somebody makes a decision. Under the table. 
Friends, relatives come in, come in. Sign up. Take the money.” 
Following the 2009 political crisis, 
the government of Madagascar 
was, in the words of one 
international consultant, “resource 
starved.” Inter-ministerial 
competition over financial 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “One thing in Madagascar, I think, 
that is not the case in other countries I have worked in, is the 
extreme competition for resources. But this is due to the political 
transition, the sort of timing when we came in with that 
project…And I think that’s probably the case in all the countries 
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resources was fierce, and climate 
finance represented a novel and 
significant form of income. 
that have poor governance, that kind of competition and pressure 
is there.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Because of all the power 
struggles between different ministries and because, you know, the 
sudden influx of resources basically was a godsend, I think for 
ministries that had been weak.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “I mean, if you remember the 
context back in 2010, the donors had almost deserted the country. 
They were just beginning to come back maybe. Projects were 
really slow getting off the ground. There was not a lot of trust.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Civil Society: “For example, during this last 
coup in Madagascar in 2009: so from 2009-2013, there was no 
financing, no funding from abroad.” 
The AF proposal framed the 
project as “inter-sectoral:” a 
partnership across government 
ministries, agencies, and parastatal 
organizations. 
AF Project Document: “Agreements were concluded between the 
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, and a 
further set of Memoranda of Understanding were under 
development at the time of writing, for delivery of joint activities 
with [the] Water Directorate, Meteorological Services, Health. 
Informal agreements were also concluded with bilateral partners 
(World Bank, JICA, AFD) and ongoing projects (BV-Lac) on 
future collaboration (pending re-initiation of programming), 
particularly regarding joint implementation of watershed 
rehabilitation activities. Discussions with regional centers such as 
IRRI and World Vegetable Centers were also underway at the 
time of writing, and the World Vegetable Center had expressed 
formal interest in participating in the project.” (Proposal for 
Madagascar, 2011, 46-47). 
“Though [a] Memorandum of Understanding ratified between 
[the] Ministries of Agriculture and Environment during project 
preparation, the Ministry of Agriculture (MinAgri) will be 
entrusted with the technical coordination of the project and 
deployment of on-the-ground activities. Specific project activities 
will be delivered through sub-contracts with participating 
institutions, such as Ministries, NGOs, research institutions 
(particularly FOFIFA), and local organizations. Collaboration 
with FOFIFA, a key project partner, will be further formalized 
through a tri-partite MOU between MEF, FOFIFA, and 
MinAgri.” (Proposal for Madagascar, 2011, 56-57). 
As it unfolded, however, the 
Ministry of Environment stripped 
these other ministries and agencies 
of decision-making power, and in 
some cases of their roles entirely. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Regarding the process of 
development, what I know is that throughout project 
development, project implementation, I have heard so many times 
people saying that they were not involved, and other sectors, like 
agriculture, were not involved enough.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Civil Society: [requested not to be recorded] 
Funding given to the Ministry of Environment will not be given 
to others, even if they are better qualified or prepared to the meet 
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the goals of the funding. “If you have the solution, but I have to 
give you the money, then it is not a good solution.”  
 
AF Project Document: The project’s independent mid-term 
review noted a lack of inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral 
coordination, attributing the project’s “low level of achievement 
at year three” in part to “limited coordination between 
government institutions regarding the implementation of the 
project” (Palazy, 2016, 4). 
“There is a major gap in coordination between sectors and use of 
the expertise of governmental and non-governmental institutions, 
which is a barrier to the success and sustainability of the project” 
(Palazy, 2016, 43). 
“The involvement of other sectors to date has been very limited. 
Relevant institutions have not been sufficiently consulted during 
the project design to enable ownership of the project.”  
“Consultations with other institutions or projects is insufficient.” 
(Palazy, 2016, 50). 
For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which traditionally 
received a far larger share of 
international aid than that of 
Environment, retained only 
nominal involvement despite the 
project’s heavy agricultural focus 
(Adaptation Fund, 2018). 
AF Project Document: “Though [a] Memorandum of 
Understanding ratified between [the] Ministries of Agriculture 
and Environment during project preparation, the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MinAgri) will be entrusted with the technical 
coordination of the project and deployment of on-the-ground 
activities.” (Proposal for Madagascar, 2011, 55-56). 
 
AF Project Document: “Despite the MIRR [integrated rice 
resilience model] falling directly under the MAEP’s [Ministry of 
Agriculture’s] mandate, the MAEP was not sufficiently involved 
during the first years of the project” (TE, 102) 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “We said: it’s fine for the Ministry 
of Environment to lead and coordinate the project, but you need a 
partner who has agricultural expertise, particularly in terms of 
rice. So it as sort of back and forth argument that, you know, 
while this project may be housed in the Ministry of Environment, 
it still needed to have a strong agricultural partner. And at the 
time [project team member] did not get along with the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Or the Minster of Environment did not get along 
with the Minister of Agriculture, or something like that. So we 
went with FOFIFA, a neutral partner. And at the time FOFIFA 
also needed resources, so it worked well because they really 
needed money to start working on the project.” 
 
Several project actors also acknowledged that the project should 
have been housed in the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “It’s also a mistake to have this project 
housed in the Ministry of Environment, to a large extent, right? 
Because it is an agriculture project.” 
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Interview, Foreign Consultant: “So it turned out, which I think 
was an unfortunate choice, but it turned out this was designed as 
an agriculture adaptation project, but it was placed in the hands of 
the Ministry of Environment.” 
 
Interview, AF Project Team: “It should be assigned to the 
Ministry of Agriculture because the project is about planting rice, 
but fortunately we got it.” 
The International Rice Research 
Institute, which played a 
prominent role in the project’s 
original design, was removed 
entirely for what several UNEP 
officials and international 
consultants described as “political 
reasons.” 
AF Project Document: “The project will strengthen scientific and 
technical capacity to develop a model for Integrated Resilient 
Rice (or Modèle Intégré de Riziculture Résiliente – MIRR), 
working with experienced national partners in this field 
(FOFIFA) and international centers of rice expertise (IRRI and 
World Vegetable Center)…” (Proposal for Madagascar, 2011, 
11). 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “At the beginning we also wanted 
other organizations to be partners, active partners, like IRRI in 
particular. We really wanted IRRI to be involved because, you 
know, they have an office in Madagascar. And they have so much 
expertise and technical advice to give. And already were very 
active in terms of adaptation to climate change in the rice sector. 
And we launched negotiation after negotiation and we tried, we 
really really really really really really tried to get them on board 
as implementing partners. But it didn’t work out…An I think the 
problem wasn’t with IRRI. I think the problem was with the 
Ministry of Environment. And I think – you know, I didn’t delve 
deep into it because in the end it was just a waste of time to try to 
figure it out– it didn’t seem like they were interested. I think the 
Ministry of Environment didn’t seem like they were interested. I 
think it probably had to do with the fact that IRRI normally works 
with the Ministry of Agriculture. And so, you know, again the 
political rivalry and the relationship may have tainted the whole 
discussion. But they were willing, IRRI I mean. I remember.” 
 
The Meteorological Agency’s role 
was limited to a “formality,” 
according to a Meteorology 
official, installing weather 
stations, without a budget for 
either maintaining them or 
analyzing the data collected. 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “They did not value the 
training from the Met Office. Because they did not even know 
how to use [the station]. But in general, there is a need for a 
station so they just set one up. When you use it and once you 
suggested to do something, they refuse and insist that it’s not 
included in the budget.” 
 “Actually, there was no money set aside for the Met Office to 
install the station in Alaotra. Instead, they invited us, for example, 
we go on a mission to Ambatondrazaka to see the station.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “It is normal if it does not 
work, because there is no good coordination. That is, the fact 
there was no available data to the Met Office to be sent to the 
farmers at all…In fact, the AFRice project does not consider at all 
that the project requires the Met Office to conduct analysis to set 
up a station in Alaotra-Mangoro for the station to send updates on 
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the weather forecast to the farmers…In other words, it is just a 
formality to have the Met Office in there.” 
As an international consultant 
described: “The Ministry of 
Environment, traditionally very 
weak and traditionally resource-
poor, did not want to hand over 
any of the climate resources.” 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “I think that’s the source [of 
tension between the Ministries of Environment and Agriculture]. 
The main source is that by the time all the donors came back, the 
Ministry of Agriculture was the main recipient of all the 
funding…Within all the development flows, basically. And so, 
you know, the Ministry of Environment, traditionally very weak 
and traditionally resource-poor, did not want to hand over any of 
the climate resources. And it still doesn’t want to hand over any 
of the climate resources.” 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “It’s a problem you see often in these 
projects because the focal point that has to approve the projects is 
in the Ministry of Environment, because climate change is an 
environment issue. And then of course they want to get the 
money for internal use rather than giving it to other ministries.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Civil Society: “If we look for funding or 
projects somewhere else, the people in the Ministry of 
Environment are not happy thinking that the funding should not 
go to us but to them, that we should not benefit from that funding. 
That is an obstacle I should not be loud about.” 
As the Ministry of Environment 
stripped other ministries and 
agencies of their roles, the tasks 
were transferred to consultancies. 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “This project was about five 
million dollars, I guess. And among these five million almost 3.5 
million is just for consultancies.” 
 
Budget Analysis: This perspective is confirmed by budgetary 
analysis of annual project reports that shows that as much as 83% 
of the project budget was dedicated to consultancies and private 
contracts (see Annex H). According to a range of project 
documents, AFRice engaged at least forty consultants through 
private contracts. 
The gradual restructuring enabled 
actors within the Ministry to 
collect kickbacks on these 
contracts in several ways. First, 
through what one domestic 
consultant referred to as the 
“tuition and fee system,” actors 
within the Ministry could demand 
a portion of external consultancy 
fees. From a $70,000 contract, a 
consultant might pocket as little as 
$15,000. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “I remember at some point 
realizing that, you know, money that was supposed to go to one 
consultant went to one consultant and his 27 staff. It was like: 
you’re not supposed to do that, right? It’s just against the rules.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: [requested not to be recorded] 
Under a “tuition and fee” system, consultants were required to 
pay back a large portion of their salary to the project official who 
approved the contract. Reported that for a $70,000 consulting 
contract, the consultant would keep only $15,000, with the rest 
collected as kickbacks.  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Like we knew, for example, in 
terms of procurement there were kickbacks going on. We knew 
that, you know, for the longest time there wasn’t a clear process 
for procurement of goods and services. And when we finally set 
up some stuff, some procedures, we realized there were people in 
the procurement department who were getting kickbacks because, 
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you know, whatever. And then even the project team was having 
to pay some part of their salary.”  
Second, tasks originally intended 
to be completed by civil service 
employees in their official 
capacity were converted to private 
consultancies taken under their 
personal names. 
The agricultural extension agency, FOFIFA, secured a number of 
these contracts.  
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: [requested not to be recorded] 
The consultant stated that FOFIFA employees had received a 
number of private contracts originally intended to be completed 
in their official roles. The consultant said that FOFIFA “paid for a 
piece of the pie,” and was engaged in “business not research.” 
 
Observation: The researcher spoke directly with three FOFIFA 
employees who completed private contracts.  
Finally, members of the AF 
project team were subject to salary 
kickbacks. Members of the team, 
who were paid from AF funds, 
were required to pay part of each 
paycheck to their immediate 
director and part to the director 
above him or her. 
Interview, UNEP Official: “Many different things that are really 
not reflecting well on the government there. I can say about, in 
general, without going into details, there have been issues about 
salary kick-backs, we have heard about.” 
 
Interview, AFRice Official: “The first challenge I see is the 
institution itself. Because with such a project, the institution 
usually sees that the money belongs to them. But the money is of 
course for the country and its local population should be the 
beneficiaries. And that’s usually the challenge. The decision-
makers tend to ask for money from the project. Then you face a 
problem with the payment, because the procedure is that the 
national project director must sign for the payment. Then the 
CFO signs the other one. So there are two signatories. When you 
get to the CFO, you have a problem because they may threaten 
you when they want something.”  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Like we knew, for example, in 
terms of procurement there were kickbacks going on. We knew 
that, you know, for the longest time there wasn’t a clear process 
for procurement of goods and services. And when we finally set 
up some stuff, some procedures, we realized there were people in 
the procurement department who were getting kickbacks because, 
you know, whatever. And then even the project team was having 
to pay some part of their salary.” 
 “Definitely corruption and the whole thing that comes around it: 
fear. There is a lot of fear among people who work in the 
government in Madagascar…People are afraid of talking. They 
are afraid of saying what they think. They are afraid of losing 
their jobs from one day to the next. And it happens a lot, because 
there is a lot of political rotation up there.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: [requested not to be directly 
quoted] Staff of the project were required to cash their paychecks 
and deliver one-third to their Director and another one-third to 
their Director’s Director. 
The AF project also invested in 
infrastructure in project sites, 
Interview, UNEP Official: “For the water infrastructure where 
there was, it was quite clear that there were, you know, pushes 
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enabling further patronage in the 
distribution of construction 
contracts. In the case of a number 
of large irrigation infrastructure 
contracts, a UNEP official 
acknowledged: “It was quite clear 
that there were, you know, pushes 
and pulls from very high up in the 
Ministry that were influencing that 
process.” The same official said 
the pressure could come from as 
high as the Minister of 
Environment. 
and pulls from very high up in the Ministry that were influencing 
that process. And we, you know, that was kind of good example 
where if we are able to do our work well we can intervene. And 
we did intervene. And the issue was rectified.” 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “We had the challenge with the water 
infrastructure procurement process. And it basically just delayed 
things so much. The fact that we had to kind of, we ended up 
rejecting the original process and restarting the procurement 
because it wasn’t conducted in a proper way. The selected service 
providers clearly weren’t selected for the right reasons.”  
 
AF Project Document: The report notes the procurement process 
for water infrastructure works experienced “major delays due to 
the need to address and rectify lack of transparency in the 
project” (5th Project Performance Report, 2017).  
 
AF Project Document: “The double signature system is intended 
to strengthen financial procedures against potential risks of 
corruption and favouritism when awarding contracts to external 
parties when awarding contracts to external parties, by adding a 
second layer of verification upon validation of payments. 
However, this system did not prevent such risks, as pressure was 
reportedly exerted onto the project team to select some 
contractors instead of others for no valid reasons (e.g., for 
construction of storage facility units)” (Bégat, 2020, 90). 
In one case, a contract for the 
construction of community 
granaries was initially awarded to 
several companies that had been 
created just days before and were 
all owned by a single individual. 
Interview, UNEP Official: “We also have specifically the issuing 
of one contract on the rice storage facilities…There was 
something going on in terms of the selection of that contractor 
that built those. Clearly they did not have, they didn’t…I saw the 
paperwork. They did not have any qualifications and it was on 
paper. It was like four different companies that were all created 
the day before, almost, they got ahold of the contract. And 
apparently owned by the same person. And you know, you know 
what I…and then they started building. I mean, they did build 
something right? But it turned out that they didn’t meet the 
specifications, things like insulation on the bottom, that was not 
there. Which meant that basically the rice would rot very quickly 
and it would not work at all…So we did manage to solve that I 
guess by catching it. And we tried to recover some of the funds. 
There is this guarantee thing with a private bank that the contract 
has to have. So you could recover some of the money, but we 
definitely have some losses there. And most disturbing was that 
the contract was awarded in the first place, right?” 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “There was a similar issue…with the 
storage facilities, so this kind of the post-harvest part of the rice 
production cycle…basically they did not perform, the selected 
contractors. I don’t know whether that had anything to do with an 
improper procurement process, quite likely. But they basically 
had to, the work that they had started doing had actually advanced 
 160 
quite far on the storage facilities, basically they had to be taken 
down and re-started. So again, a big delay there.” 
 
Observation: The researcher visited all three communes during 
collection of survey data (see Chapter 4). Informants in each site 
confirmed that the initially constructed granaries were 
demolished and reconstructed.  
 
Table 7. Public versus Private Project Benefits (Mauritius) 
Synthesis 
The AF projects in Mauritius and Madagascar differed significantly in the nature of the benefits each 
government chose to distribute, especially within project sites. The two cases also differed in the 
concentration of project resources, both financial and technical. 
Text Source(s) 
In Mauritius, all benefits were 
collective. The AF project 
prioritized coastal infrastructure – 
including revetments and artificial 
reefs, mangrove plantations, and 
refuge centers – that benefited 
entire communities. 
AF Project Document: “The programme structure, with 
approximately 82% on coastal protection measures; 11% on 
enabling environment (early warning, policy mainstreaming, 
training) and 7% on knowledge dissemination and management is 
believed to be the most effective and balanced way of realigning 
and initiating the coastal adaptation process in ROM, with a 
priority given to actual interventions that reduce coastal 
vulnerability” (Proposal for Mauritius, 2011, 6). 
The project also developed an 
Early Warning System for storm 
surges that covered the whole 
island of Mauritius, as well as the 
remote outer islands of Rodrigues 
and Agalega. 
AF Project Document: “Given the previous experiences with 
storm surges on the south coast (with wave velocities of 50 
km/hour), a warning circumference around each island of ROM 
will be defined, such that coastal communities have at least three 
hours warning of possible incoming surges (so, incidence of 
abnormal waves through a circumference at least 150-200 km 
from the coast (for each of Mauritius, Rodrigues, and Agalega)).” 
(Proposal for Mauritius, 2011, 14). 
 
Document: A report on the final early warning system notes that 
“coastal communities in Mauritius, Rodrigues, and Agalega 
Islands are able to evacuate timely and safely in case of predicted 
extreme water levels” (Bogaard et al., 2016). 
 
Interview, Mauritius Government: “The model is an extensive 
one. It covers Mauritius, Rodrigues, and Agalega. Even for 
Agalega, we have all the same products that we have for 
Mauritius. And we – even in Rodrigues and Agalega – we have 
officers from our office who are posted there.”  
In contrast, in Mauritius, most 
project funding was dispersed to 
communities in the form of coastal 
infrastructure. 
AF Project Document: “The programme structure, with 
approximately 82% on coastal protection measures; 11% on 
enabling environment (early warning, policy mainstreaming, 
training) and 7% on knowledge dissemination and management is 
believed to be the most effective and balanced way of realigning 
and initiating the coastal adaptation process in ROM, with a 
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priority given to actual interventions that reduce coastal 
vulnerability” (Proposal for Mauritius, 2011, 6). 
The AF project collaborated and 
shared resources with other 
agencies. Instead of contracting 
out capacity-building trainings to 
consultants, they provided the 
funding to the University of 
Mauritius.  
AF Project Document: “The project team has spent considerable 
efforts in developing constructive working partnerships (involved 
in project oversight, inter sectorial technical committees, and 
those active in support of site-level implementation. Formal 
MoUs, the chosen protocol for partnerships have been signed 
with UoM, Met Services, NGOs including the fishermen’s and 
the women’s associations and Reef Conservation. Other 
engagements were evident and are observed by MTE with the 
University of Mauritius, the Metrological Service, the Marine 
Oceanographic Institute, Ministry of Environment and 
Sustainable Development, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, Ministry of Housing and Lands, Ministry of 
Fisheries and Rodrigues, Ministry of Public Infrastructure, Beach 
Authority, Ministry of Tourism and Leisure, Ministry of Local 
Government and Outer Islands, District Councils, Mauritius 
Oceanography Institute, Mauritius Meteorological Services, 
University of Mauritius, and relevant NGOs/CBOs (see below), 
including Reef Conservation and Shoal (Rodrigues)” (Hodge & 
Valaydon, 2015). 
 
Interview, Mauritius Government Official: “When I put that 
project and started capacity-building, [my colleagues] were very 
much interest because what I learned, they also learned the same 
things. Now, what they chose to retain, that is up to the person. 
But there is a lot – I involved a lot of them. In each and every 
step, I put them there. So right now, the operation, I don’t look at 
it. There are two guys and I told them: you are responsible.”  
 
Table 8. Public versus Private Project Benefits (Madagascar) 
Text Source(s) 
In contrast, in Madagascar, many 
of the project benefits were 
individualized. Households in 
Alaotra-Mangoro received 
valuable rice seed, seedlings, and 
agricultural tools on an individual 
basis. 
AF Project Documents: Review of the project’s six annual 
Project Performance Reviews (PPRs) and the Mid-Term Review 
indicated that the AFRice project distributed at least ten tons of 
rice seed, as well as non-rice seed and compost to households in 
Alaotra-Mangoro.  
 
Observation: While conducting household surveys, the researcher 
observed that households in Alaotra-Mangoro had received 
agricultural implements from the AFRice project, though there 
was no indication of this in project documents  
Most infrastructure, including 
investments in irrigation and 
reforestation, benefited only some 
within communities and contracts 
were structured to enable private 
kickbacks to Ministry officials. 
AF Project Documents: 4.1 kilometers of primary canal was 
cured and dredged in Manakambahiny. 5.3 kilometers of drain 
and 3.1 kilometers of canals were cured and dredged in Bemaitso. 
13.5 kilometers of primary canal were drained in 
Ambohijanahary (6th Project Performance Report, 2018).  
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Observation: While conducting household surveys in Alaotra-
Mangoro, researcher observed that only a small number of 
households in the targeted communes benefited directly from the 
AFRice project.  
 
For detailed information about kickbacks see Table 6. 
As described above, the project 
itself was also increasingly 
privatized within the government. 
Funding was highly centralized in 
Madagascar, with little of the 
budget reaching households in 
Alaotra-Mangoro. 
Described in detail under Table 6. 
Because project actors sought to 
retain decision-making and 
financial control, they avoided 
collaboration and information 
sharing with other agencies, not 
only within the government, but 
also externally. 
Malagasy Government: “As far as PCP-Riz in particular is 
concerned, there is no collaboration. The PCP-Riz is trying to 
figure out what AFRice is and what they can do to support them. 
But the PCP-Riz could not collaborate with anyone, and what 
happened was that people called PCP-Riz to know why we were 
not in Ambatondrazaka, why we did not get involved in certain 
activities and I simply answered that I know nothing about that.”  
 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “It is normal if it does not 
work, because there is no good coordination. That is, the fact 
there was no available data to the Met Office to be sent to the 
farmers at all…In fact, the AFRice project does not consider at 
all that the project requires the Met Office to conduct analysis to 
set up a station in Alaotra-Mangoro for the station to send 
updates on the weather forecast to the farmers…In other words, it 
is just a formality to have the Met Office in there.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: [requested not to be recorded] 
The Ministry of Environment and FOFIFA also refused to share 
financial resources with the Regional Directorate for the 
Environment, leading the local branch of the Ministry to play a 
minimal role in the project. 
A number of international 
organizations were active in 
Alaotra-Mangoro and a 
representative of one organization 
reported that the government 
rebuffed a proposal to collaborate. 
Foreign NGO/Civil Society: [requested not to be recorded] 
Reported that when the project began in Alaotra-Mangoro, they 
tried to approach to get involved and were rebuffed. Also said 
that the AFRice project made no efforts to coordinate with local 
partners active in the area, like AFD (which has invested 
significantly in a watershed approach), the World Bank, and 
JICA.  
 
Table 9. Vulnerability and Equity (Mauritius) 
Synthesis 
Mauritius and Madagascar face a similar range of climate hazards, but each government utilized 
different framings of vulnerability in rationalizing site selection. These frames contributed to the 
relative equity of project outcomes in each case. 
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Text Source(s) 
The government of Mauritius 
framed the AF project around 
public values, economic impacts, 
and “life or death situations.” 
AF Project Document: “The coastal zone of ROM is critically 
important to the economy of the country, in terms of domestic 
and international tourism, as well as fisheries” (Proposal for 
Mauritius, 2011, 4). 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “They are very exposed…in the 
month of June or July, you get really huge waves, which makes 
the place difficult to stay in. It can be really terrifying to stay 
there. You see your kitchen being flooded. So they are vulnerable 
because they wouldn’t have any other place, and they build their 
life around this. There were houses where the whole family 
starting from grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, 27 
of them were staying in 10 square meters of building.” 
Though it chose to focus the 
project in the coastal zone – the 
country’s “economic engine,” in 
the words of one UNDP official – 
project actors repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of 
reaching the most socially 
vulnerable. 
Interview, UNDP Official: [requested not be recorded] The 
Coastal zone as the “economic engine” of Mauritius recorded in 
researcher’s contemporaneous notes. 
 
Interview, UNDP Official: “This project on the south of the 
island, where the options were basically protecting the village. In 
this case, it was really poor people, really needing assistance. So 
protecting the village or moving the people, and getting the 
people to move.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “In Riviere des Galets, the 
livelihood and the life of the people at times, it was said that their 
lives were at stake. Because when you have very rough seas, the 
waves and the sea would come into their house. It will flood their 
houses and at times, it was said, that in some houses there was 50 
centimeters of water.”  
As a domestic consultant described 
the failed attempt to relocate the 
residents of Riviere des Galets: “It 
was mainly to save their lives. Not 
their livelihoods, but their lives.” 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “When we were at the initial 
stages in the meeting with the Ministry of Environment, it was 
mainly to save their lives. Not their livelihood, but their lives. At 
times it was such a terrifying moment for these people to live 
through storm surge or these events where there are surges 
coming or waves crashing in their house.” 
 
Document: “The objectives [sic] at Riviere des Galets is to 
protect the lives and livelihoods of the people” (UNDP, 2014, 
23). 
Mauritius’ unpublished National 
Coastal Zone Strategy found the 
coastline near Riviere des Galets 
and the project’s third site, Quatre 
Soeurs, to be among the island’s 
most socially vulnerable, as 
measured by education, income 
level, and land ownership.  
Document: The National Coastal Zone Strategy (as yet 
unpublished) created a coastal vulnerability index (CVI) that 
classified areas according to low, medium, and high risk. Social 
vulnerability (based on Relative Development Index) was one of 
four parameters used to calculate the CVI. The report identified 
both Riviere des Galets and Quatre Soeurs among the most 




AF Project Document: “80% of people in this zone [of Riviere 
des Galets] live below the poverty line” (TOR/Project Brief) 
 
Document: The IOM’s 2011 report noted that Petit Sable, which 
is in the Quatre Soeurs area, is “quite marginalized within 
Mauritius: transportation is difficult and government 
interventions are scarce” (Gemenne & Magnan, 2011, 42).  
Inhabitants of Riviere des Galets, 
predominantly Creole, are also 
among the most politically 
marginalized. 
Observation: The government of Mauritius does not does not 
publish data on ethnicity because of its political sensitivity. A 
research assistant confirmed the predominantly Creole make up 
of Riviere des Galets during several visits to conduct interviews.  
Though the third project site, Mon 
Choisy, is relatively prosperous 
and features influential hotels that 
target foreign tourists, its beach is 
also among a dwindling number 
that allow public access. 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “Well, when you look at the 
issue, in a general sense it is the same, it’s erosion. But then what 
is at stake is very different. Whereas in Riviere des Galets, you 
have a community of, we should say quite a poor community 
living there, or fisherman, people with very low income who live 
in Riviere des Galets. Whereas in Mon Choisy, it is more hotel, 
public beach, bungalows extending to the seaside.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Assessing that shoreline erosion, 
particularly in Mon Choisy beach. Because that is actually a high 
value beach. It is a public beach. And those public beaches are in 
short supply, because the hotel industry has really taken hold of a 
lot of the shoreline. So this is a very special beach in the sense 
that it’s a place where the public will definitely go on the 
weekend.”  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “It’s one of the highest value 
beaches in Mauritius in terms of public participation. You know, 
we did every week, every day, we were counting people on the 
beach. And it’s one of the most visited beaches by the general 
public because of the lagoon. It’s not one of those high wave 
environments. And it is a lovely…like, I see the charm of the 
beach. It does have a longer shore line if you go up the north of 
the beach, and it’s very pleasant up there. On the south side of the 
beach there is a lot of food vendors and the car park. And it does 
have parking. It’s got a lot of shade. So that was actually one of 
the big features that made this beach attractive for some of the 
beachgoers.” 
Members of the project team 
acknowledged an effort to balance 
public and private interests: “We 
really wanted to look at two 
different kinds of things. One 
where the local population is 
vulnerable. The second one where 
the hotels are there at the public 
beach.” 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “Here, I think we really wanted 
to look at two different kinds of things. One where the local 
population is vulnerable. The second one where the hotels are 
there at the public beach. I think that they wanted to get some 
kind of, to get a project to work on those so as to be used as a 
model and eventually replicate what has been proposed here.”  
 
Additionally, the focus on 
dispersed goods in project sites 
AF Project Document: The project’s final report notes that the 
project: planted 20,000 mangroves in Quatre Soeurs; completed a 
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spread benefits relatively equally 
within communities.  
1,000 square meter refuge center in Quatre Soeurs; constructed a 
rock revetment 430 meters long in Riviere des Galets; and 
installed 995 artificial reef units in Mon Choisy (Boolkah, 2021, 
2-3). 
In Mauritius, in contrast, 
collaboration and information 
sharing enabled capacity-building 
across government and non-
government agencies. A number of 
non-project actors noted that the 
government is already replicating 
project results in other sites. 
Interview, Mauritian Civil Society: “The government has put 
forward twelve projects around Mauritius. So Flic en Flac is in 
the pipeline. You have Blue Bay. You have twelve projects 
around Mauritius which 100 million rupees allocated for that this 
year. Next financial, they will get more money. So I think it’s 
around the island. But Mon Choisy is a really nice pilot project in 
terms of putting in [an] artificial reef, trying to re-boost the 
biodiversity.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “I think that they wanted to get 
some kind of- to get a project to work on those so as to be used as 
a model and eventually replicate what has been proposed here. So 
like in Grand Sable there were some Japanese expert (JICA) and 
Japanese Corporation National Agency who came and proposed 
some revetment as a mean to control erosion made up of gravel 
and on an experimental basis and the ministry did not even wait 
for a year to assess and started to replicating that kind of let’s say 
technology.” 
 
Interview, Mauritian Government: “So when I put that project 
and started capacity building, [my colleagues] were very much 
interested because what I learned, they also learned the same 
things. Now, what they chose to retain, that is up to the person. 
But there is a lot – I involved a lot of them. In each and every 
step, I put them there. So right now, the operation, I don’t look at 
it. There are two guys and I told them: you are responsible.”  
The University of Mauritius 
continues to offer some courses 
developed with project funding 
Observation: Research assistant confirmed ongoing courses with 
University of Mauritius administrative staff in April 2021.  
 
Most, though not all, project 
documents are publicly available 
and accessible.  
Observation: Researcher accessed the majority of project 
documents online. Documents can also be accessed at the 
Ministry of Environment library.  
 
Table 10. Vulnerability and Equity (Madagascar) 
Text Source(s) 
The government of Madagascar 
framed the AF project around 
economic value and agricultural 
productivity (Antilahy Herimpitia, 
2017; Proposal for Madagascar, 
2011). 
AF Project Document: “As a consequence of the economic 
importance of rice, as well as the large number of people involved 
in its cultivation and trade, it is possible to affirm that benefits of 
any rice productivity increase would be widely distributed and 
would directly enhance the well-being of rural households” 
(Proposal for Madagascar, 2011, 5). 
“The region is Madagascar’s principal rice growing region, with 
approximately 120,000 ha of paddies. It is home to the country’s 
most productive farms, with average yield per ha standing 25% 
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over the national average, or an average of 250,000 and 300,000 
tons annually – an average of 3.5 or 4 tons per hectare.” (Proposal 
for Madagascar, 2011, 13)  
“…identified by NAPA [National Adaptation Plan of Action] as 
one of the most vulnerable regions and a priority area for 
adaptation investment due to its relative importance in the 
country’s economy” (Proposal for Madagascar, 2011, 18). 
“Currently considered as most vulnerable to variability but also 
considered the highest productivity region in the country” 
(Proposal for Madagascar, 2011). 
Alaotra-Mangoro is less socially 
vulnerable than many other 
regions of Madagascar, with 
higher per capita income and 
employment levels (Borgerson et 
al., 2018; Sulla & D’Hoore, 
2014). 
Document: A 2014 report from the World Bank found Alaotra-
Mangoro to be the sixth wealthiest of Madagascar’s 22 regions, 
with a 51% poverty rate. By comparison, the poorest region, 
Atsimo Antsinanana, has a 97.7% poverty rates, which the authors 
note makes it “probably the poorest area so defined in the world” 
(Sulla & D’Hoore, 2014, 95). The report is based on the 
Madagascar Household Income and Expenditures Survey and 
relies on data from 2010, around the time the AFRice project was 
designed.  
Universally, project actors 
stressed the region’s importance 
as the country’s “breadbasket” 
and “first granary.” 
Interview, AF Project Team: “They are the first rice producer in 
Madagascar. That is to say, it is Madagascar’s rice granary when 
there was no climate change yet.” 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “That priority must come from some 
vulnerability assessment or priorities. And the identification of 
Alaotra is natural, I guess, if you’re looking at adaptation of rice 
in the sector, because that is the main rice producing region of 
Madagascar.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “Alaotra-Mangoro has more 
potential because at least if it’s going to be drier, or whatever, at 
least they can still do something...Alaotra-Mangoro is in fact 
important for us, I mean for Madagascar. Because it’s our, what’s 
it called? Rice basket.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “There you find the details that 
make Alaotra unique first, and I would like to note that it is also a 
rice granary. We are reputable for having so many varieties 
…Technologically and technically speaking, Alaotra is more 
advanced compared with the others due to the fact that it is a 
granary.”  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “The reason why they did it there 
was because at the time the guidelines for the Adaptation Fund 
were also that you needed to have a big impact. So if you’re going 
to do it in a place, if you were going to do something on rice, you 
were going to do it in the place where you had the biggest 
potential adaptation impact. Which was going to be Alaotra 
because it’s the place where there’s productivity. It’s the place the 
produces most of the country’s rice.” 
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In contrast, Malagasy 
policymakers, including AF 
project team members, 
characterized the southern regions 
– then facing drought, famine, and 
out-migration – as “always in 
crisis.” Some said they saw the 
distribution of state resources to 
the south as a “waste.” 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “Of course in the south there is 
a drought. But it’s like that: a drought. That’s the climate. The 
normal climate. So I am wondering if you shouldn’t put more 
money in helping those who can really, who still have their hard a 
little bit up so they can survive…There is no water. I mean, no, 
there is a lot of water down [underground]. Unless you take a lot 
of water from drilling, but that is different. And in climate change 
the driest place is going to get drier. It’s a waste of resources. We 
need to conserve the resources. So, for me, you need to put more, 
like what’s projected, into Alaotra-Mangoro, where we have some 
potential so we don’t go into the hole.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Civil Society: “Climate change has had some 
impacts in the south. There is drought. But if you look at the 
meteorological information, they are still receiving 300 mm of 
precipitation. Such precipitation would be no problem in a place 
like Morocco or Algeria. They receive as little as 100 to 200 mm. 
The issue is water management. Putting money towards climate 
change won’t work. Climate change is just a found diagnosis to 
the problem of water scarcity. The south is always in crisis.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “We should not use climate 
change as a reason to take action, because the land here [in the 
South] is already arid and dry in general. The rainy season is 
probably only four months out of twelve, so the weather is 
generally hot here. Climate change has probably accelerated, but 
we cannot put the blame on climate change as a reason for all the 
issues.” 
Unlike the project sites in 
Mauritius, Alaotra-Mangoro is a 
politically important region. The 
location of the AF project 
followed a pattern of political and 
ethnic patronage in the 
distribution of state resources. 
Interview, Foreign NGO: “[Alaotra] is to a certain extent a bread-
basket, but there are others which are high rice-producing regions. 
But it’s also a huge money maker for certain people, whether it’s 
the people who ensure the road isn’t maintained, or maintained 
only when their trucks are going through, to those who market the 
rice from there, to those who own the land.” 
Located in the highlands, Aloatra-
Mangoro is populated primarily 
by the Sihanaka ethnic group, 
which is among the groups that 
benefit from cultural and 
geographic proximity to the 
Merina. 
Survey Results: Household surveys found that 60% of 
respondents in communes targeted by AFRice identified as at 
least partially Sihanaka.  
At the time of project design, 
many in the region were 
disenchanted with the central 
government. 
Both elites and voters in Alaotra-Mangoro had strongly supported 
the former president, Ravalomanana, who was unlawfully 
removed from power in 2009.  
 
In an indication of the project’s 
political importance, the Prime 
Minister visited the launch 
workshop by helicopter, a level of 
Interview, UNEP Official: “When we launched the project, it was 
amazing the kind of attention that it got. It was almost used 
politically. So we had the, you know, it’s a relatively small 
project. It’s like five million, right? We were launching it in 
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political engagement that a UNEP 
official described as “completely 
unprecedented.” 
Alaotra, in Ambatondrazaka, the capital. And we actually had the 
acting Prime Minister at the time was flying out by helicopter to 
attend this little workshop which was with plastic chairs, fifty 
people, you know? And the Minister of Agriculture was there as 
well. And we had after the speeches and all that, we had like 
driving around with armored vehicles around the area to check out 
the sites. And he had photos taken. I think this was just prior to 
election that was supposed to be making the government 
official….But since then they haven’t paid attention, I think. It 
was just a stunt, a one-time stunt.”  
Furthermore, measurement of 
distributional outcomes in 
Alaotra-Mangoro found that 
project participation was strongly 
associated with higher levels of 
household political connectivity 
rather than vulnerability (see 
Chapter 3).  
Described in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
AF Project Document: “Generally, the project aims to support the 
livelihood of low-income farmers but does not distinguish 
between income levels among beneficiary groups.” (Bégat, 2020, 
102).  
In Madagascar, the privatization 
and concentration of resources 
within the Ministry of 
Environment also undermined 
capacity-building in other 
ministries and agencies, a primary 
project objective. 
Interview, UNEP Official: “This thing with having the [AFRice 
Team] report to Director, having him clear things. It has really 
meant that it has been really, really hard. I mean, pushing pushing 
pushing them to do things…In terms of just pure building capacity 
among people we work with directly, it was not super successful, 
I guess…the simple fact that we were probably in the wrong 
Ministry to begin with. So if you’re building capacity, you’re 
building it with the wrong people.”  
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “For one thing, these was no such 
thing as adaptation back then. We were all learning and sort of 
making it up as we went along, pretty much. So it wasn’t 
surprising that people who were working in government, in 
Environment Ministry, didn’t know what adaptation required. So 
that’s one aspect. The other aspect is, you know, is what I was 
referring to earlier, is the fear. So you’re in a job for one reason, 
and you’ve managed to hold on to it for so many years. You 
know, there is no learning taking place. You only go where your 
Ministry or your DG or your Director tells you to do. There is no, 
people who are at the working level don’t have any kind of 
freedom to pursue interest or learn or get trained and so on.” 
For example, the government 
mapping agency, FTM, was 
originally tasked with developing 
vulnerability maps. After an early 
workshop, however, the agency 
was removed from the project and 
the contract privatized. FTM – 
whose representatives said they 
never learned why they lost their 
role – still lacks the capacity to 
develop these maps. 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “We had a lot of meetings 
earlier at the beginning but FTM was not included as they actually 
implemented it. We do not know why. We really do not know 
what happened. We have no idea because no one contacted us, no 
one cared anymore as they carried on.” 
 
Interview, Malagasy Government: “I was there but when they 
implemented it we were not included. The truth is that the 
Ministry of Environment did not have the data itself at all. So it is 
impossible to do the mapping because we have literally nothing to 
be mapped.” 
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The skill is now privately held, 
and commodified by, a private 
consultant. 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “: I was an employee at FTM 
before I left. I come to FTM because I know there was something 
that they have established with FOFIFA about the project. I 
approached them to know what they have done about the map.” 
The focus on consultancies also 
inhibited the dissemination of 
information, including project 
results such as the resilient rice 
model. Many of the research 
documents the project claims to 
have produced are either publicly 
unavailable or non-existent. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “I think [capacity] remains very 
much at the localized level because of, for example, the last 
workshop I went to, which was the national MIRR [integrated rice 
resilience model] workshop in April, I still got some people, like 
in the national rice platform, who were super interested in the 
model. But basically they didn’t seem to know anything about it 
yet. Which was a bit shocking to me. I think there is still a major 
problem of communication between institutions and sharing 
results, information, despite all the efforts we have made of, you 
know, broadcasting documentaries at the local and national radio, 
and national TV…I still got some shocks during the last months 
of the project, being like: you don’t know about that?” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: [requested not to be recorded] 
Observed that many project reports “don’t exist.” They “only exist 
on paper.” 
 
Observation: Researcher was granted access to the AF project’s 
file sharing platform online. Most project documents were 
available neither through open public search nor through this 
platform, as of August 2021.  
 
Table 11. Recognition and Intervention of Oversight Agencies (Mauritius) 
Synthesis 
UNDP and UNEP were differently situated in their oversight roles in Mauritius and Madagascar. 
UNDP, Mauritius  
UNDP had an office in Mauritius 
that employed a largely Mauritian 
staff. Its long history in the country 
gave UNDP officials contextual 
knowledge of the sociopolitical 
dynamics. 
Document: The UNDP signed a Standard Basic Assistance 
Agreement with the Government of Mauritius in 1974 (“UNDP 
in Mauritius,” 2021). 
This knowledge enabled officials to 
specifically recognize how the 
“culture of clientelism” shaped 
project implementation and 
outcomes. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Whereas in Mauritius they really 
have this culture of clientelism. And it’s like: if your kind, then 
it’s…and that is what they are expecting from us as consultants. 
Well, we’re your clients so you should do what we say.” 
 
International staff and consultants 
pointed to the important mediating 
role that Mauritian staff played 
between the Mauritian government, 
UNDP, and consultants. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “[UNEP Official] was really 
stuck in the middle between when we didn’t go for this managed 
retreat. It was hard days for [him/her]…But I feel quite grateful. 
[S/he] supported our journey there, where we recommended rock 
revetment. And [s/he] was, you know, [s/he] was very good 
when [s/he] had to tell the government: actually the UNDP does 
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not have the means and the mechanisms to do a full managed 
retreat like this.” 
 
Interview, UNDP Official: [The Project Steering Committee] is 
for governance between UNDP, the government, and everybody 
else that’s critical, sectors like agriculture, local government in 
this case. On the other hand, you’ve got your technical group. So 
you’ve got to set up these two things and a lot of projects don’t. 
And the implementing agents that are supporting them don’t 
really provide a good guide. But [UNDP official] was working 
on this one. And [s/he] would be working with the government, 
hand holding, saying the things I would be saying on a daily 
basis, and probably coaching them on many things.”  
UNDP officials intervened when 
informal power threatened to 
undermine the project’s equity. For 
example, the UNDP rejected the 
relocation of the community in 
Riviere des Galets on the grounds 
that “this is not so much a managed 
retreat as a resettlement.” 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “This is where the project got 
very political very quickly. We were asked to look into what’s 
called a managed retreat. You’re familiar with managed retreat? 
Alright. At that point, and it was in the Terms of Reference. It’s 
like: alright, we can do a technical assessment on whether a 
managed retreat is possible. We are not property developers here. 
So, you know, we proposed technical assessments, that’s to 
determine this. But this is…at the end of the day this is a UN 
project. And the UN is not, and especially the UN Development 
Program, they don’t have the mechanisms to resettle people”  
They enforced the AF and UNDP’s 
social safeguards, citing divided 
support within the community, 
especially linked to the differences 
in wealth. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “And they wanted to know…and 
of course they were also building right in front of the shoreline. I 
mean we were going into construction zones. We went to every 
single house in Riviere des Galets and we saw that a lot of them 
were constructing. And the community was very split about 
whether they wanted to move or not, as a community. As a UN 
project the whole community would have to decide to move. If 
you do a managed retreat in a project like this, it’s not some opt 
in and some opt out. It’s, either you need this and this is the last 
line, or you’re gonna have your house inundated very very often 
in the near future, and in the long-term future.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “When we did the consultations, 
we had to ask everybody. What are your thoughts on 
participating in this managed retreat? If you did move out of 
your home, the government might provide you with a home that 
is very similar to the next door neighbors. You don’t get to 
design it yourself. It would have two bedrooms. It was a very 
standard house structure, that for those that were quite poor in 
the community, it looked very attractive. But for those who were 
quite well off, it was a big no no. It was like: guys, I have 
invested so much money into building my own house here. Why 
should I have to move?” 
 
Interview, Resident of Riviere des Galets: “They said they are 
relocating us to government land, probably a sugarcane estate 
around here. But when the representatives of the village are 
asking them about this, we are not getting a response. Sometimes 
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they say that the villagers themselves do not want to be 
relocated, which is true because it is hard to leave everything and 
go away. And the rise in the sea level do not affect them so 
much. But, on the other side, there are people who live closer to 
the sea who are very much affected by flooding and want to 
move. But the government are saying that they will relocated all 
of us or none at all, because they cannot just send a few of us to 
live there, because what will happen to the rest of the estate? 
They would be wasting precious land.” 
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “The location of the plot of land 
was not to the taste of the inhabitants [of Riviere des Galets]. At 
times they were saying it was too far. Some were saying that 
proposed land gets flooded during heavy rains. And the 
relocating would have been much more expensive in the sense 
that it is not only giving the people the plot of land, but also there 
would be the need to build houses. At the end of the day, the 
Ministry was so badly prepared with that idea that they did not 
have any kind of negotiation plan that they will try to negotiated 
with the inhabitants. So it never happened. They were like going 
there with nothing much planned, and when it came to 
compensation they did not think that the various households have 
different kind – I don’t know how to say it – economy. Some 
will be having a big house. Some a smaller house. How to make 
the difference between those. So the people did not buy that.” 
 
Interview, Mauritian Civil Society: “When you look at Riviere 
des Galets, people didn’t want to move. Government went to see 
them. And they say: okay, we are going to give you a portion of 
land inland. They say no, we want to stay here, it is our place, we 
want to stay here.” 
At the same time, UNDP officials 
tolerated trade-offs between public 
and private interests, as at Mon 
Choisy where the influence of local 
hotels prevailed. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “You have to pick your battles 
and you know that, if the ultimate aim was to get [the plan] 
through the cabinet, no matter how much you have to work to 
justify the numbers you do have to bend and you sadly have to 
adapt and tweak your methodology and your algorithms to fake 
it.”  
 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “Here, I think we really wanted 
to look at two different kinds of things. One where the local 
population is vulnerable. The second one where the hotels are 
there at the public beach. I think that they wanted to get some 
kind of, to get a project to work on those so as to be used as a 




Table 12. Recognition and Intervention of Oversight Agencies (Madagascar) 
Text Source(s) 
In contrast, UNEP was not well-
situated to mediate between 
informal power and formal 
governance requirements. Without 
an office in Madagascar, UNEP 
officials would usually visit for one 
or two short stints a year. 
AF Project Document: “…the absence of a UNEP country office 
did not help when specific engagement with the hierarchy of the 
MEDD was necessary to discuss financial and management 
issues. The UNEP TM, based in Washington DC, USA from 
2017 onwards, could not visit as often as they wanted, and Skype 
discussions cannot replace personal interaction.” (Bégat, 2020, 
101). 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “There were lots of issues, obviously, 
around corruption where, you know, to the best of our abilities 
we try to keep an eye on things, but we are not based there and 
we rely on the project team.” 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “I can tell you from experience that 
other implementing agencies interpret that balance differently 
from what UNEP does. UNDP, for example, has the country 
offices heavily involved in project execution even, you know. As 
I said it is not clearly defined politically how you are supposed to 
be interpreting it. In my view, this is actually more in line with 
the intentions. Because the way UNDP [does it], for example, is 
often almost bypassing the national government and keeping 
them out.” 
None of the officials or 
international consultants spoke 
Malagasy. 
Observation: Researcher spoke with all UNEP officials and 
foreign consultants and confirmed none spoke Malagasy, the 
primary language of Madagascar. 
Though UNEP officials recognized 
that informal power shaped project 
implementation, they were unable 
to diagnose the specific 
mechanisms or to understand the 
incentives of government actors. 
They acknowledged “procurement 
problems,” “corruption,” “improper 
influence,” and “political decision-
making,” but not patronage. 
Interview, UNEP Official: “We had some issues around the 
procurement, procurement processes.”  
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “So there were a lot of issues, 
obviously, around corruption where to the best of our abilities we 
try to keep an on things, but we are not based there and we rely 
on the project team.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “But I can tell you the way things 
worked in Madagascar back then involved a lot of corruption. 
And you know, even if you try to pretend it is not there, it was 
there and it stopped us from doing a whole bunch of things. Or it 
created a whole bunch of delays. And when we, you know me as 
an external consultants, and [redacted], as an international 
organization, we are not necessarily informed explicitly of those 
things but we knew they were there.” 
As a result, they intervened only in 
circumstances where violations of 
formal governance requirements 
would be visible on a global level, 
for example through audit reports. 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “So there is always that little 
clause in the project document that funding may stop if, when, 
whatever. I have never seen them do it. But, you know, in the 
case of Madagascar we had to have interventions from the 
[UNEP] senior management at some point. So they spoke to the 
Minister. There were letters exchanged, and things sort of 
 173 
seemed to get back to normal. But, you know, by that time it was 
probably too late. The damage was done.” 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “Our role as the implementing entity 
is that we have the accountability and fiduciary responsibility, 
vis-à-vis the Fund, in this case the Adaptation Fund. And we are 
the organization that passed the accreditation process for the 
Fund…So, for example, for this project my role has been really 
more higher level oversight, and you know, fund management 
aspects. You know working on progress reports with the team for 
submission to the Adaptation Fund, because they require yearly 
reports. You know, verifying what’s in the expenditure reports, 
processing cash advances, that sort of thing…We try to keep a 
particularly close eye on big procurement processes. We also 
rely quite a bit on audit reports. We get the quarterly expenditure 
reports that we review. So I am able to see that, you know, at 
least on paper the funds were used for the right activities, in line 
with the project. But then, you know, I am not, it’s not my role to 
go through every single voucher to make that what was in the 
expenditure reports is actually backed up by the voucher. That’s 
the job of the auditors. So that’s also another important kind of 
check and balance we do have in place.” 
 
Interview, UNEP Official: “For the water infrastructure where 
there was, it was quite clear that there were, you know, pushes 
and pulls from very high up in the Ministry that were influencing 
that process. And we, you know, that was kind of good example 
where if we are able to do our work well we can intervene. And 
we did intervene. And the issue was rectified.” 
In the case of the contract granted 
to newly created companies, UNEP 
officials insisted the below-
standards granaries be demolished 
and the contract re-issued. 
Interview, UNEP Official: “We also have specifically the issuing 
of one contract on the rice storage facilities…There was 
something going on in terms of the selection of that contractor 
that built those. Clearly they did not have, they didn’t…I saw the 
paperwork. They did not have any qualifications and it was on 
paper. It was like four different companies that were all created 
the day before, almost, they got ahold of the contract. And 
apparently owned by the same person. And you know, you know 
what I…and then they started building. I mean, they did build 
something right? But it turned out that they didn’t meet the 
specifications, things like insulation on the bottom, that was not 
there. Which meant that basically the rice would rot very quickly 
and it would not work at all…So we did manage to solve that I 
guess by catching it. And we tried to recover some of the funds. 
There is this guarantee thing with a private bank that the contract 
has to have. So you could recover some of the money, but we 
definitely have some losses there. And most disturbing was that 
the contract was awarded in the first place, right?” 
 
Interview, AF Project Team: “They used them for the 
foundation, or is that how you call it? At the base of the storage 
facilities. Its foundation. The bricks that are not of good quality 
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and stuffed with mud. But there had been some economic survey 
on the norm. How can the storage facilities adhere to the climate 
standards and against insect infestation due to moisture? But they 
did not comply so UNEP had to come to the site. It had to be 
completely destroyed. Actually, in that case, the deposit should 
be confiscated because the guarantor had a problem with the 
assigned job. But even the deposit was gone. So instead of using 
that money on something else, the project had to pay again to be 
able to complete the three storage facilities.” 
 
Observation: Researcher also visited the granaries in the three 
communes in Alaotra-Mangoro and confirmed from numerous 
local sources that they had been demolished and rebuilt during 
the course of the project.  
They did not intervene, however, in 
the more systemic manifestations 
of patronage, such as salary 
kickbacks. As an international 
consultant explained: “Because 
there was no way we were going to 
change that. And the only thing 
that was going to happen is that it 
was going to cost people their jobs, 
you know? For talking. There 
would be, there would definitely be 
les représailles, you know? So we 
didn’t pursue.” 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “And in the end, that’s why we 
didn’t do a more thorough intervention when we found out all 
the things about the corruption…Because there was no way we 
were going to change that. And the only thing that was going to 
happen is that it was going to cost people their jobs, you know? 
For talking. There would be, there would definitely be les 
représailles, you know? We didn’t pursue.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “Well, we had a really hard time 
navigating that. At the time when [name] took over – so that was 
after the midterm evaluation basically – was when things started 
getting a little but more explicit, that we knew something was 
happening that was not right. And we didn’t really know what to 
do. And in our case, we are only consultants. So the only thing 
that we can really do is relay the information and say, you know, 
we suspect there is a problem here. And it is really up to UNEP 
to decide what they want to do in term of risk managing the 
project.” 
 
Interview, Foreign Consultant: “UNEP never does direct 
disbursing, right? So most of the time they just hand over the 
funds to whatever Ministry is implementing the project and 
expect some kind of reporting back…And there are so many 
ways you can fake the books. I mean, reporting template are not, 
you know…how many reports did we get for that project? 
Maybe one. And even audit reports will say: yea, you know, you 
got invoices for everything you spent. But it doesn’t say that 
everything you spent you were supposed to spend.” 
Largely unable to steer the project 
towards more equitable outcomes, 
UNEP was, as a domestic 
consultant remarked, “trapped in 
this system too.” 
Interview, Domestic Consultant: “From UNEP I have heard that 
there is too much political pull inside the coordination of the 
project, that they can’t see clearly through what happened inside 
the department. From the department side, they are saying that 
UNEP is involved too much and micromanaging the project, but 
they have no flexibility to propose something better. I think the 
truth is in between.” 
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Interview, Foreign Consultant: “[You] can’t undo it. So you have 
to sort of change your reporting basically, to make sure that it is 
open and transparent, right? Because you’re still breaking the 
rules, essentially.” 
 
AF Project Document: “A potential perverse impact of strong 
country ownership could be that the transparency of procurement 
processes is not perceived as compelling a requirement as it 
would be if UNEP or the AF were more present in daily 
implementation” (Bégat, 2020, 104). 
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Appendix B. Sampling Design 
 
599 household surveys were collected from the AFRice project’s intervention sites in the 
Alaotra-Mangoro region. Officially, the project targeted three communes: Manakambahiny 
Andrefana, Ambohijanahary, and Bemaitso. Project documents indicate that about half of 
fokontany in each commune were selected to participate, with only a select number of 
households participating within each fokontany. Cluster sampling was used to identify a 
representative sample of three different subject groups in these communes: beneficiary 
households in beneficiary fokontany, non-beneficiary households in beneficiary fokontany, and 
non-beneficiary households in non-beneficiary fokontany. Because an exhaustive sampling frame 
(such as a list of households for each fokontany) did not exist, the next lowest aggregation of 
households, fokontany, was used to randomly identify clusters for surveying. 
In the first phase of sampling, a random number generator was used to select 12 clusters (4 of 
each subject group) in each commune for surveying. In the second phase, approximately 15 
households were selected within each cluster. The method of selection differed for beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary households. Because only a small portion of the households benefited, 
random sampling was not possible for beneficiary households. Instead the survey team relied on 
chiefs fokontany (local government officials) and tangalamena (village elders) to initially 
identify beneficiary households, then used snowball sampling to identify additional beneficiaries. 
This method may have introduced some bias to the sample, as local leaders may have identified 
wealthier or more politically connected households for surveying. For non-beneficiary 
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households, the survey team used the UNICEF “pencil spin” technique to randomly select 
households (Maxwell & Caldwell, 2008). Most fokontany had only one significant village, but in 
cases where there was more than one the team divided to survey households in both.  
The sampling design was made  more complex by the discovery, during preliminary site 
visits, that many of the project benefits intended for the commune of Bemaitso had been re-
directed to another fokontany (Ambatoharanana) in the neighboring commune of Andilamena. At 
that juncture, the survey team had neither the time nor resources to fully sample the entire 
commune (i.e., collect 12 clusters). Neglecting to include Andilamena, however, had the 
potential to bias the findings, particularly because local informants indicated that political 
connections played a role in redirecting the benefits. Therefore, three additional clusters were 
added to represent Andilamena: one each of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 
Ambatoharana, and one from a randomly selected non-beneficiary fokontany. 
































































Appendix C. Survey Development Focus Groups 
 
Six focus groups were conducted in the three official AFRice project implementation sites in 
Alaotra-Mangoro. In each commune, one focus group was held at the commune head and one at 
a more rural location, suggested by the mayor of each commune. The goal in selecting rural sites 
was to obtain a balance of perspectives. A total of 99 individuals participated. Participants were 
selected to facilitate broad representation from local officials, members of local management 
committees, heads of women’s groups, farmers, and livestock raisers. Though the gender balance 
of the total participants was roughly equal (47% women), the gender break-down varied by 
group. All participants consented to participate. 
Table 14. Focus Group Location, Date, and Composition 
 Commune Fokontany Participants Date 
1 Manakambahiny Manakambahiny 12 (4 women, 8 men) September 30, 2019 
2 Manakambahiny Manaratsandry 11 (5 women, 6 men) October 1, 2019 
3 Ambohijanahary Ambohijanahary 13 (5 women, 8 men) October 2, 2019 
4 Ambohijanahary Sodeca 24 (18 women, 6 men) October 3, 2019 
5 Bemaitso Bemaitso 14 (6 women, 8 men) October 4, 2019 
6 Bemaitso Ambodifamotsotra 25 (12 women, 13 men) October 5, 2019 
 
Topics discussed included: sources of household income, household assets, food security 




Appendix D. Short-Term Food Security Index 
 
Food security is a useful measure of vulnerability in this context because, though it is widespread 
across Madagascar, it also varies widely within communities (Harvey et al., 2014). A recent 
survey utilizing the CSI method found that 98% of households around Lac Alaotra experienced 
some food insecurity (Borgerson et al., 2018).24 During the “lean period” (December-March), 
40% of households lacked sufficient food. 27% of households lacked sufficient food for a six 
month period, and 5.5% lacked sufficient food year round.  
The food insecurity index was developed and weighted in focus groups following the Coping 
Strategies Index (CSI) method (Maxwell & Caldwell, 2008). The CSI is based on the possible 
answers to a single question: “What do you do when you don’t have adequate food, and don’t 
have money to buy food?” It focuses on measuring the frequency and severity of household 
coping behaviors in a specific local context according to four basic categories: dietary change, 
short-term measures to increase household food availability, short-term measures to decrease 
number of people to feed, and rationing. The higher the score, the higher the household’s 
insecurity. 
In the first step of the design process, contextually specific coping strategies were identified 
in focus groups interviews with community members in project sites in Alaotra-Mangoro (see 
 
 
24 The area around Lac Alaotra and the Alaotra-Mangoro region are not synonymous. Alaotra-Mangoro includes 
areas, such as the District of Andilamena, that do not directly border the lake.  
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Appendix C). A preliminary list was presented to participants, who added relevant strategies and 
removed strategies not used in that community (Table 15). The second step was to categorize and 
weight the strategies depending on how severe participants perceived them to be. Participants 
grouped individual coping behaviors according to similar levels of severity, from least severe to 
most severe, then assigned them a range of weights from one to four. Finally, the weights were 
averaged across all focus groups to generate a single weight for each strategy (Table 16 and 
Table 17). Conducting this exercise across a series of focus groups, with a balance of 
representatives, accounted for different strategies and levels of perceived severity across 
communities.  
As part of the household survey, respondents were asked to identify how many times in the 
past seven days they had relied on each individual coping behavior (0-7). The frequency of each 
behavior is weighted by the perceived severity of that behavior, and this is summed across all of 
the behaviors in the list to produce a single food security score for each household.  
Table 15. Coping Strategies Identified by Focus Groups 
A Eat smaller meals 
B Eat (rice) fewer times a day, for example just once or twice  
C Eat less preferred foods, for example cassava/maize instead of rice  
D Consume less variety of food  
E Purchase rice on credit  
F Take on rice debt 
G Supplement food with foraging/hunting in the forest  
H Receive/borrow food from family, friends, or neighbors  
I Borrow money from family, friends, or local organizations  
J Reduce money spent on education or health  
K Consume seed stock for next season  
L Skip a loan payment  
M Send children to eat with neighbors 
N Feed working members of household more 




Table 16. Focus Group Weighting of Coping Strategies 
Strategy Focus Group Ranking for Each Individual Behavior 
 
 FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 FG5 FG6 Avg. Rank 
a. Eat smaller meals 4 1 3 1 2 1 2 2 
b. Eat fewer times a day 2 3 4 3 3 2 2.8 3 
c. Eat less preferred foods 1 2 2 2 1 1 1.3 1 
d. Consume less variety of food 3 2 1 2 1 2 1.8 2 
e. Purchase rice on credit 4 1 4 4 4 4 3.5 4 
f. Take on rice debt - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
g. Supplement with 
foraging/hunting 
3 3 2 3 2 3 2.7 3 
h. Borrow money 2 4 3 4 4 4 3.5 4 
i. Borrow food 4 1 3 4 4 - 3.2 3 
j. Reduce spending on ed/health 4 3 - 3 3 4 3.4 3 
k. Consume seed stock 4 4 4 4 4 3 3.8 4 
l. Skip loan payment 4 - - 4 4 4 4 4 
m. Send children to eat with 
others 
- 4 - 1 3 4 3 3 
n. Feed workers more 3 - - - - 3 3 3 
o. Harvest crops early - 2 - - 1 1 1.3 1 
 
Severity Weights: 
Not severe (Tsy dia mafy) = 1 
Moderate (Antonina) = 2 
Severe (Mafy) = 3 
Very severe (Tena Mafy) = 4 
 
Table 17. Final Strategies and Weights 
Strategy Consensus 
Ranking 
Eat less preferred foods, for example cassava/maize instead of rice (Ahena ny fihinana 
sakafo tiana ho anina ohatra  mangahazo, katsaka no sakafona fa tsy vary) 
1 
Harvest crops early (Manoa vary aloha/ vary ririnina) 1 
Eat smaller meals (Misakafo kely) 2 
Consume less variety of food (Tsy mihinana karazantsakafo maro) 2 
Eat (rice) fewer times a day, for example just once or twice (Tsy dia misakafo matetika) 3 
Supplement food with foraging/hunting in the forest (Mitady sakafo fanampiny ohatra 
any anaty ala) 
3 
Receive/borrow food from family, friends, or neighbors (Mahazo na mitrosa sakafo avy 
amin’ny fianakaviana ‘ namana, na mpiray vodirindra) 
3 
Reduce money spent on education or health (Ahena ny fandaniambola amin’ny 
fianarana na fahasalamana) 
3 




Feed working members of household more (Izay miasa ihany no atao betsaka sakafo 
ambiliha) 
3 
Skip a loan payment (Tsy fandoavana ny trosa) 4 
Borrow money from family, friends, or local organizations (Mihindrambola amin’ny, 
fianakaviana, namana, na otive, sy toerana azo indramambola) 
4 
Purchase rice on credit (for example: OTIV/Secama) (Vary nalaina trosa, ohatra 
OTIV/Secama) 
4 
Take on rice debt (Atao “vary maintso”) 4 






Appendix E. Household Assets Index 
 
Household assets were calculated based on the value of a basket of household goods divided by 
the number of household members. This measure was not designed to be comprehensive, but 
rather to capture differences in wealth based on key assets. It also avoided potentially sensitive 
questions about income and savings. The basket was developed based on previous local surveys 
and refined by focus group feedback (Bellemare, 2009; Borgerson et al., 2018). The assets 
include both durable goods (e.g., flashlight, mobile phone, radio, bike, motorcycle) and the 
number of each type of livestock a household possesses (Table 18). A local collaborator 
determined the average value of each asset in Malagasy Ariary in 2019 based on market 
observation. The value in Ariary was converted to US dollars based on the average exchange rate 
in 2019: 3,805 Malagasy Ariary to $1. The final index is in US dollars to ease interpretation. 
Wealth indexes are often developed through Principle Component Analysis (PCA) 
(Hargreaves et al., 2007; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). Since data was collected on a range of 
other SES indicators (e.g. access to clean water), this technique was possible. The PCA, 
however, identified durable goods and livestock assets as explaining a large proportion of the 
variance, so only these two indicators were retained unweighted. Wealth measures based on 
assets do have drawbacks, including the risk of reflecting longer-term wealth rather than “short-
run or temporary interruptions, or shocks to the household” (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). In this 
case, the outcome of interest is not associated with the current resources available to the 
household, indicating that an index based on assets is appropriate.  
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Table 18. Value of Household Assets 
Value of Durable Goods  Value of Livestock Assets 
Shovel 40,000Ar $2.6  Cow 1 000,000Ar $264.38 
Plow 300,000Ar $79.3  Chicken  5,000Ar $1.3 
Small Tractor  8,000,000Ar $2115  Duck 10,000Ar $2.54 
Tractor 16,000,000Ar $4,230  Turkey 40,000Ar $10.58 
Clock 16,000Ar $2.6  Dove 5,000Ar $1.32 
Flashlight 5,000Ar $1.3  Pig 150,000Ar $39.66 
Mobile Phone 30,000Ar $7.9  Goat 60,000Ar $15.86 
Radio 40,000Ar $11  Sheep 80,000Ar $21.15 
Furniture 300,000Ar $79.3  Rabbit  6,000Ar $1.6 
Television  200,000Ar $52     
Satellite Dish 220,000Ar $58,16     
Solar Panel 160,000Ar $42.3     
Gun 5,000,000Ar $1321,88     
Bike 100,000Ar $26.4     
Ox-Cart 2,00,000Ar $525.6     
Moto 3,500,000Ar $925     




Appendix F. Political Connectivity Index 
 
The political connectivity index is calculated based on the number of political connections a 
household has and the level of those connections in the state hierarchy. I theorize that the 
distribution of AFRice benefits occurs at the interface of local kinship networks and the state 
patronage structure. The index is therefore intended to capture political connectivity specifically 
as it relates to accessing state resources at the local level, by calculating the extension of each 
household’s informal network and its connections to the state hierarchy. 
In the first step of developing the index, the survey captured the total number of household 
connections in four different dimensions: positions held directly by household members, 
positions held by extended family members of the household (havana), household members 
current positions on local management committees, and household members positions on 
management committees in the past five years (roughly the duration of the AFRice project in 
Alaotra-Mangoro). Household and extended family member connections to the following official 
government positions were captured: deputy, district head, local branch of national government, 
mayor, assistant mayor, mayor’s office, fokontany head, fokontany office, military, gendarme, 
national police, and teacher. Additionally, the following informal positions were captured: elder 
(tangalamena), doctor, pastor, and local police. Current and previous household connections 
were captured to the following local management committees: agriculture, environment, fishing, 
water, seed certification, rice storage, education, rice collectors, women, youth, and political.  
In the second step, connections of household and extended family members were consolidated 
into different levels of the state hierarchy (Table 19). Security forces were consolidated into a 
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separate level because they often transcend these boundaries. The number of connections of each 
household was summed at each level for both household members, extended family members, 
and committee connections. In the final step, weights for each level were derived from a 
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) and used to calculate a single connectivity score ( 
Table 20). Greater weight is thus attributed to levels that account for higher proportions of 
the variance in the data, not necessarily higher levels in the state hierarchy. 
Table 19. Levels of Political Connection 
Level Positions 
National Deputy     
District District Head National Office    














   
Local Elder Teacher Doctor Pastor Local Police 
Committees Current     
Committees Previous     
 
Table 20. Principle Component Analysis Weights 
PCA   
House Family Level Positions 
N/A .043 National Deputy     
0.012 .186 District District Head National 
Office 
   





0.073 .828 Local Elder Teacher Doctor Pastor Local 
Police 




   
0.008 .408 Security 
Forces 
Military Gendarme National 
Police 
  
0.117 N/A Committees Current     
0.080 N/A Committees Previous     
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Appendix G. AFRice Benefits 
 
Several indices were developed to measure AFRice benefits. Participation Level estimates the 
level of a household’s direct participation in the project by summing the number of ways in 
which beneficiary households could have theoretically benefited. It captures the following 
tangible benefits, activities, and trainings.  
Table 21. Forms of Household Participation in AFRice 
Tangible Benefits Activities Trainings 
Adapted Rice Seed 
(“Madikatra”) 
Tree Nursery Integrated Rice Model 
(“MIRR”) 
Non-Rice Seed (e.g., vegetable) Tree Planting Compost Production and Use 
Compost Adapted Seed Field Tests Agroforestry 
Fruit Seedlings Seed Certification Livestock Management 
Non-Fruit Seedlings  Sustainable Land Management 
Agricultural Implements  Upland 
Agriculture/Stabilization 
(“Lavaka”) 
  Non-Rice Cultivation 
  Post-Harvest Storage 
  Water Management 
  Pest Management 
  Rice By-Product Use 
  Climate Change Risk 
 
Value of Direct Benefits estimates in US dollars the value of the benefits a household 
received from AFRice, based on an assumption of a minimum amount received and estimated 
value determined through market observation. Though the direct benefits are relatively small in 
US dollars, they nevertheless represent significant value in the context of low household incomes 
and assets. A local collaborator determined the average value of each asset in Malagasy Ariary in 
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2019 based on market observation. The value in Ariary was converted to US dollars based on the 
average exchange rate in 2019: 3,805 Malagasy Ariary to $1.  
Table 22. Estimated Value of Direct AFRice Benefits 
Benefit Minimum 
Received 
Estimated Value  Total Value  
 
Rice Seed  Assume 100 kilo 
(“Makalioka”) 







Assume 100 kilo 
(Corn) 




Compost  Assume 450 kilo 
(1/2 ton) 
 
7,000Ar/50 kilo sack*9 sacks = 
63,000Ar 
$16.6 
Fruit Seedling Assume 100 1,000Ar/fruit seedling * 100 
seedlings = 100,000Ar 
$26.3 
Non-fruit Seedling Assume 100 500Ar/non-fruit seedling*100 
seedlings = 50,000Ar 
$13.1 
Pesticide Pump  Assume 1 75,000Ar $19.7 
Tree Planting Assume 10 days 2,500Ar/day*10 days = 25,000Ar $6.6 
Shovel Assume 1 40,000Ar $10.5 
Watering Can  Assume 1 7,500Ar $2 
Weeding Machine  Assume 1 30,000Ar $7.9 
Spade  Assume 1 10,000Ar $2.6 
Sickle  Assume 1 12,000Ar $3.2 
Sacks  Assume 10 1,200Ar/sack*10 sacks = 12,000Ar $3.2 
Agricultural 
Implements (Total) 




The Level of Indirect Benefits estimates the level of a household’s indirect participation in 
the project by summing the number of ways all households could have theoretically benefited 
from AFRice. It captured the following dispersed benefits from infrastructure upgrades and 
access to improved forms of agricultural knowledge. For each form of improved agricultural 
knowledge product it includes whether the household has heard of it and has a hard copy (if 
relevant). For weather forecasts, it captures whether households access forecasts via the 
newspapers, radio, or public announcement (tamtam).  
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Table 23. Forms of Indirect AFRice Benefits 
Upgraded Infrastructure Improved Knowledge Products 
Water infrastructure improved water access on 
agricultural land 
Integrated Rice Model (“MIRR”): heard, hard 
copy 
Reduced siltation on agricultural land downhill 
from reforestation sites 
Sustainable Land Management Guidelines: heard, 
hard copy 
Use of post-harvest storage facilities at commune 
head 
Agroforestry Guidelines: heard, hard copy 
 Vulnerability Maps: heard, hard copy 
 Crop Calendars: heard, hard copy 
 Weather Forecasts (Newspaper): heard, hard copy 
 Weather Forecasts (Radio): heard, hard copy 






Appendix H. AFRice Budget Committed to Consultancies and 
Private Contracts 
 
Calculations are based on annual Project Performance Reports (PPR) submitted to the 
Adaptation Fund and publicly accessible online. The financial data below represents anticipated 
costs not actual expenditures, but is nevertheless useful for estimating the proportion of the 
overall AFRice budget allocated to consultancies and private contracts. Consultancy estimates 
include budgets for workshops conducted by consultants. All estimates in US dollars. 
 
Table 24. Percentage of AFRice Budget Committed to Consultancies and Private Contracts 









% Private  % Consult. & 
Private 
PPR1 2013 887,798 190,000 1,903,038 46.65 09.98 56.63 
PPR2 2014 579,520 396,411 1,546,580 37.47 25.63 63.10 
PPR3 2015 795,264 600,000 1,902,177 41.81 31.54 73.35 
PPR4 2016 959,194 952,107 2,753,373 34.84 34.58 69.45 
PPR5 2017 926,300 875,120 2,153,903 43.01 40.63 83.64 




Appendix I. Household Characteristics 
 
Table 25. Descriptive Household Characteristics 
 Units Obs. Min Max Mean SD 
AFRice Beneficiary Y/N 599 0 1 0.33 0.47 
Size  # 596 1 15 4.83 1.96 
Household Head Age Years 597 18 110 45.22 13.93 
Household Head Education Years 598 0 16 6.19 3.44 
Born in Commune Y/N 594 0 1 0.64 0.48 
 
Ethnicity 
     Sihanaka 
     Nosimboahangy 
     Merina 
     Avaratra 
     Betsimisaraka 











    
Religion 
     Protestant 
     Catholic 
     Traditional 
     Lutheran 
     Other 
     None 







    
       
Socioeconomic Indicators       
Food Security Score Index 599 0 158 27.02 27.48 
Non-Livestock Assets  USD 592 1.3 9437.70 970.90 1502.62 
Livestock Assets USD 596 0 18420.30 540.10 1528.57 
Total Assets USD 592 1.3 21361.30 1514.40 2484.14 
Total Assets per Person USD 589 0.43 4914.03 328.47 527.03 
Access to Clean Water Y/N 596 0 1 0.75 0.43 
Distance to Water Walking 
Minutes 
597 0 60 6.73 10.17 
Distance to National Highway Walking 
Minutes 
595 0 1440 124.1 219.72 
Non-Wood Cooking Fuel Y/N 586 0 1 0.29 0.45 
Rice Stockage in House Y/N 596 0 1 0.81 0.39 
House Helper Y/N 596 0 1 0.14 0.35 
       
Land Ownership       
Owns Land Y/N 599 0 1 0.79 0.41 
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Total Land Owned Hectares 599 0 72.4 3.16 6.83 
Leases to Others Y/N 598 0 1 0.13 0.34 
Leases from Others Y/N 599 0 1 0.41 0.49 
Sharecrops to Others Y/N 599 0 1 0.17 0.37 
Sharecrops from Others Y/N 599 0 1 0.30 0.46 
Title Y/N 464 0 1 0.38 0.49 
       
 
Adaptive Capacity 
      
Livelihood Diversification Score Sum 599 1 10 4.3 1.7 
Specific Capacity Score Sum 599 0 8 2.04 1.78 
Coping Strategies Score Sum 599 0 8 2.02 1.56 
       
Household Political 
Connectivity 
      
Political Connectivity Score Index 595 0 7.32 2.35 1.67 
Household Connections Sum 597 0 5 0.52 0.82 
Extended Family Connections Sum 597 0 15 4.16 3.27 
Current Committee Connections Sum 599 0 5 0.34 0.79 
Previous Committee Connections Sum 599 0 5 0.21 0.60 
       
AFRice Benefits       
Level of Participation Index 599 0 21 2.49 4.63 
Value of Direct Benefits USD 599 0 211.20 27.88 52.71 
Level of Indirect Benefits Index 599 0 15 2.95 3.25 
Perceived Equity in Participation 
     Equitable 
     Inequitable 
     Not Sure 




    
Perceived Equity in Benefits 
     Equitable 
     Inequitable 
     Not Sure 




    
Heard of AFRice 
     Local Official 
     AFRice Representative 
     Friend 
     Family 
     Radio 
     Neighbor 
     Committee 
     Television 











    
AFRice Selection 
     Volunteer 
     Fokontany 
     AFRice Official 
     Mayor 







    
       
Weather Forecasting       
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Possess Radio Y/N 597 0 1 0.68 0.47 
Receive Radio Y/N 588 0 1 0.68 0.47 
Receive Forecasts Y/N 588 0 1 0.61 0.10 
Use Forecasts Y/N 588 0 1 0.48 0.50 
       
Village Characteristics       
Distance to Highway Minutes  
Walking 
599 5.3 855.0 125.14 191.22 
 
 
 
